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

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MEXICAN INDIAN POLICY IN NEW MEXICO

DANIEL TYLER

INDIAN POLICY REQUIRES, but does not always receive, precise definition. It can include the ideological principles of a nation's leaders; decrees, pronouncements, laws, and regulations at several levels of government; the execution of mandates by government employees (civil and military); and the actual treatment of Indians by frontiersmen whose sometimes prejudicial contact with Indians resulted in twisted historical verdicts belying the original intent of policy makers. The subject is further complicated by time and space, for what may be considered "policy" for one group of Indians in one part of the country during one decade might be irrelevant for others in different circumstances.

The intent of this essay, therefore, is to focus only on the nomadic Indians of the northern Mexican frontier, New Mexico in particular, and to determine if political and military authorities in Mexico followed a recognizable policy toward them in the 1821-1848 period. Since Mexico as a nation had proclaimed equality for all its inhabitants, the struggle between Indians and Mexicans in the frontier areas might have been significantly affected. What was the Indian policy that evolved?

This paper briefly reviews the Spanish background of Indian policy and the ideological debate that emerged in Mexico when the war for independence had succeeded and the leaders were faced with the challenge of incorporating revolutionary ideals in national policy. Most of the research, however, concentrates on the communication between Mexico's *Secretaría de Guerra y Marina* (the War Department) and the *comandancias* of Chihuahua and Santa Fe. Through this official correspondence

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Mexican authorities, from the president to the *Comandante Principal* in Santa Fe, articulated an Indian policy, revealed how it was affected by changing local and national circumstances, and proved in the long run that the Spaniards had established guidelines in Indian policy still worthy of implementation.

One must begin with the Spanish legacy. As of 1821 Spanish Indian policy for the northern frontier reflected the plans of the Marques de Rubí's *Dictamen* of 1768, the *Reglamento* of 1772, the Royal Order of 1779, and the *Instrucción* of 1786—the last named directive being a "synthesis of the policies of the past. . . ."[1] So serious was the problem of Indian devastation in the Borderlands area during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, that Spain had agreed to create a separate political jurisdiction, the *Provincias Internas*, under a military governor whose power was nearly equal to that of the viceroy of New Spain.

When Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez issued the *Instrucción* of 1786 to Comandante Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, he gave Spanish Indian policy the force of a royal ordinance that "remained fundamental policy throughout the remainder of the Spanish period."[2] In spelling out a procedure for dealing with the *indios barbaros*, Gálvez spoke from the personal experience of having fought the Apaches in Nueva Vizcaya. To him, this tribe, which more than any other had necessitated the creation of the *Provincias Internas*, was composed of superior warriors whose talents in war far surpassed those of the Spanish presidials. Moving quickly without encumbrances or excess paraphernalia, willing to suffer thirst and eating only *sabandijas* (reptiles and insects) on campaign, laughing and singing in the face of death, and patient enough to wait an entire month for the right moment to attack, the Apaches, according to Gálvez, were twice as effective in battle as the Spaniards.[3]

But he also viewed them with compassion and directed his troops to consider the broader Spanish objective of including these Indians as citizens of New Spain. Thus, the *Instrucción* of 1786 and subsequent pronouncements, conceived of a plan of both war and peace designed to impress the Indians with the might of Spanish arms but flexible enough to keep open the path to friendship when peace was genuinely sought. The Apaches were singled

out as the most troublesome. Commanders were encouraged to exploit divisions among them and the nations of the North, but were told that even "a bad peace . . . was better than a good war."[4] Trade with the "savages" was to be promoted but regulated; presents were to go to peaceful tribes; and both firearms and liquor were to be introduced among the Indians that they might become more dependent on Spanish manufacturers.

When the first demands for Mexican independence began to sweep across the northern frontier in 1810, Gálvez's policies were still in evidence. New Mexico under Juan Bautista de Anza had achieved, by then, a generation of peace with Comanches; Navajos had been wooed away from the Gila Apaches; and Utes, Comanches, and Navajo leaders had been urged to join in a war of revenge against the dreaded Apaches.[5]

According to Pedro Bautista Pino's report in 1812 to the Spanish Cortes, only the Apaches remained incorrigible. Navajos, he said, had become civilized through farming, Comanches were fulfilling the conditions of peace treaties, and the money-hungry Utes had come in for peace to improve their chances of good trade relations.[6] A *Fondo de Aliados* was established in the Santa Fe presidio "to supply gifts and rations to nomadic Indians who had made peace and to feed them whenever they appeared in Santa Fe for talks."[7] Indian allies (Pueblos and *genízaros*) participated in military campaigns as scouts, soldiers, and interpreters. Although divided on the muster rolls by race, "they proved formidable soldiers in battle . . . since they held little fear of the savage Plains tribes."[8]

Trade with the nomads was encouraged and regulated by license, but the westward penetration of Anglo-Americans began to demolish "the structure of alliances which an enlightened Spanish policy had built among the tribes surrounding New Mexico,"[9] and the suspicion was soon planted that Washington's objectives might include the interruption of trade arrangements, possession of land, and an alliance with the Plains Indians in a war against New Spain's northern frontier.[10] Since the center of Indian problems on this frontier had been Nueva Vizcaya and New Mexico in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the westward movement of Americans, combined with the struggle for independence in

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New Spain, presented serious challenges to the doctrines enunciated by Gálvez twenty-five years earlier.

Indications of a changed role for Indians were apparent in 1812. The constitution of that year was annulled by Ferdinand VII's return to the throne, but when it was proclaimed in Mexico on May 31, 1820, combined with the rebel Constitution of Apatzingán of 1814, "the Indian was restored to his position of equality with the white man."[11] Between 1810 and 1821 Hidalgo, Morelos, and Iturbide went on record favoring Indians,[12] and their plans and decrees made clear that a major change was taking place in the desired status of Mexican Indians.

The Plan of Iguala, February 24, 1821, specified that everyone —African, Indian, and European—was a citizen with equal rights to employment and protection from the government.[13] Six months later the Treaty of Córdova converted Mexico into a sovereign state and reaffirmed the same principles.[14] Although the Constitution of 1824 did not mention Indians directly, the Plan of Mexico of January 27, 1827, made clear that Indians were to enjoy the rights and privileges conceded to them, and in subsequent legislative acts defining Mexican citizenship, Indians were officially considered Mexicans with the same rights and responsibilities as any other race.[15]

Even the word "Indian" was supposed to be abolished on public and private documents. Congressional deputies proposed in 182[illegible] that "*indio*, in common acceptance as a term of opprobrium for a large portion of our citizens, be abolished from public usage."[16] In subsequent debates, congressional deputies referred to "*los llamados indios*"[17] or, in the case of Indian towns and land, "*indigene*" was acceptable.[18]

But the Chamber of Deputies was almost equally divided in its opinion on the matter of equality for the Indians.[19] Liberals wanted to eliminate the Indian problem by denying their political existence. They blamed the Spaniards for causing Indian poverty and they believed that by converting the Indians into legally free citizens, by abolishing ideas of "racial, caste, and class distinctions," they could rectify the harmfulness of Spain's paternalism.[20]

Those in opposition, the Conservatives and the Church, advocated a return to the colonial mission system. The dogma of equality, they argued, was "inapplicable to a heterogeneous society,"[21] and to the clergy, the very idea of a republic was repulsive.[22] As the years passed, the Conservative position grew stronger, not only because Indians refused to embrace their new freedom as the Liberals had predicted, but also because a policy of egalitarianism was difficult to endorse while Liberals espoused simultaneously a creole view of Mexican nationality.[23] So the Conservatives made political capital of the Liberal dilemma while Indian uprisings broke out across the nation from the Yucatán to the Yaqui Valley in Sonora.

By its indecision and preoccupation with other matters, Congress abandoned any pretense of leading the nation toward an innovative Indian policy. Each state was left to determine for itself how to incorporate Indians into the new Mexican society.[24] In New Mexico the decision making fell into the hands of an administrative arrangement established under the *Provincias Internas*. Chihuahua, New Mexico, Durango, Sinaloa, and Sonora came under the control of *Comandantes Especiales de Armas* who reported to the *Comandante General* at Chihuahua.[25] This arrangement was modified slightly in 1824 when New Mexico was at first included as part of the state of *Interno del Norte* and then designated a territory subject to the *Comandancia General* in Chihuahua.[26] Since the Congress did not immediately pass an organic law for the territories,[27] Indian affairs became the responsibility of the Chihuahua *Comandancia* and its subordinate *Comandancia Principal* in Santa Fe. Throughout the Mexican period, the execution of Indian policy in New Mexico was the primary responsibility of the governor or his military counterpart acting, for the most part, under the orders of the Chihuahua *Comandancia*. As a result of the tumultuous events in the mid-1830s, New Mexico was finally promoted to the rank of *Comandancia General* in 1839, and comments on Indian matters were exchanged directly with the *Secretaría de Guerra y Marina*. In 1845 this status was withdrawn.[28] Regardless of these minor adjustments, the fact remains that Indian policy was influenced by the national struggle between federalism and centralism and by the Hispanic sense of

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hierarchy which kept a line of communication open from the president to the *Comandante Principal* in New Mexico.

What were the ingredients of this policy? Prior to the revolutions in Texas, California, and New Mexico in the mid-1830s, and the centralization of political power in the hands of Antonio López de Santa Anna, Indian problems on the northern frontier were of relatively little concern to the government in Mexico City. Numerous documents support the contention that money, weapons, horses, and supplies were woefully inadequate to cope with nomadic Indians. Additionally, the militia law of 1826, which guaranteed New Mexico three presidial companies of cavalry plus two militia companies, was nothing more than a gesture of good intent appearing in the records of Congress.[29] Civil governors often hired the service of scalp hunters, when no other recourse was available, to strike some degree of terror into the hearts of the freely roaming, gregarious Indian tribes.[30]

New Mexicans were forced to recognize the central government's policy of benign neglect, and their attitudes toward the nomadic Indians reflected the fact that the Rio Grande communities had been on their own for a long time. Very little local sentiment favored the Liberal's egalitarian philosophy.[31] Surrounded by Apaches, Navajos, Utes, Comanches, and Kiowas, the territory had expended much of its energy in just holding on. The scars of past wounds, the vicious cycle of attack and revenge, and the determination of the Indians to profit from the Mexicans without being conquered by them were causes for suspicion on both sides. These roots were deep in the Spanish period. Non-Pueblo Indians, therefore, were "*gentiles*," "*naciones barbaras*," "*naciones errantes y sin residencia*," "*tribus barbaras del Norte*," "*indigenas*," "*salvajes*," and "*gandules*" (a word which meant "tramp," "bum," or "brave," depending on how it was used). They were not Mexican citizens as the Liberals had hoped they would become in 1824; they were not equal to the creoles, mestizos, and Pueblos; and they needed to be dealt with in such a way that they learned first and foremost to respect the arms of the Mexican nation.

Thus, the first criteria of Mexican Indian policy was to demonstrate a war-making capability that Indians would respect. Lack-

ing the military support they needed, New Mexicans were forced to adapt their situation to the general precepts of the Gálvez *Instrucción*. As they expanded to the west toward Cubero, incidents between Mexicans and Navajos increased dramatically. Heightened by slave raiding on both sides, the situation deteriorated into a constant state of war. The Mexicans could not win because they could not carry the offensive into Navajo country for a long enough period of time. Troops had to be paid, and fields and flocks needed attention. But Mexican authorities exploited the division they encountered among Navajos. "Friendlies" were offered coin, trade goods, and paid service in a Navajo company specifically detailed for war against their brethren, the "hostiles."[32] Most New Mexicans believed that Navajos did not deserve peace. Although a treaty had been signed in 1823, and seven others had been made between 1805 and 1846,[33] frequent treaty violations on both sides and the lingering distrust of foes who had warred against each other for generations made permanent peace impossible.

To the *Comandancia* in Chihuahua, Comanches were a far more serious problem than Navajos. Pressing southwest from the Plains toward the New Mexican settlements, these Indians infiltrated the entire northern frontier and forced Apaches into the laps of the Mexicans. The *Comandancia* urged local officials to remain neutral, to let Comanches and Apaches fight each other, and to suggest peace only as the occasion demanded.[34] Since the days of the *Provincias Internas*, Comanches had replaced Apaches as enemy number one. They raided so far into Mexican territory that, from the viewpoint of officials in Chihuahua, a peace was clearly warranted. One was signed in 1826. It included the delivery of medals and canes, the promise of an annuity to designated chiefs, and a Comanche agreement that they would not cross the Pecos River into Chihuahua or Coahuila without first seeking permission from the *Comandancia*. Comanches agreed to these terms and promised to include the Kiowas.[35]

But the fears of New Mexicans along the eastern fringe were only mildly assuaged. In a plea from the New Mexican territorial assembly to its delegate in Congress, the threat of Comanche-Kiowa invasion gave singular evidence of the real terror asso-

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ciated with Comanche activities from Abiquiu through Taos and south to El Paso.[36] By 1831 the *Comandancia* was forced to declare war on the Comanche nation. Citizens were implored to provide logistical support, arms, munitions, and horses required for an extended campaign.[37] As the war continued, small amounts of money and tax exemptions were available to those who fought the enemy.

By 1835 the *Comandancia* was sanguine about ending the Comanche war, but help from the Apaches was going to be required.[38] Although they had effectively separated New Mexico from the rest of the nation by seizing control of the area between Socorro and El Paso, exacting tolls from the few intrepid travelers,[39] Apache bands were seen as natural allies in the incessant war with Comanches. Occasionally, they, too, incited the Mexicans to arms against them, but in comparison to the frightful damage done by the western Apaches in Sonora,[40] Chihuahua and New Mexico fared rather well and viewed Apaches as useful allies.

Peace was established with a principal Apache *capitancillo* in 1835.[41] In communicating the news of this peace treaty to the central government, the *Comandante* in Chihuahua noted that "the Apaches up to now have not failed me nor have they caused me the least injury, because they know that I do not deceive them." In a similar spirit of friendship, the Apache leader, Juan José Compa, expressed his deep regret over past hostilities and urged the Mexicans to make additional peace treaties with their relatives, the Coyoteros and Mescaleros.[42] But the Mescaleros were the enemy. Mexicans were warned to distinguish between them and Indians who were peaceful.[43] A few years later, however, Gileño Apaches agreed to peace terms with all the Mexican states of the northern frontier. They promised to provide an accurate census, to wear white handkerchiefs on their heads, and to assist in wars against the Comanche even if other Apaches were among the enemy. They agreed to brand their animals, sell weapons only to those who were at peace with the Mexicans, deliver criminals to Mexican authorities, remain in one place until a home had been located for them, and ask permission when they wished to visit the Mescaleros.[44]

Clearly, the peace objective with the Apaches was consistent with Gálvez's orders to exploit the existing discord between

Apaches and the nations of the North. With Utes attacking Abiquiu and Taos, Pawnees intruding aggressively as far south as the Pueblo of San Juan,[45] and Comanches threatening the north and east, an alliance with Apaches was justifiable. A bad peace, said Gálvez, was better than a good war, and with this principle, the Chihuahua *Comandancia* was in full accord.[46]

Even more effective, however, than the war-peace policy was the continuation of the Spanish custom of gift giving. A *Fondo de Aliados* was established in Santa Fe with money provided from the national treasury (*Hacienda Publica*). These funds were used to buy vermillion, corn, mirrors, knives, bridle bits, buttons, scissors, bright cloth, and other gewgaws for delivery to the surrounding tribes. Strict accounts were kept in the military records of the Presidial Company of Santa Fe.[47] As in the Spanish period, the *Fondo* was intended to make the Indians hungry for Spanish food and goods. It was consistent with the objective introduced by Gálvez of making the Indians dependent on Hispanic civilization. In the Mexican period, the gifts were intended for all "naciones amigas,"[48] and these groups seem to have included, at one time or another, all the nomadic tribes that lived in or around New Mexico.

Another Spanish tactic had been the use of Indian allies. This policy the Mexicans also pursued. Apaches, as we have seen, were used against Comanches; Santa Clara, Taos, Isleta, Acoma and Laguna Indians were organized against Navajos.[49] Militia muster rolles were filled with Indians from other pueblos where the primary motive for siding with the Mexicans was to acquire the spoils of war and seek revenge for previous damages incurred at the hands of the *gentiles*.

In this way, New Mexicans maintained the status quo, since the principle of federalism and the Constitution of 1824 had essentially left the states and territories to deal with the Indians as best they could and with limited resources. What happened to Indian policy in the ten years preceding the Mexican War reflects the nation's increasing concern about the instability of the Borderlands area, a more aggressive attitude on the part of Texans and Santa Fe traders, and the political centralization of the government at the hands of President Santa Anna.

To begin with, New Mexico became a department in 1836 when

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Early 19th Century New Mexican Indian fighter. Courtesy of J. Cisneros and the Swallow Press Inc., Chicago.

Santa Anna abolished the Constitution of 1824. All departments were expected to take control of their finances and resolve Indian problems without relying on other government agencies.[50] A few years later, the military designation of *Comandancia Principal* was upgraded to *Comandancia General*, freeing New Mexico from its subservience to Chihuahua. Both politically and militarily, New Mexico was made directly responsible to the central government. Santa Fe approved this change, but the increased power also implied greater responsibility.

To alleviate money problems, New Mexico was authorized to receive revenue from the customs houses at Guaymas and Mazatlan. The income was to be used specifically in the pursuit of an enlightened Indian policy.[51] Monthly allocations of five thousand pesos were to enable New Mexicans to conduct their affairs with the Indians without having to dip deeply into their own pockets. Though this money was rarely delivered, it revealed a concern on the part of the central government which had been absent during the first ten years of Mexican rule. Additional decrees exempted New Mexico from forced loans to pay off the international debt to the United States while others authorized the taxation of distilleries, games, shops, and amusements for the purpose of raising additional funds.[52] In the hands of an unscrupulous governor, new revenue measures could have been an open invitation to corruption, but the record does not support the contention of some that Manuel Armijo was a petty crook who pocketed all the money for his personal gain.

After 1837, Armijo was the man of the hour. The Indian policy that evolved over the next few years was greatly influenced by his good reputation in Mexico City and his brand of frontier leadership. Governor of New Mexico from 1827 to 1829, and leader of the movement that quashed the uprising of 1837, Armijo again occupied the governor's office from 1837 to 1843 and from 1845 to 1846. Acknowledged as a talented Indian fighter,[53] he inherited a Navajo war that his predecessor had tried and failed to resolve with the largest force of militia and Indian auxiliaries ever sent against them.[54] Armijo taxed merchants and incoming caravans of angry Americans to raise money and continue the war.[55] In the opinion of Armijo, "the central government and his own depart-

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ment might force the wild tribes into a condition of dependency if war could be waged effectively for a long enough period of time.[56] To some extent his policy was vindicated with peace treaties in 1839, 1841, and 1844, but the battle with the Navajos was never completely won.

Other measures were necessary to control the nomads. Following the direction of earlier policymakers, Armijo continued the practice of gift-giving and regulating trade. He insisted that citizens remain on the frontier even when their homes were threatened,[57] and he organized the militia and Indian allies to police areas where contraband was supposedly entering the department. Even his land grant policies reflected a desire to settle the outlying areas as insurance against foreign invasion as well as a means to continue the commercial relations with Plains Indians which he deemed so important. He wanted that trade to be conducted openly with peaceful Indians, and he worked to eliminate the tradition of taking and selling slaves which had done so much to destroy amicable relations.[58] But traders like the Comancheros were hard to control, and when they had to compete with the guns and liquor of incoming Americans, trade regulation became almost impossible.

From the standpoint of the central government, New Mexico's Indian problems became increasingly worthy of attention during the 1840s. In a memorial to Congress, the *Secretaría de Guerra y Marina* described the abandoned condition of presidial companies along the northern frontier, the state of war existing since 1832 between Mexicans and Indians, and the terrible destruction of property. He noted that Comanches had penetrated to within four leagues of the capital of Durango, that Zacatecas was in a state of panic, and even San Luís Potosí had suffered attacks from the *indios barbaros*. Although peace had been achieved with the Gileños and Lipan Apaches as well as with Kiowas, the memorial made clear that other Apache bands, along with Comanche, Navajo, Yaqui, and Papago Indians, were in a state of rebellion from Sonora to Tamaulipas. Although Mexican citizens were doing everything in their power to respond to the situation, they were being victimized by the "ingrates from Texas" who encouraged the Indians to invade Mexican territory.[59]

The possibility of a Texas invasion, with or without the Indians, caused the central government to make a final, albeit subtle, modification in Indian policy. For the first time, the official correspondence began to speak directly of "extermination" and "destruction" of the Indians as a viable objective.[60] Communications from *Guerra y Marina* expressed presidential zeal for New Mexico's search and destroy missions, and these words of encouragement included several personal statements to Armijo that he continue to lead the defense of the territory against all foes just as he had during the revolution of 1837.[61] More arms, supplies, and money were ordered for New Mexico; auxiliary troops from other departments were attached to the Santa Fe presidio; and by 1846, the President had ordered the treasury to provide New Mexico with "all the resources available to the Supreme Government."[62] Thus, the primary concern of an Anglo-Saxon invasion resulted in a more aggressive approach toward New Mexico's Indian problems.

Indian policy had begun to merge with the nation's preoccupation with foreign invasion. New Mexico was urged to cooperate with Chihuahua and other departments in order to maximize the force available for retaliatory attacks. The number of soldiers available for duty in New Mexico increased to more than 200, and the *Compañía Activa de Chihuahua* became a visible indication that Santa Fe presidials were finally getting some help. Armijo obviously believed that cooperation with other departments was the new order of the day, and when the Texans appeared to be invading again in 1843, he urged Chihuahua, Durango, and Sonora to come to his aid.[63]

Military cooperation between departments, assignment of auxiliary troops to the northernmost presidio, more arms and munitions, and a more personalized relationship between the central government and Armijo—these were the ingredients of Mexican Indian policy on the eve of the war with the United States. Nothing had really changed from the days of Gálvez, but New Mexicans must have felt some satisfaction that at last their long struggle with the nomadic Indians was eliciting a response from Mexico City. They were careful not to cross the "Rio de Arcansa" while chasing Utes in 1845 because they respected the govern-

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ment's treaty agreements with the United States;[64] and when they heard that they might be swapped to the United States in a financial settlement involving U.S.-Mexican grievances, they protested vigorously and declared that they would rather become an independent nation: the *Republica Mexicana del Norte.*[65]

But for all their patriotism and pride as a Mexican community New Mexicans still faced an Indian problem that had worsened in the 1840s. The Navajo had joined forces with the Utes to attack outlying Mexican communities. They appeared to be raiding at will, extending their range of operation out onto the Plains where they interfered in the status quo existing between Comanches and other tribes.[66] Apache activity south of Socorro was so vigorous that this part of New Mexico came to be known as "la tierra afuera,"[67] while in the north the Utes became so infuriated by the continuing slavery expeditions of the Mexicans that they made an attack on the New Mexican governor in his own office. The situation had become so critical by 1845 that the *Comandante General* of Chihuahua proposed the establishment of a series of military colonies along the same lines Croix suggested in 1778.[68] All of the northern frontier was affected by this state of affairs causing soldiers to be diverted from the crisis with Texas and the United States to the Indian wars of the northern Borderlands.[69]

Even Armijo fell out of grace. The central government bitterly criticized him for not carrying out the laws and using the resources that had been made available to him.[70] Other Mexicans threw up their hands in frustration and praised Anglo-American Indian policy for its forthright approach to the primary issue of survival.[71] When the Americans conquered New Mexico, therefore, they found the same Indians unchastized and equally cynical of the new sovereign.

Clearly, the Mexican Indian policy had failed in New Mexico but not because the plan was radical or out of touch with reality. The strategems employed to maintain peace were essentially an echo of the Gálvez policies: gift giving, trade regulation, military campaigns with the support of Indian allies and militiamen, and peace treaties with tribes that showed a desire for friendship.

There also seems to have been some consciousness of the nation's goal of equality for all citizens, although the attitude of the New Mexicans in the Mexican period was much less sanguine

about integration than when Pedro Bautista Pino wrote his 1812 report to the Spanish Cortes.[72] In January 1825 the governor of New Mexico received a communication from a superior in Durango which pointed out that all inhabitants of the nation were Mexicans under the same government.[73] He was referring to the nomadic tribes, some of whom were friends of the government while others were enemies. At a later date, New Mexicans made clear that they considered the Pueblos to be good citizens along with those who served in the military. So, even though the ideological crusade of the Liberals in Mexico failed to take root in the Borderlands, there was some awareness of the national goal of uniting all races and peoples under one government.

Unfortunately, the enlightened objectives of the idealists failed to take root in New Mexico. The central government denied New Mexico the support it needed to woo the Indians successfully until it was too late. The sparse number of settlements, the agility and mobility of horsed Indians, and the inadequate military strength of the New Mexicans contributed to a situation in which the Indians managed to maintain the upper hand. Additionally, New Mexicans persisted in maintaining all kinds of local arrangements with Indians, some of which were based on mutual economic needs, with the result that almost any policy, be it national or provincial, was undermined by the perpetuation of private business practices.

Local New Mexican authorities tried to adapt to the specialized conditions of the frontier while keeping in mind the policies the central government dictated. Armijo's success, in fact, was largely due to his willingness to take matters into his hands and report what he had accomplished *ex post facto.* Since nothing succeeds like success, he earned the respect of the central government until the situation in Texas and the United States demonstrated that New Mexico was a weak appendage of the Mexican republic and vulnerable to attack.

But even Armijo, in his way, had followed the essential principles of the Gálvez Indian policy. He saw the connection between good trade relations and peace with the Indians, and his reputation as a battlefield commander served to rally the inhabitants of New Mexico when a call went out for volunteers to punish renegade Indians. If the Mexican Indian policy differed from that of

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the Spanish, the difference was one of degree. The northern Borderlands were far more turbulent between 1821 and 184 than they had been in the days of Gálvez, and the means for executing the policy were generally inadequate to cope with the disturbances caused by the arrival of North Americans. But the *policy* had changed little in seventy-five years. What remains to be studied are the measures that New Mexicans took, apart from government policy, which affected their relations with the Indians in day-to-day living.

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4. Moorhead, *Apache Frontier*, p. 125.
5. Alfred Barnaby Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1932), pp. 77, 82.
6. Pedro Bautista Pino, Antonio Barreiro, and José Agustín de Escudero, *Three New Mexico Chronicles: The Exposición of Don Pedro Bautista Pino 1812; the Ojeada of Lic. Antonio Barreiro 1832; and the additions by Don José Agustín de Escudero, 1849*, trans. H. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard (Albuquerque: The Quivira Society, 1942), pp. 132-35.
7. Marc Simmons, *Spanish Government in New Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 143.
8. Simmons, *Spanish Government*, p. 151.
9. Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, p. 83.
10. Pino, et al., *Chronicles*, p. 203, n370.
11. C. Alan Hutchinson, *Frontier Settlement in Mexican California: The Híjar-Padrés Colony, and Its Origins, 1769-1835* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 89-90; *Leyes Fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y Planes Revolucionarios Que Han Influido en la Organización Política de la Republica*, num. 13 del Boletín Compilador de Leyes Federales y del Distrito y Territorios (Mexico: Secretaría de Governación, July-August, 1923), p. 5.

12. C. Alan Hutchinson, "The Mexican Government and the Mission Indians of Upper California, 1821-1835," *The Americas* 21 (April 1965):340.
13. *Leyes Fundamentales*, p. 42.
14. The Treaty of Córdova, August 21, 1821, which created Mexico as a sovereign state, reaffirmed the same principles that were communicated to the governor of New Mexico by the Secretaría de Estado who urged that the Comanche and other "Nations of the North" maintain their friendship with the Mexicans and continue to trade with the rest of the empire. This was the wish of Agustín Iturbide who asked that his feelings be conveyed to the Indians as soon as possible. See *Mexican Archives of New Mexico* (MANM), State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe, N.M. Governor's Papers, 1822.
15. *Leyes Fundamentales*, Plan de Mexico, articulo 4°; and *Leyes Constitucionales*, articulo 1°, pp. 132, 180, 213.
16. Charles A. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 218.
17. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism*, p. 218.
18. Edward H. Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962), p. 334.
19. Hutchinson, *Frontier Settlement*, p. 170.
20. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism*, pp. 217, 222, 246.
21. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism*, p. 243.
22. Wilfrid Hardy Callott, *Church and State in Mexico, 1822-1857* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1926), p. 46.
23. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism*, p. 244.
24. Spicer summarizes the Mexican program for the Indians as threefold: full citizenship; political incorporation; distribution of land. See Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest*, pp. 334-36.
25. *Memoria*, Secretaría de Estado, read in Congress, November 7, 1823, Governor's Papers, 1823, MANM.
26. *Leyes Fundamentales*, pp. 113, 116, 117.
27. Hutchinson, *Frontier Settlement*, p. 174.
28. See Myra Ellen Jenkins, *Calendar of the Microfilm Edition of the Mexican Archives of New Mexico, 1821-1846* (Santa Fe: State Records Center and Archives, 1970), pp. 61, 73, 87, 113, 120, 129.
29. Letters between Santa Fe and Chihuahua make reference to the need for the militia companies and three presidial companies of cavalry as provided by the law of March 21, 1826. In Article 14 of a June 13, 1838, law, the groundwork was laid for creating two companies of *milicia activa*. See Governor's Papers, 1838, MANM.
30. Civilian governors contracted with scalp hunters when military officials were unable to defend the territory. Sonora, Chihuahua, and Durango, among others, purchased the services of men like James Kirker only to find that he sometimes killed and scalped indiscriminately. See Ralph A. Smith, "Indians in

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American-Mexican Relations Before the War of 1846," *Hispanic Americ* *Historical Review* 43 (February 1963):34-64. Suspicion of Kirker's deleter activities in New Mexico is found in Governor's Papers, 1836, MANM.

31. The situation in Sonora was different. There, half of the public lands w allocated to the Indians; mission lands were turned over to the state redistribution to the Indians; schools and tax benefits discussed in a serie 1828 laws, and the state constitution of 1825 entitled Indians to vote. See Pau Ezell, "Indians under the Law, Mexico, 1821-1847," *American Indigena* (July 1955):199-214.

32. Frank McNitt, *Navajo Wars* (Albuquerque: University of New Me Press, 1972), p. 67; Military Records, 1828, MANM.

33. McNitt, *Navajo Wars*, p. 88.

34. Gaspar de Ochoa to *Comandante Principal* of New Mexico, March 1825, Governor's Papers, 1825, MANM.

35. Copy of October 8, 1826, treaty with Comanches in Governor's Pap communications received from *Comandante General* in Chihuahua, 18 MANM.

36. Juan Estevan Pino to Manuel de Jesus Rada, November 24, 1829, co munications received from *Guerra y Marina*, Governor's Papers, 1829, MA (Pino Report).

37. *Orden General*, October 16, 1831, Chihuahua, *Comandante Princ* Papers, 1831, MANM.

38. José Calvo to *Gefe Político* of New Mexico, January 5, 1835, and Pri Circulars of May 18 and August 19, 1835, from Calvo, Governor's Papers, 18 MANM.

39. Lansing Bartlett Bloom, "New Mexico Under Mexican Administrat 1821-1846," *Old Santa Fe* I (July 1913):12, 13; Pino Report, Governor's Pap 1828, MANM.

40. Smith, "Indians in American-Mexican Relations," p. 54; and Spa *Cycles of Conquest*, p. 240.

41. Printed Circular, January 6, 1835, communications received from C *andante General* in Chihuahua, Governor's Papers, 1835, MANM. The rec do not make clear which Apache band this was.

42. Letters of Juan José Compa, January 6, 16, 1835, communications ceived from *Comandante General* in Chihuahua, Governor's Papers, 18 MANM.

43. José Joaquín Calvo to *Gefe Político* of New Mexico, April 13, 1836, co munications received from authorities within Mexico, Governor's Papers, 18 MANM.

44. José Joaquín Gutierrez, El Paso, August 25, 1838, to *Comand General*, communications received from *Comandante General*, Chihua Governor's Papers, 1838, MANM.

45. Simón Elias to Antonio Narbona, December 14, 1827, *Comandante Pr cipal* Papers, 1827, MANM.

46. Making treaties with the nomadic Indians was consistent with ea Spanish policies. These agreements reflected a wide range of problems with

rious tribes. With the Navajo, for example, treaties almost always included procedures for returning captives and stolen goods, rules for commercial ding, and subtle attempts by the Mexicans to reduce the Navajo through bap- m and Christian teachings. With the Apache, treaties underscored the im- tance of tribal location, the need to receive permission to move around, and a mise of aid against the Comanches. Although all the treaties of the Mexican od have not been studied carefully (a good subject for aspiring scholars), they ear to reflect the singularity of each tribe's specific relations with the Mex-

7. Military Records, 1827-1829, MANM.

8. Military Records, 1827-1829, MANM. See audit of *Fondo de Aliados*, 4, 1826.

9. Military Records, Donaciano Vigil Papers, 1836, MANM.

50. Ward Alan Minge, "Frontier Problems in New Mexico Preceding the Mex- War, 1840-1846" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1954), p. 105.

51. Minge, "Frontier Problems," p. 55.

52. Minge, "Frontier Problems," pp. 104, 105, 106-7, 192.

53. Minge, "Frontier Problems," p. 54.

54. McNitt, *Navajo Wars*, p. 77.

55. Minge, "Frontier Problems," pp. 22-23.

56. Minge, "Frontier Problems," p. 55.

57. Minge, "Frontier Problems," pp. 275, 283.

58. Minge, "Frontier Problems," pp. 51-75; McNitt, *Navajo Wars*, pp. 79, 84.

59. "Memoria del Ministerio de Guerra y Marina," communications received *Guerra y Marina*, Governor's Papers, 1841, MANM.

60. Even one of Mexico City's leading newspapers, *El Siglo*, devoted an entire to the northern Indian problems in 1842. See Hale, *Mexican Liberalism*, 235.

61. Miscellaneous, 1840, MANM; Governor's Papers, 1842, 1843, MANM.

62. Joaquín Castillo y Lanzas to *Gefe Político*, January 17, 1846, communica- received from Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Governor's Papers, MANM.

63. Armijo to D. Juan Archuleta, June 6, 1843, communications received by rnor and Comandante General from within New Mexico, Governor's , 1843, MANM.

64. D. Juan Archuleta to José María Chávez, June 19, 1845, Military Records, MANM.

65. Copy of a protest by citizens of New Mexico, the governor, etc. who fear Mexican government in its treaties might allow New Mexico to become the U.S. for a price, December 20, 1845, Miscellaneous, 1845, MANM.

66. McNitt, *Navajo Wars*, p. 89; Smith, "Indians in American-Mexican Rela- p. 60. See also Charles L. Kenner, *A History of New Mexican-Plains In- lations* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), p. 90.

67. Bloom, "New Mexico Under Mexican Administration," pp. 12-13.

68. Smith, "Indians in American-Mexican Relations," p. 55.

69. Smith, "Indians in American-Mexican Relations," pp. 59-60.

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70. Minge, "Frontier Problems," p. 150.
71. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism*, p. 238.
72. Pino, et al., *Chronicles*, pp. 132-33.
73. Gaspar de Ochoa to *Comandante Principal* of New Mexico, January 2 1825, communications received from Durango and Chihuahua, Governo Papers, 1824, MANM.

MAURICE GARLAND FULTON: HISTORIAN OF NEW MEXICO AND THE SOUTHWEST

WILLIAM E. GIBBS AND ALFRED L. CASTLE

ONE SUMMER EVENING the lights were on in the basement of Wilson Hall at the New Mexico Military Institute. As was his custom, Maurice G. Fulton, the chairman of the English Department and local historian, was working late in an office he shared with a motley crew of cats who ate from open cans of sardines and tuna. Fulton heard noise in the hallway, and moments later, looking up, he found himself peering into the barrel of a forty-five. Facing him was Lil Casey Klasner, a peripheral participant in the Lincoln County conflict of the late nineteenth century, who demanded that Fulton turn over his edited version of her autobiography. Notoriously absent minded and never able to master the act of wearing a uniform properly, Fulton showed considerable presence of mind and quickly handed over the manuscript.[1] Little did Fulton know that a reputation for scholarship and a commitment to historical accuracy could be dangerous liabilities. But he survived this incident, surmounted other obstacles, and became a significant historical scholar of New Mexico and the Southwest who left his mark on regional historiography.

Throughout his early life, Fulton benefitted from a variety of educational experiences. Born in Oxford, Mississippi, on December 3, 1877, he was early exposed to a stimulating environment. His father, Robert B. Fulton, was a distinguished southern educator who served for many years as chancellor of the University of Mississippi. Placing a high premium on education, he sent his son to private school in Oxford, Mississippi. Because college education was considered mandatory in the Fulton family, Maurice entered the University of Mississippi in 1894. In the gentle surroundings of "Ole Miss," he studied literature and

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