



NAVAHO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1795-1846

FRANK D. REEVE

edited by Eleanor B. Adams and John L. Kessell

INTRODUCTION

FRANK DRIVER REEVE's life-long interest in the history of the Navaho people began with his doctoral dissertation at the University of Texas on "The Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880." During a fruitful career as professor of history at the University of New Mexico and, for eighteen years, editor of the *New Mexico Historical Review*, his untiring research resulted in publications detailing the People's contact with European men and ideas from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century.* When Dr. Reeve retired in 1964 he devoted himself to the last significant gap in the story, the period 1795 to 1846.

Unfortunately his never robust health deteriorated seriously in the years between his retirement and his death on December 31,

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1967. It was difficult for him to go on, but he did not despair; he was grimly determined to complete his life work. During the many months he spent in the hospital he managed to finish a draft of his last work, which he asked Eleanor B. Adams to prepare for publication.

The research, almost entirely from original sources, was done, but the editors' task has not been easy. We found it necessary to check every citation, to reorganize, rewrite, and revise to make a coherent story. We have not meddled with Dr. Reeve's basic interpretations, but, working with his sources, we have on occasion added to or abridged material in the draft to achieve balance.

Eleanor B. Adams

John L. Kessell

PART I 1795-1815

FOR MORE THAN A CENTURY after the founding of New Mexico the Spaniards were unable to reach any satisfactory *modus vivendi* with the Navaho Indians. Now and again an uneasy truce prevailed, but peace seldom lasted long before the 1720's. Various reasons have been given for the beginning of harmonious relations, which endured for half a century—hostilities against the Navaho by other tribes, the success of Spanish punitive expeditions, and the fact that the Navaho had acquired enough sheep to supplement their old farm economy and make a satisfactory living without raiding Indian pueblos and Spanish settlements.¹

Between 1720 and 1770 the Navaho even gave the Spanish authorities and missionaries reason to hope that they might settle down in permanent pueblos and accept Christianity, although in the long run nothing substantial came of this. Meanwhile, in the 1750's, Spanish settlers began moving into areas where the Navaho had long made use of the land for farming. The land grants included the usual stipulations to protect the rights of third parties with prior claims—in these cases the Navaho Indians—but not until the 1770's did the Indians challenge the intruders and end the long peace.² Spaniards who had taken up grants in the Navaho country began to complain of thefts of livestock. Military reprisals proved sadly ineffective. The raids increased in number and violence, and settlers were forced to abandon their ranches. Attempts to make peace failed until 1786, when Governor Juan Bautista de Anza concluded an agreement with the Navaho for military alliance against the Gila Apache, resumption of trade, and protection of Navaho plantings in the Cebolleta area. Settlers were again allowed to graze their stock in this region, provided it did not encroach on Indian farm land.³

According to the treaty, the Navaho were supposed to be under a head chief, or "general." Whatever the white man might like to think, these Indians had never enjoyed tribal unity, and a headman of all the Navaho was no more than a figment of the Spanish imagination. During the ten years that followed the treaty Navaho

tranquility was disturbed by an occasional fracas with the Ute or Comanche on the north and the Apache on the south, but their main external problem was to get along with their New Mexican neighbors. Not all the Navaho were inclined to wholehearted observance of peace and alliance with the Spaniards, and intermittent outbreaks occurred. Nevertheless, for the time being the dissidents appeared to be in the minority.⁴

By 1795 the Navaho were enjoying considerable prosperity:

The Navaho, whom you suspect may have aided the Apache in their incursions, have, since the death of their general Antonio [El Pinto], been their irreconcilable enemies, while they have observed an invariable and sincere peace with us. These heathens have no need to covet sheep, for their own are innumerable. They have increased their horse herds considerably; they plant much and on good land; they work their wool with more delicacy and taste than the Spaniards. Both men and women go decently clothed, and their captains are rarely seen without silver jewelry. They are more inclined to speak Spanish than any other heathen tribe, so that they seem more like town Indians than many of those who have been reduced.⁵

When Governor don Fernando de la Concha (1788-1794) relinquished the reins of government, he prepared a lengthy report on New Mexico for the benefit of his successor, don Fernando Chacón (1794-1805). The Navaho, he wrote, "possess much cattle and sheep, and a proportionate number of horses. In general they occupy rugged mesas of difficult access, and pasture their livestock on the borders of the Río Puerco [of the East] and in the Canyon de Chelly. . . . They reap generally abundant harvests, and enjoy some commodities which are not known to the other barbarous Indians."⁶

THERE are three "dirty" rivers in New Mexico. The Río Puerco of the East drains the region southward from the Río San Juan watershed into the Río Grande. The Río Puerco of the North is a short tributary of the Río Chama, flowing northward from the San Pedro

Mountains. The Río Puerco of the West drains westward from the continental divide near the north end of the Zuñi Mountains. According to Antonio Cordero, experienced frontier commander, Navaho locations in the mid-1790's were as follows: "Sevolleta [Cebolleta], Chacoli, Guadalupe, Cerro-Cabezon, Agua Salada, Cerro Chato, Chusca, Tunicha, [Canyon de] Chelle and Carrizo."⁷ These traditional Navaho homesites were scattered across the vast area of present northwestern New Mexico and northeastern Arizona over which this semi-nomadic people ranged.

Cebolleta Canyon drains from the southeastern side of the San Mateo and Cebolleta Mountains, which Mount Taylor caps at the southern end. The Navaho used this water, and that in Guadalupe Canyon which flows from the northeastern side of the mountains, to irrigate their maize. Between Cebolleta and Guadalupe Canyons an arroyo known as Agua Salada, usually dry except in the recess of the mountains, winds east and southeast into the Puerco of the East. One of several volcanic necks, Cerro Chato rises near the mountains on the north side of Agua Salada. Across the Puerco to the east Cabezón pierces the sky. Farther north lay the "Valle de Chacoli."⁸ A hundred miles west, Tunicha Wash drains the eastern slope of the Chuska Range (bisected today by the New Mexico-Arizona line).⁹ Over the mountains lies Canyon de Chelly, a magnificent red sandstone-walled canyon through which water runs westward into the Chinle Wash and then north to the Río San Juan. Carrizo is a lava topped mesa offshoot of the Chuska range, north of Chelly and east of the Chinle Wash.

These were the locations where marauders, traders, and diplomats could find the Navaho at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Navaho land occupancy was determined by an agricultural and pastoral life. The New Mexicans were strung along the Río Grande Valley, on ranch or in village, from Belén and its suburbs on the south to Taos on the north, with extensions to the northwest up the Río Chama and eastward into the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. Intensive farming and restricted pasturage tied them more closely to the land than the semi-nomadic Navaho, but during the nineteenth century increasing population was to force expansion.¹⁰

The routes to Navaholand from the Río Grande Valley were dictated by the mountains that extend southward from Tierra Amarilla to San Isidro, west of the river. The Río Chama flows south and southeast from Tierra Amarilla. About fifteen miles above Abiquiú it emerges from a canyon with "ice cream and lemon pie" cliffs and continues on to join the Río Grande in the Española Basin. Below the canyon the Río Puerco of the North joins the Río Chama in the Abiquiú Valley, the Piedra Lumbre of Spanish days.¹¹ Traders and soldiers searching for Navaho followed the Río Chama up to the Piedra Lumbre. On the right the old Spanish trail followed Canjilón Creek (Arroyo Seco) north to bypass the Chama Canyon, crossed the river at El Vado, and continued northwest through the old Navaho country to central Utah, where New Mexicans traded for skins and Indian children.¹²

The trail to the new Navaholand turned southwestward across the Piedra Lumbre for a few miles, climbed the "Cuesta Navaho," and crossed the rolling, forested plateau drained by Poleo Creek and the Río Gallinas to the "Cuesta Blanca," or continental divide, between the drainages of the Chama and San Juan Rivers. State Highway 96 now follows more or less the same route to Cuesta Blanca. Dropping down the steep western escarpment, the trail then followed Cañada Larga.¹³ Near the junction of Cañada Larga and Canyon Largo the water of Ojo Amarillo bubbled from the ground to relieve the thirsty traveler. From this area a westerly way could be found to the flat country where the Río Chaco, when in flood, flows to the San Juan. Lonely Shiprock kept its counsel as soldier or trader passed by.¹⁴ Beyond the Hogback, a lava flow tilted by geodynamic force, a shallow valley between the Lukachukai on the left and the Carrizo Mountains on the right, pointed the way to Chinle Wash and Canyon de Chelly.

Farther south, Washington Pass through the Chuska Mountains opened another way into the heartland of the Navaho. The Pass can be reached from Jémez Pueblo by traveling around the southern end of the Sierra Nacimiento, northwest along the winding Arroyo Salado to the Río Puerco, and west to the Chaco Wash. Still another route from Jémez led southwestward along the eastern

side of Mesa Prieta to a crossing of the Río Puerco of the East.¹⁵ It proceeded toward Mt. Taylor, and south in the direction of Laguna Pueblo, with the mountain on the west and Mesa Gigante on the east. Whether folk were bent on peace or war, Jémez, Abiquiú, and Laguna were the chief points of departure for the Navaho country.

By 1796 the uneasy peace between Spaniard and Navaho showed signs of breaking down. Pedro de Nava, Commandant General of the western division of the Provincias Internas, found reports of suspected Navaho raids and renewal of their alliance with the Gila Apache disturbing enough to instruct Governor Chacón to take prompt diplomatic action. Who was at fault—the governor, his subordinates, the citizenry, or the interpreters “who were living with them to watch over their movements and plans”? If emissaries and gifts failed, then the old-fashioned punitive campaign would be in order.¹⁶

The pending trouble stemmed partly from New Mexico’s rising population and the need for more land. For example the García de Noriega brothers, Francisco and Antonio, interpreters for the Navaho, who applied with eighteen other persons in March 1798, received a town grant from Governor Chacón at the Canyon of San Diego de Jémez.¹⁷

Officials looked upon many landless citizens as semi-vagabonds and troublemakers—they were contentious, and idleness became the handmaiden to mischief. Settlements on unoccupied lands should be established to take care of this problem and to reduce the hazards of travel through long stretches of unoccupied countryside. Early in 1800 Governor Chacón, under instructions from Commandant General Nava, reestablished the village of Alamillo on the Río Grande north of the site of Socorro. When his appeal for settlers did not bring voluntary response, the governor arbitrarily ordered some sixty families described as “day laborers, servants, gamblers, those living in concubinage, and incorrigible unlicensed traders to the heathens” to move there. Since they lacked resources, he subsidized them until harvest time and provided military protection against the Apache who roamed the mountains to the west.¹⁸

Moreover, some livestock owners needed more pasture land. Governor Concha had come to an agreement with the Navaho to ease the grazing problem on the western frontier. These Indians permitted the New Mexicans to graze their stock in Navaho territory, provided that it did not invade their planted fields.¹⁹ When the New Mexicans, as individuals or groups, expanded their land holdings, this happy state of affairs came to an end.

The arrangement for joint use of pasturage on the western frontier of New Mexico was followed by a move to take over farm land at Cebolleta Canyon. Early in 1800 thirty residents of the Albuquerque district petitioned to settle at a site five leagues north of Laguna Pueblo. The mere fact that they asked for this favor implied that the place was not occupied by Navaho. This is rather surprising in view of the fact that these Indians had long used land along the eastern side of the Sierra de Cebolleta. As was their custom they left their fields for part of the year, and, from the white man's point of view, seasonal use did not mean occupancy in the sense of land ownership. Even after six years in office, Chacón could not have understood the true state of affairs.

In accordance with the governor's order of January 23, 1800, José Manuel Aragón, alcalde mayor of Laguna Pueblo and its jurisdiction, visited the place and pronounced it suitable for settlement. He gave the grantees formal possession on March 16, with the proviso that they must form a regular settlement—which meant living around a plaza for defensive purposes. They were forbidden to “abandon it under any pretext, which they gladly admitted and acknowledged.” The boundaries of the grant were the Sierra de San Mateo on the north and west; the Mesa del Gavilán on the south, adjoining the Rancho de Paguete; and on the east, the Cañada through which the road from the pueblo of Laguna to those of Zía and Jémez ran, and the Cañada de Pedro Padilla.²⁰

The new residents had scarcely arrived when some Navaho stole their stock. Presumably the have-not Indians were tempted by the nearness of the spoils. The result was a major campaign against the Navaho in general. Chacón marched to Tunicha with a force of

five hundred men, including soldiers, residents, and Pueblo Indian auxiliaries. Twenty Navaho leaders promptly appeared and opened peace negotiations. They were so anxious to avoid war that they surrendered 28 stolen animals, 30 tilmas, 48 skins, and one captive Hopi Indian. In addition, they promised not to ask the governor for gifts in the future, although this custom dated from at least the mid-eighteenth century. Soldiers and Indians celebrated the accord with a general trading session. Commandant General Nava was gratified by the news.²¹

Despite their promise, the settlers had fled from Cebolleta when the trouble started. The governor ordered them to reoccupy their homes. According to José Benito Baca, a native of Cebolleta who testified in 1882 at the age of seventy, more settlers now took up residence at San Mateo Spring on the western side of the Sierra de San Mateo. The spring lay on the eighteenth-century Durán y Chávez grant, which had been abandoned during the Navaho uprising of the 1770's.²²

To the Navaho, the question of land ownership in the Mt. Taylor area remained a moot point. On February 26, 1804, six of them appeared before the governor in Santa Fe and asked permission to locate at Cebolleta. Two of them claimed that they had received a favorable reply to an earlier petition to Commandant General Nemesio Salcedo y Salcedo and that the papers he had given them had been lost in a skirmish with some Apache in the south. Governor Chacón was not inclined to go along with the alleged action by his superior and protested, telling Salcedo that Cebolleta was too near the center of New Mexico. Although the Navaho had occupied it at times, its greatest use to them was as a vantage point to keep watch over what was going on in New Mexico and to launch forays against their neighbors' stock. Furthermore, there was now a plaza at the site, occupied by settlers to whom the governor himself had granted it. Scarcity of water and tillable land left no room for more people. If Navaho were allowed to relocate there, the usual friction would result. These arguments convinced Salcedo, but not the Navaho.²³

In May Chacón had doleful news to report to Salcedo:

I enclose for your excellency the journal of events from April 1 to date, which includes hostilities caused by the heathen Navaho nation during the first quarter of the moon in April. Large parties were seen in various directions. They were responsible for the theft of something over 3000 pregnant ewes, 58 head of cattle and 24 horses, and for the death of nine herders in different places, most of whom were asleep, and of one captive boy.

If we were to pardon and overlook said outrages, committed in cold blood and unprovoked, as has been done in the past, it would not be difficult to get them to come down peacefully at once. But the results would be to confirm their feeling that we are afraid of them and that they are superior to us because they are united. And shortly, when they see us off guard, they will repeat their attacks with impunity. This is not so easy for them at present because orders have been given to bring the livestock and horses back a long way from their lands.

About the middle of next month, when the citizens have finished planting and the horses have recuperated, continual campaigns will be undertaken, and the results will dictate the manner in which I contract peace when [the Navaho] seek it, demanding among other things that they return all or the greater part of what they have stolen up to then, as I stipulated on the two previous occasions when they rose during my term as governor.²⁴

The provocations mentioned in this report had begun in the Río Abajo where the alcalde mayor reported the theft of two horses and eight head of cattle from the Cañada de Los Álamos on the Río Puerco. Segundo, a principal Navaho leader, arrived at Laguna two days later claiming that some poor Navaho were responsible. He said that the animals would be returned and that his people wanted peace with the Spaniards and to get on with their planting. Other Navaho called on the lieutenant of the Jémez district under the pretext that their chiefs had sent them to find out the number of animals stolen. When they left, they drove off ten head of cattle and as many horses. On April 26 the alcalde mayor of the Río Arriba related that sixteen Navaho driving seven stolen animals encountered some Ute, who not only relieved them of the booty but scalped one Navaho and wounded three.

Other marauders had struck at the Ojo del Espíritu Santo on April 23, killed three men and a boy, and taken the stock. The justicia of Jémez overtook the raiders on the Río San Miguel and recovered a thousand ewes.²⁵ When he got home he discovered that still other Navaho had run off his own stock. Setting out again, he caught up with the culprits at the Agua del Ratón in Navaho country near the prehistoric ruin of Pueblo Pintado. But seeing that the raiders had been joined by many more Navaho, he did not attack because he had no more than fifteen men.²⁶ On the twenty-fifth the Navaho attacked Nacimiento, where they killed two shepherds. The night before, a strong party, estimated at more than two hundred Indians, surrounded Cebolleta. They sacked three houses with outside doors and took twelve horses and fifty head of cattle. Then they went to the outlying pastures, where they killed three herders, seized one boy, and drove away the sheep. The following day the alcalde mayor of Laguna tracked them to the Paraje de Los Cañoncitos,²⁷ where he noted that they had divided the spoils and gone off in different directions. Following the trail of the largest party, he overtook the Navaho at midnight, killed one Indian, recovered sixty ewes and nine head of cattle, and got away with ten Navaho horses with all their gear. Heading back to Laguna the alcalde rode into a Navaho ambush. The hostiles killed the horse he was riding. He and an Indian auxiliary were slightly wounded in the fray.

In early May, with the scent of plunder in the air, seven Jicarilla Apache volunteered to join the Spaniards against the Navaho. Two days later a couple of Ute came in to offer the services of their tribe.²⁸

Salcedo approved Governor Chacón's plan for retaliation and offered assistance for a large-scale offensive after the spring planting of 1804. For the time being the governor asked for forty horses and three mules to mount the presidial troops.²⁹ In July he marched against the enemy with a force of five hundred men, including fifty presidials. Three hundred and seventy-five Ute and Jicarilla Apache Indians accompanied the expedition and profited to the extent of

twenty-two captured horses. The invaders killed four Navaho warriors and one woman and took ten captives.

Although Salcedo was pleased,³⁰ Chacón was not satisfied with the victory, feeling that it was insufficient to lead to a satisfactory peace. Scarcely pausing to draw breath after he finished penning his report, on July 30 he dispatched Lieutenant Antonio Vargas of the Santa Fe company with six hundred men. According to Salcedo, a third blow to humble the Navaho would be planned, if necessary. Meanwhile don Antonio returned from the field with a score of fifty-seven persons killed, including seventeen warriors, and five prisoners. He recovered sixteen horses and thirty-three head of stock. He lost one genízaro.³¹ An estimated nine hundred to a thousand warriors reacted quickly and strongly by striking at Cebolleta on August 3. They killed the corporal of the detachment guarding the village, one resident, and an Indian. Four soldiers and eleven settlers, including a woman, were wounded. The aggressors suffered twenty-two dead and forty-four wounded.³²

The settlers petitioned for permission to abandon their homes and moved to Laguna without awaiting a reply, much to the annoyance of Salcedo who, determined to bring the Navaho to their knees, was in no mood to accept this retreat. He sent sharp instructions ordering the settlers to return immediately or forfeit all rights to the land. Although he was tempted to punish them for insubordination, he sent a force of thirty men from Nueva Vizcaya under Lieutenant Nicolás Farín to help chastise the Navaho and protect the Cebolleta settlers while they reoccupied their lands. Lieutenant Farín took command of the Navaho campaign on October 12.³³ He aroused Salcedo's ire to the boiling point by talking peace rather than waging war with the Indians.³⁴

On November 21 Lieutenant Antonio Narbona arrived at Zuñi from Sonora with 215 men equipped for sixty days in the field. Chacón ordered him to proceed to Laguna. Heavy snow delayed the force at La Tinaja, but the weary men finally reached El Vadito on the Río San José, where the alcalde of Laguna joined them on November 26 with a hundred Indian auxiliaries.

The best laid plans of mice and men often go astray. Farín had marched six days earlier and Narbona was unable to take command of the whole operation in accordance with Governor Chacón's order of November 10. Therefore he decided to set out with his party on the twenty-seventh on an eighteen-day foray. He would do his utmost to join Farín, but if he failed, he would go it alone.³⁵

"Overcome with mortification and shame," Narbona wrote the governor from Laguna on December 10. All he had accomplished was an attack on a pitifully small Navaho ranchería near Canyon de Chelly. Forty-eight hours of snow at the outset of the campaign had prevented him from picking up and following enemy tracks. When finally he did, neither cavalry nor infantry was fit to go on; the horses were spent and the men's feet swollen.³⁶ If Chacón should decide to send him back to Sonora, Narbona continued, he would need five hundred pesos, or supplies for twenty days.³⁷ Commandant General Salcedo's original orders to Narbona and Farín had called for a simultaneous two-pronged invasion from Zuñi and Laguna to catch the Navaho by surprise. No sooner had he dispatched Narbona from Sonora than he set about planning another blow.³⁸

Meanwhile, on January 17, 1805, Narbona redeemed himself, carrying the war to the heart of Navaho country in Canyon de Chelly. A large number of the enemy had fortified themselves high on the rock wall in an almost inaccessible cave. The Spaniards attacked from above and below. The battle raged all one day and into the next, ending in a resounding victory for the invaders. Ninety Navaho braves and twenty-five women lay dead. Later Corporal Baltasar Rivera carried eighty-four pairs of ears to the governor in Santa Fe. Narbona apologized for the loss of the other six. The captives included two Navaho braves, one Hopi, eight women, and twenty-two children. One of them was no less a personage than Segundo. The spoils of war totaled three hundred fifty sheep and thirty horses. Lieutenant don Francisco Piri of the Ópata company from Bacoachi died in the fray. Sixty-four soldiers, settlers, and Indian auxiliaries were wounded. Narbona was forced to order the

destruction of eighty-five horses no longer fit for service. In spite of his success, Lieutenant Narbona warned the governor that it should not inspire false confidence:

I went through Canyon de Chelly, stronghold on which the Navaho have based their hopes of making themselves invincible, from its head to the mouth. Because many people live there and because nature has fortified it with the steep rock of which it is made, that hope is not ill-considered. Although I dislodged them this time, I can do no less than point out to you, as is my duty, and without exaggeration, that if in the future it is necessary to fight there again, a larger force than the one I had will be indispensable. They should take a large supply of munitions. I brought more than ten thousand rounds from my province [Sonora] and had to use them all to get out of the canyon.

It is wide and there are many planted fields in it, watered by a fairly good river which runs through it. But this does not make it impossible for the enemy Indians to attack from the heights those who march below. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary, in addition to those who fight within, to station two parties on the rims of the canyon to drive off the foe who might lie in ambush, and to be on guard against any eventuality.

Narbona informed Governor Chacón that he had allotted eleven wounded captives and children to individual New Mexicans and Sonorans. He was leading twenty-four prisoners, including two taken on his first foray, in collars. When the Navaho Cristóbal and his followers begged for peace, the commander told them to go to the governor to negotiate and to ask for the release of Segundo and his family. Narbona made his situation quite clear:

If Your Lordship should decide to permit the aforesaid Indian Segundo to go free, you can, if you like, apprise me of your wishes in the pueblo of El Paso, to which I am withdrawing because I am almost out of ammunition and my horses are in very bad shape.

He must also have been short of provisions, for all the sheep were eaten. The captured horses he gave to the Sonoran auxiliaries and New Mexican guides.



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The commander went out of his way to commend these guides for their good service and asked Chacón to reward them, as well as Antonio Armijo, a volunteer who was most useful because of his knowledge of the enemy's territory. Narbona praised the New Mexican forces, including the militia and Indian auxiliaries, and singled out several for special commendation. Militia Captain Lorenzo Gutiérrez performed with such gallantry that "I do not hesitate to praise him more and more, assuring Your Lordship that he is worthy of trust, even in the most important military undertakings." Young Lieutenant Bartolomé Baca commanded the party which protected Narbona's descent into the canyon, holding off the foe with exceptional valor.³⁹

Narbona's signal victory of 1805 lives on in Navaho tradition. According to an eighty-eight-year-old Navaho informant, Hosteen Tsosi, it was this fight that gave Cañón del Muerto its name. Tsosi claimed that some seventy women and children fell victim to the invaders while the men, except for the aged and crippled, were away hunting.⁴⁰

COLONEL Joaquín del Real Alencaster succeeded to the governorship of New Mexico on March 23, 1805, in the midst of the Navaho war.⁴¹ Commandant General Salcedo had sent orders for Narbona to wait in New Mexico to escort the outgoing governor to Chihuahua. In the meantime he might attack the Navaho again at the discretion of Governor Chacón. Narbona informed the governor that the number of wounded and the shortage of munitions and horses put this out of the question. Moreover, for the same reasons it would be difficult for him to go to Santa Fe. He was marching immediately for Tomé, where he would await further orders.⁴²

Before leaving, Chacón drew up a statement of appropriate peace terms should a treaty with the Navaho be made. No pact should even be considered unless one of two things came to pass: 1) The Navaho gave up all stolen cattle, sheep, and horses in their possession. 2) The Navaho came to terms after a campaign in

which they lost more than they had stolen. Chacón estimated this at four thousand ewes, one hundred fifty head of cattle, and sixty horses. Any treaty should include the following stipulations: 1) The Navaho were to make no claim at Cebolleta or use this as the pretext for further outbreaks. 2) They were to relinquish any claims to animals in the possession of Spaniards. 3) Two Navaho captives would be exchanged for the two captives they held. 4) The Navaho were not to trespass with their livestock at Juan Tafoya Canyon, Río del Oso, or San Mateo, but move their animals northward toward the San Juan River. 5) The most petty theft or hostile action would lead to military reprisal unless the property and the culprit were given up at once. 6) They were not to expect gifts when they might come to Santa Fe to call on the governor, but only their board while in the capital.⁴³

Cristóbal and Vicente, first and second Navaho "generals," as New Mexican officials termed them, came to Santa Fe in April with Cristóbal's nephew and two captive boys, natives of Alameda and Cebolleta, accompanied by the lieutenant of Jémez. They asked the new governor for "lasting and perpetual peace in good faith." They pleaded their claim to the Cebolleta land, but the governor made it clear that they must desist. They appeared to be convinced and went on to say that since they were returning the two boys, Segundo, his family, and the rest of the Navaho captives should be returned to them, for reciprocal restitution of property damage was not feasible. They also asked for José Antonio García to live with them as their interpreter. Real Alencaster replied that he would make a full report to the Commandant General for his decision, since he himself was empowered only to grant a truce, which he did. He told them to return to Jémez in twenty-five days to learn the results.⁴⁴

In accordance with Salcedo's reply, Real Alencaster made peace with the Navaho at Santa Fe on May 12, 1805. Never again were they to lay any claim to the Cebolleta lands. They must surrender all captives. They must not enter into alliances, trade, or communication with nations hostile to the Spaniards, and when the occasion arose, they must make war on them. If any Navaho com-

mitted an offense against New Mexicans, the chiefs must turn him over for punishment. The Spaniards would permit the Navaho to trade, raise livestock, plant, and engage in other business. In accordance with their request, José Antonio García was reappointed their interpreter to live with them. "Captain" Segundo and sixteen other prisoners who had been held at San Elzeario were exchanged. Any other captives held by either side would be returned. Now that they had been received under the protection of the king, any violation of the above terms, which obligated the whole nation, would be taken as a formal declaration of war and would lead to their annihilation.⁴⁵

Although Cristóbal, Vicente, and Segundo agreed to these terms, they did not represent the Navaho as a whole. Even before they left Santa Fe the alcalde of Santa Cruz de la Cañada reported that Navaho had run off ten head of cattle and two horses from Santa Clara canyon. When the governor reproached the three Navaho leaders, they retorted that they could not prevent those who had lost their families and property during the war from marauding. They would do their best to prevent further misdeeds.

On the night of the fourteenth Navaho had stolen the horse herd from near Jémez pueblo while the Indians guarding it slept. Two herders followed the track. Real Alencaster wrote to interpreter García ordering him to admonish the Navaho leaders. But Vicente and his son-in-law Luis had changed horses the moment they heard the news and gone in pursuit eager "to cut off the heads of the aggressors." Shortly thereafter Cristóbal and Segundo set out "in another direction for the same purpose."⁴⁶ For some reason they had told García to remain at Jémez Canyon; the governor was disturbed when he received no reply to his request for information from the interpreter. He summoned García's literate nephew and sent him to Jémez with orders to make sure that information about exactly what the Navaho were up to reached the authorities.⁴⁷

For several months there were no serious repercussions from these incidents, and New Mexican officials were quite pleased with the situation. The Navaho did try to restore stolen stock found among their people and to keep out of trouble.⁴⁸ Peaceful Navaho

had visited Zuñi and warned of possible attack by the Mescalero Apache.⁴⁹

Along in August Franciscan Custos José de la Prada wrote from Abiquiú that he had ransomed a Navaho woman captive from the Ute. He said that they had taken her in "just war, and unjust war on the part of the Navaho." But because her captors had scandalously mistreated her, he had willingly given two horses and a mule, worth a hundred pesos, to redeem her body and soul.⁵⁰

Governor Real Alencaster continued to send out routine patrols lest the Navaho become overconfident, although the loss of horses in the recent war and drought made mounting such expeditions a problem.⁵¹ For the time being affairs between Navaho and New Mexican jogged along quietly except for minor episodes.

Apparently it was impossible for the Navaho to accept the loss of Cebolleta. In October 1805 forty-odd Navaho families arrived to harvest the maize even though they had not planted it. The settlers complained to alcalde José Manuel Aragón at Laguna that they were being treated like heathens and that it would be better for them to give up than to work hard every year for the benefit of the Navaho. The alcalde expressed the strong opinion that maintaining the Spanish settlement was prejudicial to the province. It had led to the general suffering caused by the Navaho uprising. He warned that the Navaho would wreak vengeance even if they had to ally themselves with the Gila Apache. If this should happen, the poor families there, near the sierra and five leagues from Laguna, would perish without hope of aid.⁵² The alcalde's recommendation went unheeded. It is possible that representatives of the Navaho had planned to carry their case to Chihuahua, but they did not arrive with the annual trade caravan.⁵³

Two months later Vicente came to Laguna in search of a horse that other Navaho had stolen and sold at Ácoma. Vicente and his people were living at Juan Tafoya Canyon and Cerro Chato. He told the alcalde that he was going to complain to the governor because some Spanish shepherds had beaten him when he tried to prevent them from putting their stock where he was keeping his horses.⁵⁴ He also told Aragón that he had heard that the Jémez

Indians wanted to dance with Navaho scalps. Vicente felt that this would open old sores and might lead to Navaho raids on Jémez.⁵⁵

Commandant General Salcedo foresaw another potential source of trouble when a Coyotero Apache came to Zuñi seeking to make peace. He wrote to Real Alencaster that since the Coyotero Apache of the Sierras del Pinal, Tabano, and Blanca on the Sonora frontier had just made peace with the authorities in Chihuahua, he feared that any link with the inconstant Navaho might upset this arrangement.⁵⁶

Winter passed into the spring of 1806 without major incident, and the Navaho hoped that they might again receive presents when they visited Santa Fe. Since that point had been settled by the treaty, the commandant general maintained his chilly attitude. He told the governor to tell them that it was time for them to rely upon their own resources. Moreover, reports of robberies committed by individual Navaho cast doubt upon their good faith. During the early summer some Navaho were observed bartering tilmas with Apache in the Mogollón Mountains; this was a breach of the treaty. The Navaho might backslide under the bad influence of enemy Apache. At any rate the commandant general instructed Governor Real Alencaster to warn Navaho leaders that any of their followers found in the company of hostile Indians would be treated as true enemies.⁵⁷

On October 13, 1807, some Apache attacked Zuñi. Governor Real Alencaster ordered a punitive expedition to leave Santa Fe October 31; two hundred fifty settlers and Indians would join the regulars at Laguna. Meanwhile Segundo came to Santa Fe with a refugee criminal from Jémez. Through interpreter García the Navaho told the governor that to convince him of his intention to keep the peace he would do all he could to restore to the Spaniards a Navaho baby taken in the 1805 Narbona campaign. There were strong suspicions that some Navaho had stolen the child from militia captain Lorenzo Gutiérrez.

The governor quizzed Segundo about Navaho activity among the Mescalero and Gileño Apache. The Indian assured Real Alencaster that his people traded their blankets, hats, and other goods

to all who would buy—Spaniards, Ute, and all other neighboring tribes. Navaho trade goods among the Apache were not proof of friendship, for the Apache and Navaho had been on good terms during the New Mexican-Navaho war of 1805. But since then, Apache treachery had led to dissension and fighting. The Spaniards had no further need to worry on this score; Segundo even offered to enlist some of his kinsmen for the campaign against the Apache.⁶⁸

MEANWHILE, although the ownership of Cebolleta was still a sore point with the Navaho, the New Mexicans had settled the matter to their own satisfaction. On January 16, 1807, Governor Real Alencaster approved the petition of the once reluctant settlers for confirmation of title, since they had lived there more than the five years stipulated by his predecessor. Thus, insofar as the Navaho claim could be blocked by legal formality, the New Mexicans had made good their claim to ownership of land at Nuestra Señora de los Dolores de Cebolleta.⁶⁹

In the spring of 1808 the governor tried to balance the scales of justice between New Mexican and Navaho. Complaints had reached his ears that trespassers had taken over cropland belonging to Segundo's people. He instructed don Lorenzo Gutiérrez, second alcalde at Albuquerque, to have the matter investigated. The alcalde dispatched Bartolomé Baca with instructions to redress grievances by removing those who had intruded on land without proper license.⁶⁰ Don Bartolomé encamped west of the Puerco, where Segundo and Delgadito insisted on discussing the matter that very night. According to Baca:

I listened to the complaint by the said captains and the rest of their people. They showed me a small field which they had planted on the Río Puerco, a site where they had also planted the year before. Now five residents of the Río Abajo have intruded into the said field. . . . [Three of them] being present, I summoned them and stated the Nav-

aho complaint. I asked them their motive for using the field with the Navaho. They told me that their lieutenant had given them leave to do so. When I asked them for the said license in writing, they told me that they did not have one, because from time to time he ordered them to withdraw to their lands. Explaining that this land could only be granted by the superior government, and in view of the fact that it has not come to my attention that a lieutenant holds authority to do so, I ordered that they should lose what they have planted, and exempted them from punishment for their disobedience in overstepping the boundaries. . . . What they had sown was to be divided by the [Navaho] captains among those of their tribe whom they considered most needy.⁶¹

Baca moved on to Juan Tafoya Canyon, where New Mexican sheepmen were watering their woollies, thus interfering with Navaho irrigation of their maize. Don Bartolomé made short shrift of these intruders:

I ordered the mayordomos of the said sheep to assemble, and in the presence of the Navaho, I ordered them not to harm or to annoy [the Indians] with ill treatment under the penalty of twelve pesos fine and as many days in jail for the first offense, and for the second, whatever my superior might impose and consider fitting. I designated from the Cerro Chato down canyon as the area for grazing their sheep.⁶²

Another point of conflict lay in the Cañada de Pedro Padilla, some three leagues from Cebolleta. The Navaho said that they understood that only Cebolleta and its environs had been granted to the settlers there, and not the springs flowing from the rock in the cañada, a long way from Cebolleta. Baca examined the title papers and found that this cañada did lie within the Cebolleta grant; the Navaho petition would have to be referred to higher authority. On receipt of this news many of them wept, but they cried too soon. In the opinion of Alcalde Gutiérrez the disputed area was of more benefit to the Navaho than their being there was prejudicial to the settlers of Cebolleta. He himself could not make the decision, but he believed that justice was on the side of the Navaho. Not only did the settlers have sufficient farm land, but the Cañada de Pedro Padilla was the Navaho lookout for defense against Apache invasion.

Acting Governor Alberto Maynez agreed with these arguments, but said that the settlers could make further representations to him. A few days later, however, the governor had second thoughts. On July 2 he again wrote to Alcalde Gutiérrez, saying that Santa Fe alcalde Juan Rafael Ortiz had just returned from a journey to Laguna via the Río Puerco. In view of what Ortiz had to say about the Navaho claims, he now pointed out that mere permission to the Navaho to plant on the Puerco did not confer property rights. In this case and in the case of the land at the Cañada de Pedro Padilla, the decision would be made in favor of those who proved ownership.

Meanwhile, in accordance with the governor's initial friendly response to the Navaho claim, Gutiérrez had commissioned Lieutenant Vicente López to transfer the land at the Cañada de Pedro Padilla to the Navaho in the presence of the citizens of Cebolleta. If any settler had planted only at the cañada, the Navaho were to allow him to stay until he had taken in his harvest. On July 5 López carried out the assignment. At Cebolleta he appointed three witnesses and summoned the *comisionado de la plaza*, Francisco Aragón, and the settlers who had planted in the Cañada de Pedro Padilla. He told them that they must accompany him to the cañada to witness the transfer to Captain Segundo. Only four out of fifteen interested parties responded, but Lieutenant López went ahead with the transfer. He told Segundo to distribute the farm land among his people pending any decision to the contrary from higher authority. He noted that the plantings in the cañada were meager and uncultivated, while those near Cebolleta were "opulent" enough for even more settlers. He reiterated the opinion that the Cañada de Pedro Padilla was more useful in Navaho hands, not only because the settlers had more than enough land without it, but also because the Navaho guarded "this gateway to our frontiers."

On July 7 Francisco Aragón and four settlers of Cebolleta appeared before Gutiérrez to defend their rights. The alcalde was unable to persuade them that the transfer would be beneficial to both parties in the long run.

When the governor learned of Gutiérrez' action and of the protest by citizens of Cebolleta, he explained that although he had agreed with the alcalde's analysis of the situation at first glance, that was by no means to be interpreted as an order to put the Navaho in possession. The governor believed that neither party had proved ownership and the Cañada de Pedro Padilla was in effect a buffer zone between them.

In order to cut this contention off at the root, my final decision is that it shall remain, as it is, a boundary area in which the settlers of Cebolleta and the Navaho people may freely graze their stock without making further claims [to the land]. Each party is to pay the other for damage done to planted fields, according to universal custom.

Probably the compromise satisfied neither party, but, so far as we know, dissension ceased for the time being.⁶³



THE NAVAHO and the Apache remained at peace with the New Mexicans for the next several years. During this period they now and again tried their mettle against each other. When, in August 1809, four Navaho requested permission from the alcalde of Albuquerque to steal some horses from the Faraón and Mescalero Apache in the Sierra Blanca, Governor José Manrique said that there was no objection to the raid.⁶⁴ Minor conflicts with the Faraón also occurred in 1813.⁶⁵

The Zuñi folk had long been between the anvil and the hammer with the Navaho to the north and Apache to the south, as events in the summer of 1815 illustrate. A few Navaho traveling from Chelly to Zuñi to trade set upon two Zuñi boys they met, took a pair of blue earrings and a hoe, and gave one of the lads a severe beating. Apache stole some animals in a night raid.⁶⁶ On October 2 Navaho interpreter García notified the Santa Fe authorities that a group of his wards had campaigned against the Mogollón Apache, killing one and taking six captives. About two weeks later more than a hundred Mogollón Apache raided Zuñi, where they killed several persons and drove off a flock of sheep. The pursuit party, too weak to retaliate, returned without satisfaction.⁶⁷

NOTES

1. See Frank D. Reeve, "Seventeenth Century Navaho-Spanish Relations," NMHR, vol. 32 (1957), pp. 36-52, and "Navaho-Spanish Wars 1680-1720," NMHR, vol. 33 (1958), pp. 205-31.

2. See Reeve, "The Navaho-Spanish Peace: 1720's-1770's," NMHR, vol. 34 (1959), pp. 9-40.

3. See Reeve, "Navaho-Spanish Diplomacy, 1770-1790," NMHR, vol. 35 (1960), pp. 200-35.

4. Gov. Fernando de la Concha to Viceroy Revillagigedo, Santa Fe, May 6, 1793; Archivo General de la Nación, México (AGN), Provincias Internas, tomo 102. Comandante General Pedro de Nava to Gov. Fernando Chacón, Chihuahua, July 8, 1796; Spanish Archives of New Mexico (SANM), State of New Mexico Records Center, Santa Fe (SRC), no. 1366.

See Ralph Emerson Twitchell, *The Spanish Archives of New Mexico*, 2 vols. (Cedar Rapids, 1914), vol. 2, and *Calendar of the Microfilm Edition of the Spanish Archives of New Mexico, 1621-1821* (Santa Fe, 1968). See also Daniel S. Matson and Albert H. Schroeder, eds., "Cordero's Description of the Apache—1796," NMHR, vol. 32 (1957), p. 356; and Reeve, "Navaho-Spanish Diplomacy."

5. Chacón to Nava, Santa Fe, July 15, 1795; SANM, no. 1335. Cf. Lansing B. Bloom, "Early Weaving in New Mexico," NMHR, vol. 2 (1927), p. 233.

6. Donald E. Worcester, ed., "Advice on Governing New Mexico, 1794," NMHR, vol. 24 (1949), p. 239.

7. Matson and Schroeder, "Cordero's Description," p. 356. Cf. Pedro Garrido y Durán, Chihuahua, Dec. 21, 1786, in Alfred B. Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers, A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of New Mexico, 1777-1787* (Norman, 1932), p. 350.

8. On the E. R. Kern map of 1849 the "Valle de Chocoli" is plainly marked. James H. Simpson, *Journal of a Military Reconnaissance from Santa Fé, New Mexico, to the Navajo Country* (Philadelphia, 1852), map facing p. 6; also the recent edition, *Navajo Expedition*, ed. by Frank McNitt (Norman, 1964), p. 26. Cf. the Bernardo de Miera y Pacheco map of New Mexico (1779) in Eleanor B. Adams and Fray Angelico Chavez, *The Missions of New Mexico, 1776* (Albuquerque, 1956), pp. 2-4, 218.

9. Reports made after the American occupation of 1846 divided the Chuska Range into three parts: Chuska, Tunecha, and Lukachukai (variously spelled), from south to north. The U.S. Geographic Board now accepts "Chusca" for the entire range. Will C. Barnes, *Arizona Place Names*, rev. ed. (Tucson, 1960), p. 8.

10. Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888* (San Francisco, 1889), p. 278. According to Bancroft, at the end of the eighteenth century the population of New Mexico's Hispanic community was some eighteen thousand and that of the Pueblo Indians about half that number. Assuming a steady rate of increase, the Navaho numbered about five thousand. Their strength had been estimated at two to four thousand in the 1740's and rose to approximately eight thousand in the 1860's. Reeve, "Navaho-Spanish Peace," p. 14, n. 13, and "The Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880," NMHR, vol. 12 (1937), pp. 254-55.

11. Reeve, "Early Navaho Geography," NMHR, vol. 31 (1956), pp. 290-309.

12. See Joseph J. Hill, "The Old Spanish Trail," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 4 (1921), pp. 444-73; and essentially the same article retitled "Spanish and Mexican Exploration and Trade Northwest from

New Mexico into the Great Basin, 1765-1853," *Utah Historical Quarterly*, vol. 3 (1930), pp. 3-23.

13. Pedro León Luján, *Diario*, Dec. 1838; Mexican Archives of New Mexico (MANM), SRC. See Myra Ellen Jenkins, *Calendar of the Microfilm Edition of the Mexican Archives of New Mexico, 1821-1846* (Santa Fe, 1970).

14. Shiprock, a challenge to climber and photographer, has had other names. "Through the courtesy of the Engineer Department the requisite data were kindly supplied by a statement of the geographical position of 'The Needles,' or the Crestone Mountain, a prominent landmark in New Mexico, otherwise named in the survey of the Navajo Indian reservation as Wilson's Peak, situated in township 11 north, of range 3 west of the Navajo special base and meridian." Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, pt. 5. (Washington, 1876), vol. 1, p. 43.

15. Nuestra Señora de la Luz de las Lagunitas Grant; Surveyor-General of New Mexico, Bureau of Land Management, Santa Fe (S-G, BLM), no. 101. See Albert James Diaz, *A Guide to the Microfilm of Papers relating to New Mexico Land Grants* (Albuquerque, 1960). Washington Pass was named for Col. John M. Washington who led the military expedition across the mountains in 1849.

16. Nava to Chacón, July 8, 1796. Chacón had also advised Nava of Apache marauding which, judging from the localities mentioned, included both the southern and the Jicarilla Apache.

17. Cañón de San Diego Grant; S-G, BLM, no. 25. Miguel García was Navaho interpreter as of May 1, 1839, so the office may have become a family affair. *Compañía presidial de caballería permanente de Santa Fe*; MANM.

18. Unsigned letter, March 31, 1800; SANM, Series 1, BLM, no. 1155. Nava to Chacón, Chihuahua, June 11, 1800; *ibid.*, no. 1199. Nava to Chacón, Chihuahua, Jan. 18, 1800; *ibid.*, no. 1171. See Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, vol. 1.

19. Concha, Santa Fe, May 1, 1793; Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla (AGI), Audiencia de México, 89-6-23.

20. Deposition of Aragón, Laguna, March 16, 1800, Town of Cebolleta Grant; S-G, BLM, no. 46. "A short distance from Laguna is the place called Cebolleta at the foot of the sierra of the same name from which a small river rises. Two and a half leagues before it reaches Laguna it joins the water of El Gallo. In this place the Indians of Laguna and more recently the Navajo Apache have been accustomed to plant; at present, according to reports by José de la Peña, the latter occupy the place." Fr. Juan Agustín de Morfi, *Descripción Geográfica del Nuevo México*, 1782; AGN, Historia, tomo 25. Father José Benito Pereiro, priest at Laguna, testified that "the Spaniards

and peoples of other classes began their new settlement [Cebolleta] near this mission" on March 19, 1800. Benjamin M. Read, *Illustrated History of New Mexico* (Santa Fe, 1912), p. 348.

21. Chacón to Nava, Socorro, June 21, 1800; SANM, no. 1492. Nava to Chacón, Chihuahua, July 2, 1800; New Mexico Originals (NMO), Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (BL). See also services (1770-1805) of Juan de Dios Peña who participated in this campaign. SANM, no. 1874.

22. Deposition of Baca, Santa Fe, July 3, 1882, San Mateo Spring Grant; S-G, BLM, no. 134.

23. Chacón to Salcedo, Santa Fe, March 28, 1804; SANM, no. 1714. Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, April 19, 1804; NMO. Charles IV appointed Salcedo on Aug. 26, 1800, but the new commandant did not take office until Nov. 4, 1802. SANM, nos. 1499a, 1625.

24. Chacón to Salcedo, Santa Fe, May 16, 1804; SANM, no. 1730.

25. *Diario de las novedades ocurridas desde 1º de abril hasta la fecha*, Santa Fe, May 16, 1804; *ibid.* The Río San Miguel is one of the short tributaries flowing westward to the upper Río Puerco of the East, south of Cuba (formerly Nacimiento) and north of La Ventana. When the Indians of Zia, Santa Ana, and Jémez petitioned in 1766 for a grant confirming their rights to the valley of the Ojo del Espíritu Santo, they claimed as their northern boundary "a place called La Ventana where some Navajo Apache live." Petition by Felipe Tafoya in name of pueblos of Zia, Santa Ana, and Jémez, Santa Fe, June 16, 1766, Pueblos of Zia, Santa Ana, and Jémez; Court of Private Land Claims (PLC), BLM, no. 50. There were rancherías of Navaho "in the suburbs of Jémez Pueblo" as late as 1844. Com. Gen. of New Mexico to Inspector del Segundo Distrito, Santa Fe, Jan. 27, 1844; MANM. José Manuel Sandoval recalled as of May 10, 1886, that when he was herding sheep in 1843 there were near Nacimiento no residents "but the Navajos and Utes." S-G, BLM, no. 66. "Six miles southeast of present Cuba at San Miguel was the camp of the head-chief of the Navajos. . . . 7 miles west of Cuba, the father of Santiago Ortiz, centenarian Navajo of Torreon (died 1938), once had a farm." Richard F. Van Valkenburgh, *Diné Bikéyah* (Window Rock, Ariz., 1941), p. 48. Antonio Atencio, age 85, recalled on May 11, 1886, that Comanche raiders stole the horse herd "belonging to the settlers and to the Navajoes at San Miguel on the other [east] side of the Puerco." S-G, BLM, no. 66.

26. *Diario de novedades*, May 16, 1804. "He [Hosteen Beyal] insists with some emphasis that the Mexicans never fought the Navaho in the Chaco country; they came here to trade, bringing goods on pack horses and in mule-drawn carts. These carts had wheels made of boards and bodies of upright sticks. The trouble between the Mexicans and Navahos started,

according to Hosteen Beyal, when four Mexican traders, watering their horses near a hogan, were playfully attacked by several Navahos. These latter were bad Indians, according to our informant; they braided their hair and dressed like Utes with the intention merely of frightening the Mexicans. During the prank one of the traders was accidentally killed. The others escaped and carried word of the attack. The Navaho-Mexican war resulted." Neil M. Judd, "The Material Culture of Pueblo Bonito," *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections*, vol. 124 (1954), pp. 346-47. Hosteen is essentially correct about fighting in Chaco Canyon. The war referred to is obscure, but the story is interesting.

27. Diario de novedades, May 16, 1804. I assume that the Paraje de los Cañoncitos where the marauders tarried is the place of the same name where Navaho live today about ten miles east of Cebolleta. "The largest tributary canyon [of the Puerco] is known locally as Cañoncito. It has a wash running parallel to the Río Puerco channel, for about twenty miles, approximately three to five miles west. . . . The wash has cut its way down on the west side of the valley." D. L. Luhrs, "Observations on the Río Puerco of the East," *El Palacio*, vol. 42 (1937), p. 128. See also Jerold Gwayn Widdison, "Historical Geography of the Middle Rio Puerco Valley, New Mexico," *NMHR*, vol. 34 (1959), pp. 248-84.

28. Diario de las novedades, May 16, 1804.

29. Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, June 8, 1804; SANM, no. 1735. Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, July 19, 1804; SANM, no. 1745. The request for animals was to be fulfilled in January.

30. Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, July 16, 1804; SANM, no. 1743. Salcedo to Chacón, Aug. 8, 1804; SANM, no. 1748. Juan de Dios Peña of the Santa Fe presidio brought home the ears of the slain enemy. Services of Peña. It was customary to hang the ears of dead Indians on the wall of the governor's residence in Santa Fe.

31. Salcedo to Chacón, Aug. 8, 1804. Salcedo to Chacón, Sept. 16, 1804; SANM, no. 1754. The term *genízaro* was applied in New Mexico to various Hispanicized non-Pueblo Indians and their racially mixed descendants.

32. Salcedo to Chacón, Sept. 16, 1804. This action is mentioned in the service record of Lt. Col. José Silva, Santa Fe, Dec. 31, 1842. MANM.

33. Chacón to José Manuel Aragón, Santa Fe, Sept. 26, 1804; Town of Cebolleta Grant. Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, Sept. 16, 1804; quoted in *ibid.* Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, Oct. 5, 1804; SANM, no. 1763. Because of losses to Navaho (and to Apache in the Sacramento Mountains) Salcedo promised 300 horses in January for service in New Mexico. Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, Oct. 5, 1804; SANM, no. 1766. Farín to Chacón, Laguna, Oct. 12, 1804; SANM, no. 1765.

34. Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, Jan. 11, 1805; SANM, no. 1788.
35. Salcedo to Narbona, Bacoachi, Oct. 20, 1804; SANM, no. 1767. Chacón to Farín, Santa Fe, Nov. 20, 1804; SANM, no. 1774. Narbona to Chacón, Paraje del Vadito, Nov. 26, 1804; SANM, no. 1776.
36. Narbona to Chacón, Laguna, Dec. 10, 1804; SANM, no. 1778.
37. As of Dec. 31, 1804, the Santa Fe presidials were not well equipped, having only 64 of a required 100 escopetas, and only 88 pistols. SANM, no. 1785. Salcedo promised to supply the deficiencies. Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, Jan. 10, 1805; SANM, no. 1787. These figures imply that the garrison numbered 100. Concha had reported in 1794 that it was a 120-man company. Worcester, "Advice on Governing New Mexico," p. 250.
38. Salcedo to Narbona, Oct. 20, 1804.
39. Narbona to Chacón, Zuñi, Jan. 24, 1805; SANM, no. 1792. The fight is mentioned by Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, p. 285, with some discrepancies, and in *Three New Mexico Chronicles*, trans. and ed. by H. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard (Albuquerque, 1942), pp. 132-33. "At last," wrote Pedro Bautista Pino, "after many bloody encounters and after the Navajoes had lost even Chell[y], their capital (which was well fortified and admirably provided with men and arms), they sued for peace, in 1805." The Ópata Indians of Sonora, some of whom had accompanied Narbona, had early accepted Spanish domination and had aided their conquerors against the Apache. They had received special attention for their valor and faithfulness, and were acculturated rapidly. "The Opata . . . have completely disappeared today as a cultural and ethnic entity." Jean B. Johnson, "The Opata: An Inland Tribe of Sonora," *University of New Mexico Publications in Anthropology*, no. 6 (Albuquerque, 1950), p. 7.
40. Van Valkenburgh, "Tsosi Tells the Story of Massacre Cave," *Desert Magazine*, vol. 3, no. 4 (Feb. 1940), pp. 22-25. A more plausible version credits the name to the finding of two skeletons in 1882 by archaeologist Col. James Stevenson who therefore adopted the name Cañón de los Muertos. Cosmos Mindeleff changed it fifteen years later to Cañón del Muerto. David L. De Harport, "Origin of the Name, Canon del Muerto," *El Palacio*, vol. 67 (1960), p. 96. Later a famous Navaho took Narbona's name, which would seem to imply admiration for the alien warrior.
41. Real Alencaster to the Audiencia of Guadalajara, Santa Fe, March 31, 1805; SANM, no. 1802. He served until 1808.
42. Narbona to Chacón, Zuñi, Jan. 25, 1805; SANM, no. 1793.
43. Condiciones que deben hacerse a la Nación Navaho cuando se ponga de Paz, Chacón, Santa Fe, March 27, 1805; SANM, no. 1801. Cf. Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, p. 285. The denial of gifts was a distinct departure from protocol. When Indians visit Santa Fe, wrote Gov. Concha, "One should have some person entrusted with their maintenance

and meals, to whom should be credited two *reales* for each day during the time of their residence. . . . As soon as they are disposed to return to their camps, it is customary to regale them with some clothing, hats, mirrors, orange paint, indigo, knives, cigars, sugarloaves, and so forth." This had been the principal means of maintaining peace. Worcester, "Advice on Governing New Mexico," pp. 242-43.

44. Real Alencaster to Salcedo, Santa Fe, April 12, 1805; SANM, no. 1810.

45. Real Alencaster to Salcedo, Santa Fe, May 15, 1805; SANM, no. 1828.

46. Real Alencaster to Salcedo, Santa Fe, May 22, 1805; SANM, no. 1834. Real Alencaster to Salcedo, May 15, 1805.

47. Real Alencaster to Salcedo, May 22, 1805.

48. Salcedo to Real Alencaster, Chihuahua, July 19, 1805; SANM, no. 1859.

49. Real Alencaster to Salcedo, May 22, 1805. The name Mescalero came to be applied most commonly to Apache in the Sierras Blanca and Sacramento east of the Río Grande, yet in the 1790's a Spanish officer wrote that "Zuñi is menaced, to the south, by the Coyotero Apaches of the Pinal, who are there called Mescaleros. . . ." George P. Hammond, ed., "The Zuñiga Journal, Tucson to Santa Fé," NMHR, vol. 6 (1931), p. 63.

50. Fr. José de la Prada to Real Alencaster, Abiquiú, Aug. 18, 1805; SANM, no. 1876.

51. Real Alencaster to Salcedo, Santa Fe, Oct. 2, 1805; SANM, no. 1900.

52. Aragón to Real Alencaster, Laguna, Oct. 11, 1805; SANM, no. 1902.

53. Salcedo to Real Alencaster, Chihuahua, Dec. 19, 1805; SANM, no. 1936.

54. Aragón to Real Alencaster, Laguna, Dec. 6, 1805; SANM, no. 1929.

55. *Ibid.* In order to maintain peace, Gov. Concha had noted, "there are various Navajo chiefs, such as Carlos and Vicente, who are able to facilitate the management of the others." Worcester, "Advice on Governing New Mexico," p. 242.

56. Salcedo to Real Alencaster, Chihuahua, Dec. 19, 1805; SANM, no. 1936.

57. Salcedo to Real Alencaster, Chihuahua, April 23, 1806; SANM, no. 1985. Salcedo to Real Alencaster, Chihuahua, July 5, 1806; SANM, no. 1998.

58. Real Alencaster, Instructions to Lt. Ignacio Sotelo, Santa Fe, Oct. 29, 1807; SANM, no. 2083. Nicolás de Almanza for Real Alencaster to Salcedo, Santa Fe, Nov. 3, 1807; SANM, no. 2089.

59. Petition to Real Alencaster, Laguna, Jan. 12, 1807, and approval, Jan. 16, 1807, Town of Cebolleta Grant. "The towns of Marquez, Seboyeta, Bibo, and Moquino are located in this grant. There are no through-flowing streams, although several streams have water in their headward portions in Mesa Chivato. Water Canyon, Cebolleta Canyon, and the canyon west of Marquez each carry water, but the streams dry up as soon as they emerge into the open country away from Mesa Chivato." Charles B. Hunt, "The Mount Taylor Coal Field," U.S. Geol. Survey, *Bulletin* 860-B (1936), p. 73.

60. Real Alencaster to Lorenzo Gutiérrez, Santa Fe, May 25, 1808; SANM, no. 2105. Gutiérrez to Bartolomé Baca, Pajarito, May 29, 1808; *ibid.*

61. Baca, Diario, May 31-June 4, 1808. This did not end the competition. There seems to have been some internal conflict both among Navaho and Spaniards over the planted fields in this area. See Juan Rafael Ortiz to Acting Gov. Alberto Maynez, Santa Fe, July 2, 1808. Gutiérrez to José Antonio Chávez, Pajarito, July 6, 1808. Chávez to Gutiérrez, Padillas, July 6, 1808. Gutiérrez to Maynez, Pajarito, July 7, 1808. Maynez to Gutiérrez, Santa Fe, July 9, 1808. SANM, no. 2105.

62. Baca, Diario.

63. *Ibid.* Baca to Gutiérrez, Tomé, June 5, 1808. Gutiérrez to Maynez, Pajarito, June 11, 1808. [Maynez to Gutiérrez], Santa Fe, June 23, 1808. Ortiz to Maynez, July 2, 1808. Maynez to Gutiérrez, Santa Fe, July 2, 1808. Gutiérrez to López, Pajarito, July 3, 1808. López to [Gutiérrez], July 5, 1808. Gutiérrez to Maynez, July 7, 1808. Maynez to Gutiérrez, July 9, 1808. SANM, no. 2105.

64. Gov. Manrique to Salcedo, Santa Fe, Aug. 29, 1809; SANM, no. 2248. Manrique served from 1808 until 1814.

65. Vicente López to Manrique, Laguna, Sept. 14, 1813; SANM, no. 2514.

66. Rafael Baca to Gov. Maynez (second term, 1814-1816 ad interim), Laguna, Aug. 7, 1815; SANM, no. 2616.

67. Diario de las novedades, April-Dec. 1815; SANM, no. 2585.

NAVAHO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1795-1846

FRANK D. REEVE

edited by Eleanor B. Adams and John L. Kessell

PART II, 1816-1824

AFTER a few comparatively tranquil years relations between Navaho and New Mexican deteriorated again in the summer of 1816. The settlers at Cebolleta were scared. In August Captain Bartolomé Baca, alcalde at Belén, informed the alcalde of Albuquerque that he was marching with his militia company to protect Cebolleta from the threat of Navaho attack.¹ Late in September Laguna alcalde José Vicente Ortiz reported to Governor Pedro María de Allande that fifteen Navaho had called on Fray Mariano Peñón, asking him to tell the governor that they were leaving their farms along the south side of Mt. Taylor, at Encinal, San José, and Cubero. They wanted a paper forbidding Spaniards to appropriate their land during their absence. These Indians were going to take refuge at Canyon de Chelly for fear, they said, of the Comanche.²

The trouble had begun earlier that summer. On August 4 Governor Allande wrote to Commandant General Bernardo Bonavia y Zapata about a friendly visit which Juan Lucero had made to the Comanche nation. On the sixteenth he wrote again, saying that Comanche had attacked Navaho. The New Mexico governor, Bonavia replied, should warn the militia captains and local officials to stand by to act as the movements of the Comanche or any other Indians might require.

The commandant general recognized the perils of the situation, for New Mexico lay between the two tribes. He ordered Governor Allande to summon Comanche captains and the general of the Navaho to Santa Fe and to endeavor to reconcile their differences. The Comanche must be made to realize that it was breach of their friendship with the Spaniards to go through "our own pueblos" to attack the Navaho, who were also friends of the Spaniards. On the other hand, Navaho suspicion that New Mexicans had countenanced Comanche hostility was unfounded, and there was no excuse for them to retaliate upon the people of the pueblos through which the Comanche had passed. Bonavia hoped to convince both parties of Spanish impartiality so that New Mexico could count upon Navaho aid in case the Comanche continued to misbehave. Allande was to leave no doubt that the moment either tribe broke the faith, it would be forced to respect the armed might of the King.

In case the Comanche were thinking of allying themselves with their eastern kinsmen, or with "the rebels and Americans," they should be warned that

any offers and gifts the former may make are not intended for their benefit, but to place them under obligation to be disloyal to us, thus making it possible for them to steal horses to take to the Americans. These Americans act in very bad faith, and their only aim is to take their lands and property from them and to finish them off little by little. If it were possible for these Comanche to go to the United States, they would see the proof of this truth. They would find no Indians there because the Americans have caused them to disappear, as they intend to do with them and all those whom they can win over. This has been the reason which has forced some tribes of the New Orleans territory to come to settle in ours.

In view of the Comanche's unlicensed entry into Spanish territory to attack other friends of the Spaniards, a real insult, further gifts to them, such as Lucero had taken, would be a sign of weakness. It was essential to preserve "the decorum of the armed might of the King our Lord."³

Meanwhile, on August 20 a Navaho called Salvador went to Ignacio María Sánchez Vergara, alcalde at Jémez, complaining that Comanche had stolen Navaho horses. Salvador said that because the settlers of the Río Abajo had moved their animals, the Navaho suspected that something was afoot. They had sent him to find out the truth. The alcalde and Interpreter Antonio García assured Salvador that the Spaniards were in no way involved in Comanche depredations. The Indian seemed inclined to accept this, but he wanted the governor's word as well. Sánchez Vergara promised that he and García would take the governor's reply to the Navaho who were awaiting the results of Salvador's mission. Allande responded that he had already sent a message for the Navaho making it clear that "I consider them my sons and friends, and that I have been distressed by the harm the Comanche have done them, but that neither I nor anyone belonging to this province was warned in time to forestall the Comanche."⁴

NAVAHO raided herds in the Río Abajo the next year, 1817, but details are lacking. Early in March 1818 Governor Allande notified the alcaldes of Cochití, Alameda, Albuquerque, and Belén that Ute Indians accompanied by Navaho had run off horses and killed stock in the Jémez jurisdiction. The alcalde of Jémez was sending out a force, and Allande ordered the other alcaldes to keep patrols of settlers and Indians out beyond where their animals grazed. They were also to alert herders and shepherds that Navaho were on the prowl. For the time being Allande could do no more, because he was then readying a large force of soldiers and citizens from the whole Río Arriba to investigate a report by Apache Indians that a party of Americans was at the Arroyo de los Yutas.⁵

It soon looked as if the Navaho were ready to break the peace in earnest. At Loma Parda in June a band of about seventy attacked a detachment of fourteen soldiers under Sergeant Mariano Bernal on their way to garrison Cebolleta. The troops beat them off and captured fourteen horses.⁶ A few days later Alcalde Sánchez Vergara wrote from Jémez that the Navaho were on the of-

fensive. At San Miguel on the upper Río Puerco they had killed Juan Alire of Corrales in a gaming quarrel and seriously wounded four shepherds. They were stealing stock here and there. They took the whole horse herd from don Luis María Cabeza de Baca's Ojo del Espíritu Santo ranch. Baca and his fifteen children had received this grant in 1815; it stretched from the crest of the Sierra de Jémez on the east to the Río Puerco and the end of Mesa Prieta on the west; and from Mesa de la Ventana in the north to Cañada de la Querencia and Antonio Armenta's ranch in the south.⁷ But Navaho resentment over grants in this area was nothing new.

During July 1818 New Mexicans found it difficult to appraise the significance of such episodes. Was the whole Navaho nation rising? or were a few malcontents responsible as they had been before? Jémez Indians who had been among the Navaho at the time of Alire's murder said that the tribe as a whole was not to blame. On the basis of a scouting expedition from the Mt. Taylor area to Zuñi, José Vicente Ortiz, alcalde at Laguna, thought that the depredations were the work of the "hungry thieves who roam these parts." He offered to go to the Navaho leaders and do all he could to persuade them to turn in the miscreants. This point of view seemed reasonable at the time. Allande had sent Interpreter García with eighteen Jémez, Zía, and Santa Ana Indians to question the Navaho leaders about the motives for the murder, and to have them bring in the culprits as they had promised to do in a similar case in April 1817 when two shepherd boys were killed.⁸

About the same time Governor Allande was informed of trouble to the north. Navaho Indians had killed Vicente García, a citizen of Santa Cruz, in the jurisdiction of Abiquiú. Navaho also got away with four hundred sheep, two burros, and other animals from the Río de las Gallinas, or Arroyo del Capulín.⁹

It was becoming apparent that the situation was more serious than many had wished to believe. When Interpreter García met Joaquín near Tunicha, this Navaho captain told him that the Navaho in general were rising against the New Mexicans. Allande immediately notified Alcalde Ortiz that he was sending sixteen presidials to El Vadito pending the arrival of Captain Bartolomé

Baca and his militia company. He also told him to give the lieutenant alcalde of Zuñi an escort so that he could return there and help the alcalde take precautions against Navaho raids.¹⁰

At sunset on July 20 Sánchez Vergara saw smokes in the vicinity of Jémez. He feared surprise attack and went on the alert. Soon Captain Joaquín appeared with a brother and two nephews. Concealing his suspicions, the alcalde received his visitors with the usual courtesies and was soon convinced of this Navaho leader's loyalty and good will. Joaquín had come to report that the Navaho nation was preparing for war. He had tried to dissuade them, but in vain. Therefore he and his band had decided to withdraw and to cast their lot with the Spaniards. According to Joaquín, the hostile Navaho had gathered in force at Carrizo, where they had fortified themselves on mesas with Ute allies, and were raiding from that base. He said that five or six detachments attacking from all sides could frustrate the rebels' plans. Joaquín's followers had given him four days for his mission; he would await the governor's decision, but if he failed to return within this time, his people would assume that he had been made a prisoner.¹¹

In late July or early August Captain Bartolomé Baca gave Antonio Chávez the aid of twenty Ácoma Indians, two militiamen, and two citizens to reconnoiter the area to which Navaho raiders had taken sheep stolen from "La Cebolla." They found no trace of these animals, but did bring in 302 head that had strayed to Ácoma. Not long after, another scouting party, operating a hundred miles to the northeast, failed to pick up the trail of Navaho reported in the Valle Grande area. Nevertheless, the pueblos of Santa Clara and San Juan were ordered to move their horse herds to the east side of the Río Grande. Matías Ortiz at Cuyamungué assembled a force of two hundred cavalry and twenty-five infantry and awaited instructions from Santa Fe.¹²

A new governor, don Facundo Melgares, took office during the critical summer of 1818. Despite the storm clouds gathering over New Mexico, the veteran soldier began his term with buoyant optimism. In a series of letters to Commandant General Alejo García Conde, written from Santa Fe in August, Melgares told

what he was doing to humble the Navaho. First he had sent a couple of Ute petty captains as emissaries to let them know how distressed he was by their hostile acts. He wanted guilty Navaho brought to him at once and the spoils returned. If they obeyed, he would forget all the crimes they had committed to date. If they refused this generous offer, he would march into Navaholand in person and give them no quarter.

While he waited for a reply the governor ordered two patrols to the Navaho frontier under presidial Captain Andrés Gómez Sañudo and militia Captain Bartolomé Baca "to repel any coward among that canaille who might be intent upon continuing his rascality."¹⁸ On August 16 Captain Gómez Sañudo, on his way to aid Baca, wrote from the Vado de Piedra on the Río Puerco that he had word of Navaho stealing stock in that area. He immediately set out in pursuit. At the Rincón de Santa Rosa he ran into Captain Baca, who had left home for Cebolleta on August 14. After a siesta on the Río Puerco, Baca and his men rode on. They were scarcely out of sight over the next hill when a band of Navaho swooped down and ran off a bunch of horses. The Navaho prevented the herders from getting a message to Baca until the following morning, when he too went after the thieves. At the place where the captains met they noticed the trail of fifteen or twenty Navaho with horses and cattle. Since it was old, they decided to split up to continue the search. Just then two Navaho came along driving nine or ten horses. When they saw the New Mexicans they took off. Although they outdistanced the pursuers, Baca acquired the horses. The patrols remained in the field, and on September 1 four of Baca's men, killed by Navaho, were buried at Laguna. Meanwhile, news of repeated raids in the Zuñi area reached Santa Fe.¹⁴

The Ute captains came back with word that their mission had failed. The ungrateful Navaho had declared that they would continue open warfare and resist invasion. Melgares acted accordingly. He prepared to march on September 1 at the head of a thousand men. He told the commandant general that he could lose no

time in subjecting the Navaho because of rumors of foreign infiltration among the tribes north and east of New Mexico. When he was on the point of leaving the capital, news from Taos forced him to change his plans.

At five o'clock in the afternoon of August 30, 1818, Alcalde Juan de Dios Peña of Taos received Melgares' orders for the Navaho campaign. At the very same hour word reached him that "an American, formerly a soldier in our forces, called Manuel Hernández, had come from Anglo-American territory to Río Colorado, the first plaza of this jurisdiction." Hernández claimed that a multitude of "Frenchmen," allied with Kiowa and other tribes, were assembling to attack New Mexico. Peña detained the troops scheduled to leave for the Navaho expedition the next day, saying "here we are on the point of losing the province if we permit an hour's delay." He expected to hear from Melgares within twenty-four hours. In the meantime the alcalde sent for "the American" and ordered the families at Río Colorado and Arroyo Hondo to come in to Taos. He dispatched a hundred good men to reconnoiter the threatened frontier.¹⁵

The following morning Melgares commissioned Lieutenant José María de Arce to investigate. Arce set out for Taos immediately. There he questioned Hernández for twenty minutes before sending him to Santa Fe. Although the lieutenant was sceptical about Hernández' tale and believed that even if it were true the foreigners' plans would take some time to mature, he was going out at once with two hundred men to the Valle de Culebra to guard the passes. From there he would send out a party to scout the other side of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains as far as the Río Napestle. In view of the crisis in the north, he asked Melgares to relieve the citizens of the Río Arriba from Navaho campaign duty.

Indeed Arce was more than doubtful of Hernández' veracity. He pointed out that the man was an apostate who had deserted to join the foreigners who had been tried the year before, and that he had since been living with the Indians. He could well be playing a double game. If so, and if the enemy intended to attack through

other passes, Arce believed that small parties should be sent to guard the frontier at Lo de Mora and El Vado, where they could also spy on hostile Indians.¹⁶

For the time being Melgares was obliged to cancel the Navaho campaign. He clapped Hernández in irons and had him questioned at length.¹⁷ On September 6 the governor wrote to the commandant general that in order to forestall any "insidia de los americanos o insurgentes," without neglecting the Navaho war, he had made the following dispositions: He had mustered all the manpower of the province, posting 600 men at Taos under Arce as the vanguard, 400 men with two pieces of artillery under Gómez Sañudo at El Vado as the center, and 800 men under Bartolomé Baca on the right bank of the Río Grande as the rear guard to hold off the Navaho. He had issued the necessary arms and munitions "for the formidable task of defending this province if any kind of enemy tries to dispute our Beneficent Sovereign's undeniable right to it." If the foreign menace proved minimal, Melgares would make two expeditions, one to the Plains to determine the actual number of foreigners, the other to punish the Navaho. In another letter of the same date he asked for two hundred cavalymen and infantrymen from Sonora and one hundred from Nueva Vizcaya to stiffen the defense of New Mexico and to bring the wars to a glorious conclusion.¹⁸

The commandant general replied on September 22. He too minimized the reports of the former Carrizal presidial Hernández. Even if there were some truth in his "farrago of unrelated and mostly exaggerated information," his motive was to clear himself of earlier charges of suspect conduct. In view of the evidence that Hernández had been involved in the activities of "Muni y Sotó" (Auguste P. Chouteau and Jules de Mun) he was to be held in jail until further notice. The danger could not be as imminent as he claimed. How could the supposed American general have achieved the alliance with all the tribes on the Missouri River, returned to report to his government, and gone back to undertake the "imagined expedition," all since May? Such rumors were nothing new. A letter from the Spanish consul in the United

States, a copy of which he had sent to Melgares, indicated that the Americans were not planning anything of the kind.

Certainly Melgares must not abandon the precautions upon which the security of the northern frontier had always depended. He was to continue to send out patrols in the guise of buffalo hunters and traders to the Kiowa and allied tribes, and to the Comanche on the east. But he must take advantage of this season of abundant water and pasturage to humble "the perverse Navaho" before they seized the opportunity to overrun the province. Melgares was to proceed with the Navaho campaign as planned, leaving the well-qualified Arce as *comandante de armas* during his absence. One hundred soldiers each from Chihuahua and Sonora were on their way to New Mexico by the shortest route.¹⁹

The viceroy, Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, Conde de Venadito, agreed that the Navaho campaign must come first. Nevertheless, while he accepted his subordinates' appraisal of the Hernández statement, from his vantage point in the capital he emphasized the need for continued vigilance. He had received other reports of foreign activity among the tribes. Meanwhile Arce's reconnaissance in force far to the north produced nothing to support Hernández' story.²⁰

FREE AT LAST to mount his delayed Navaho expedition, Melgares took the field in late October with a sizeable force, including troops from Sonora. During the 49-day campaign that followed he chalked up a score of seven Navaho dead, two prisoners, and the capture of 20 horses, 3 mules, and 2,300 sheep. Aided by bad weather the Navaho had eluded him, "fleeing on the highest peaks." His attempts to attack them were in vain. One night the Indians threw down *jarrazos* (lit. "great jars"; perhaps for *jarazos*, "spears") wounding seven soldiers. Fortunately for them, a strong north wind and the cloudy obscurity prevented them from being seen and cut to pieces.²¹

According to an account of the 1818 campaign written a generation later, Melgares besieged a fortified stronghold of the

Navaho (perhaps Big Bead Mesa) for more than forty days without success. This high, almost impregnable mesa had permanent water on top and caves in which the Navaho could store their crops protected from the elements.²²

At this point the Navaho sent Melgares a cross and proposed peace. He replied that they must render homage to the sovereign, settle down in the "sierra de la nombre de la tribu," and make restitution for the damage they had done, or the war would continue. For the time being, however, the governor felt that it was advisable to negotiate "because in view of the fact that they are an Apache group in language, way of life, and characteristics, their robberies and forays will continue to be a problem until their extermination." Had it not been for other circumstances Melgares believed that he could have dealt definitively with the Navaho:

The country these cowardly heathen inhabit is limited and is hemmed in by this province [N.M.] on the east, and by the Ute and Hopi on the west. And in spite of their nomadic life, without homes, or any kind of government, authority, or law, I do not believe that it would be difficult for me (with the knowledge of their country I have acquired by traveling in it with an observant eye) to destroy them or force them to withdraw via the Río Grande [San Juan-Colorado] which runs to California west of this province and of their Navaho country.²³

On January 12, 1819, acting Commandant General Antonio Cordero acknowledged receipt of Melgares' account of the Navaho campaign. "Although greater success would have been desirable, I realize that the season of the year, the locality, and the circumstances regarding these Indians do not favor achieving it." He approved the governor's reply to the Navaho and said that because of conditions in the province Melgares should make every effort to secure peace, even reducing the requirements if necessary. Cordero transmitted the information to the viceroy the following day, reiterating his belief that peace with the Navaho was essential. The viceroy agreed.²⁴

Nevertheless, according to Melgares, "after diplomatic and kindly negotiations with the perfidious Navaho" these Indians killed a Laguna and stole some horses. The governor planned to attack the tribe from all sides. "I do not believe that it is humanly possible for them to escape ruination or flight to the other side of the Río Colorado which empties into the sea at California, in which case we shall be rid of this troublesome neighbor."²⁵

On January 29 the governor ordered the alcalde at Santa Cruz de la Cañada to assemble two hundred men. Three days later he learned that a horde of Navaho was headed for the Río Abajo. He sent an urgent warning to the alcaldes of Alameda, Albuquerque, and Belén in the hope that they, with the citizens of these districts and their militia captains, might teach the hostiles a lesson.²⁶ The governor himself then marched into Navaho country for the second time.

Melgares was in the field on February 17 when the alcalde of Zuñi sent a message that five Hopi Indians had come to ask the aid of the New Mexicans against the Navaho. The governor sent a detachment, which attacked Navaho in the Hopi pueblos of Walpi and Teguá. The soldiers killed some of the intruders and put the rest to flight, thus showing the Hopi with what alacrity the Spaniards would respond when Hopi well-being and tranquility were at stake. As soon as he returned to Santa Fe in March the governor dispatched five emissaries to Hopi from Sandía, probably descendants of the Hopi or Río Grande Pueblo refugees settled there in the mid-eighteenth century. Melgares was delighted and hoped to be able to send two friars "to complete the work," for never since the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 had the Hopi "asked for aid from New Mexico, perhaps fearful because of their crime, or of being subjugated." He was convinced that he at long last could make them realize "how much they have lost, how many humiliations they have suffered from the Navaho and other tribes because they were not under the auspices of the one true God and the king our lord."

During this second Navaho campaign Melgares' troops had killed thirty-six, made twenty prisoners of both sexes, and cap-

tered considerable livestock, which was divided up and eaten. Leaving a small force in the field under Captain Gómez Sañudo, Melgares had led the rest back to Santa Fe, arriving about March 18.²⁷

Once more the Navaho sued for peace. From the New Mexican point of view it was high time. Not only were there reports of foreign activity on the Plains and in the Rockies, but ever since 1810 the troubled state of the viceroyalty had resulted in neglect of the frontier military. Even wages for the troops in New Mexico were in arrears. The burden of supporting the presidials on campaign had to be assumed, at least in part, by voluntary subscriptions from the local citizens.²⁸ Peace on the western front promised some hope of respite.

Chief Joaquín and his followers came into Jémez on March 31, 1819, to negotiate. Presenting Rafael Montes with a cross, they handed over four New Mexican captives, two from Cebolleta, one from Sauzal, and one from Atrisco. Joaquín had a black mule he said belonged to the governor, but he did not give it up because they had all been riding the one animal. Montes asked Melgares to give Joaquín the pinto horse and mare taken from the Indian's brother when he was captured at Zuñi. Joaquín offered to bring in the two remaining captives in return for the favor he was asking. Montes sent a soldier on to Santa Fe with the message and the cross.²⁹

Melgares replied the following day, saying that he had decided to grant a truce. He would go or send representatives to the Cerro Cabezón to draw up terms, and would let the Navaho know the date so that all the tribe might assemble to hear them. He sent Joaquín a commission as captain so that both Spaniards and Navaho might know how his services were appreciated. The Indian was to take the news to his people and let them know that they were now free to come and go at Jémez—and that they were not to rouse Melgares' ire again.³⁰

Ten days later five Navaho came to Jémez from the Mesas de Chaca to buy maize. Montes consulted the governor, not knowing whether he should allow these Indians to go on to trade with

other pueblos. Melgares replied that for the time being they could go only to Jémez; since there were no interpreters elsewhere, misunderstandings might arise.³¹

When Governor Melgares conveyed the gratifying news to the commandant general on April 18, he said that the Navaho would already have been living in pueblos as vassals of the crown if the news of "the ambitious Anglo-Americans on the north at the confluence of the Rochecon [Roche Jaune], or Piedra Amarilla, had not prevented it." Now that he had harried them throughout their land they had come in "more humble than ever. . . . For all this, blessed be the Lord of Hosts, Who so obviously protects the arms of the king our lord." "Full of joy," he boasted that not a shot was to be heard on the entire line, nor was there a single enemy of the king. The commandant general and the viceroy commended the able interim governor of New Mexico. Both were confident that he would use excellent judgment in drawing up a treaty with the Navaho. He would, of course, remit it to Mexico City for approval, and the viceroy suggested a stipulation that the Navaho be required to give hostages as a guarantee of good faith.³²

During the Navaho war settlers in the more vulnerable localities had led an uneasy life. New Mexicans had been moving to the region beyond Abiquiú for more than a decade. On August 1, 1806, Governor Real Alencaster approved the San Joaquín del Cañón del Río de Chama grant, about four leagues west of Abiquiú, to Francisco Salazar, ensign in the local militia, his brothers, and twenty-eight other poor and landless petitioners. Early in 1808 Juan Bautista Valdez and nine others received the Cañón de San Miguel (Pedernales) grant near Abiquiú. Possession was given to thirty-nine settlers on March 1 of that year. From time to time the Navaho drove the early settlers away, but they always returned. The settlers at San Joaquín abandoned their holdings during the war, and in April 1819 they appealed for military support to enable them to return and plant their crops. Governor Melgares replied that the danger was over because the enemy had asked for peace.³³

The formal treaty was signed at Santa Fe on August 21, 1819,

by Melgares, with the marks of Joaquín, caudillo principal; Gorda, for the cacique; and Vicente, Salvador, and Francisco, captains. The terms were not substantially different from those of earlier treaties. As usual, there was to be a "general" of the Navaho nation, preferably Joaquín because of his character and loyalty to the Spaniards, with subordinate captains of the several "families or factions." The Indians were to cultivate the land and provide for themselves. Known Navaho transgressors were to be taken to the governor for punishment. Complaints against New Mexicans were to be referred to the government, which would punish the delinquents and award damages if necessary. As for the lands heretofore used by the Navaho: "The boundary remains as before without change as far as Cañón Largo, the mouth of Chaco Canyon, and Agua Azul, to which the livestock of the province has ranged in past years when, happily, peace reigned, and to which it shall now go, without passing the limits specified."

On certain points this treaty differed from earlier ones: The general of the Navaho must live as near as possible to Jémez for the prompt dispatch of business between Navaho and Spaniard. The Spanish authorities may have been thinking of closer observation and control of the Indians, even though one of the interpreters already lived at Jémez. In order to ensure the peace, "four youths shall live as hostages in this capital [Santa Fe] and shall be released each year, or after a shorter period, in exchange for an equal number, at the discretion of the Navaho general." To show their good will, the Spaniards would hand over a number of Navaho held captive in Santa Fe once the treaty was put into effect. Another clause enjoined the Navaho to respect the persons and property of the Hopi, "in view of the fact that this government is taking them under the protection of our kind sovereign, in whose shadow they have taken refuge."³⁴

JUDGING from the lack of documentation to the contrary Melgares' 1819 peace with the Navaho lasted nearly two years. During this respite on the western front the governor of New Mexico did

what he could to improve the defense of the province and to investigate rumors of American activity. New Mexican patrols ranged as far as the Yellowstone.³⁶ Melgares also kept informed about the internal unrest in New Spain. By July of 1821—the month the army deposed Viceroy Conde de Venadito—Navaho and New Mexican were at it again.

On July 6, 1821, Alcalde José Joaquín de Montoya complained to Melgares. Landholders in his jurisdiction, fearful of Navaho raiders, had moved away in violation of the commandant general's order of September 16, 1804, which forbade the abandonment of frontier points on pain of loss of property and lands. The burden of defense was too much for the few poor people who remained behind. The alcalde urged that the defectors be forced to return, even without their families. Melgares replied that the commandant general's ruling held, provided there was nothing to the contrary in the 1820 *Ley Constitucional*.³⁸

Late in July the governor ordered the constitutional alcalde of Santa Fe to send forty fully armed men with provisions for a month to Captain Bartolomé Baca at Cebolleta to serve as cavalry against the Navaho. At the end of a month they would be relieved by a like number so that the burden of this service would be distributed equitably. Volunteers might join if they wished, and perhaps would profit from booty.³⁷ Late in July militia Captain Juan Antonio Cabeza de Vaca led an expedition of two hundred twenty-five men from Jémez, but the record of their accomplishments, if any, is missing.³⁸ In late September Captain Francisco Xavier Chávez campaigned against the Navaho, killing twenty-one braves, making seven captives of both sexes, and taking four hundred horses and 2,112 sheep. Moreover, he laid waste the Navaho maize fields and drove the Indians from the Sierra Tunicha, "su iglesia, más de cien leguas de su centro."³⁹

On October 3, 1821, Juan Armijo set out from Cebolleta with an irregular force of militia and Indian auxiliaries from the Río Abajo. His account of this expedition vividly portrays the day-to-day problems that plagued such operations against the Navaho. The first night he camped at the paraje of San Lucas in prescribed

military order. Obviously the local citizens did not regard this enterprise with unqualified enthusiasm. Some of them had drawn up a statement expressing their resentment because the number of men specified by the governor had not been raised. Francisco Armijo of Belén presented this to Juan Armijo just as he was about to march on the fourth. When Juan refused to accept it, Francisco wheeled around shouting that he was not going on the campaign and that he would defend all who followed him. Although Juan Armijo now had only the Indian auxiliaries and the deserters' officers, he went on to the paraje of the Siete Ojos, where he made camp. There Francisco Armijo returned with the deserters, saying that he had taken pity on the wretched men, but had repented his error. He now volunteered to go to meet Juan Rafael Ortiz and bring up the supply train. Convinced of his change of heart, the commander gave him sixty men for this task.

When Francisco failed to return by the appointed day, October 9, Juan marched to meet him, camping at the Cañada de las Cabras "in good order." On the eleventh, when he was ready to proceed, don Francisco Pino of the *alcaldía* of Belén complained that although he was lieutenant of the *milicia urbana*, Juan Armijo had not made him his *ayudante* but had conferred the honor on don Manuel de Turrieta, *alférez de milicias arregladas*. Pino handed his force over to Armijo and departed—followed by all his men who had plotted this action the night before. Armijo stated that the reason was not so much the slight to Pino as the men's fear of entering Navaho country with a small untrained force.

Desertions and insubordination did not deter Juan Armijo. He went on to the Cañada de la Rica, where he met Francisco Armijo and the supply train handed over by Ortiz at "la Peña Blanca, farm of the Navaho Cayetano." On the same day Juan gave Francisco six men to pursue the deserters, whom they overtook at Cebolleta. Pino and his subordinates Juan and Rafael Baca were adamant, but the other deserters rejoined the expedition, which set out again on the fifteenth, with the culprits on foot, shouldering their weapons, as punishment. By forced marches lasting well into the night

they now pushed on via the Cañones de la Agua Chiquita, the Cañon de la Mesa Quemada, and the Cañones de la Agua Salada, reaching the edge of the Chuska Valley on October 18. Here they found a track leading "contra la Sierra Mesas del Ojo del Joso." At eleven o'clock on the nineteenth they surprised the Navaho, killing seven. The Indians fled with three of the bodies, so only four pairs of ears served as testimony to victory. The New Mexicans, who suffered no casualties, took a nursing infant, seized the foodstuffs, captured five horses and killed two. Armijo could no longer resist the complaints of his hungry men, "those who performed this service being drawn from the poorest classes in their districts."⁴⁰

The presidial troop entered the field in December, but the "humbled" Navaho did not want to fight. Once again they asked for peace and agreed to go to Santa Fe to treat with the governor.⁴¹ This led to a tragedy.

Representatives of the tribe, on their way to meet Governor Melgares, received what appeared to be a friendly welcome at Jémez. Behind the scenes, however, the people of Jémez and Cochiti had conspired against the Navaho. Under the leadership of Alcalde Juan Antonio Baca they fell upon the Indians and clubbed thirteen to death.⁴² The Navaho appealed to the governor for justice and the culprits were tried and sentenced. Although the sentence was confirmed by the superior authorities, petitions for pardon were forwarded to Mexico City. The case was referred to the Mexican Congress in March 1824. The guilty men went free.⁴³

While this doleful event ran its judicial course Mexico achieved independence. In accordance with the Plan de Iguala, all inhabitants of the former viceroyalty of New Spain, whether Europeans, Africans, or Indians, were to enjoy full status as citizens, including protection of their property rights. The Navaho, however, were neither aware of nor able to grasp the significance of this guarantee. So, early in 1822, while New Mexicans were celebrating the new order, Navaho tribesmen wrought havoc. According to Thomas James, a disdainful American observer in Santa Fe:

They killed all of every age and condition, burned and destroyed all they could not take away with them, and drove away the sheep, cattle and horses. They came from the south directly towards Santa Fe, sweeping everything before them, and leaving the land desolate behind them. They recrossed the Del Norte below Santa Fe, and passed to the north, laid bare the country around the town of Taos, and then disappeared with all their booty.

Governor Melgares called out the militia. The same observer, who "preferred to be a spectator in such a war," favors us with a typically gringo view of Melgares and his tatterdemalion company:

Most of them were armed with bows and arrows. A few had guns that looked as if they had been imported by Cortez, while others had iron hoops fastened to the ends of poles, which passed for lances.

The governor, followed by his adjutant, reviewed this motley assembly on foot. "Five feet high, nearly as thick as he was long," Melgares "still seemed big with the fate of New Mexico." But "the blood-thirsty Navahoes . . . had returned in safety to their own country."⁴⁴

On March 8 a pioneer American trapper recorded "that the Spanierds Have Sent 700 men against the nabeho Indeans." On May 1 he wrote from Taos:

We Ware Informed that Spanish army Had Returned that they Had taken one old Indean and Some two or three old Horses that Ware So poor the Nabeho Cold not drive them up the mountains— for it appers the[y] Went up the Steep mountain and Role down the Rocks on their Pursurs So that the[y] Ware Compled to dis-continu the pursute.⁴⁵

UNDER THE NEW REGIME changes in civil and military functions resulted in confusion. It was difficult to know from one day to the next who held a particular office and what his authority was.

During 1822 Melgares, Francisco Xavier Chávez, and Lieutenant Colonel José Antonio Vizcarra exercised civil and/or military authority, as dictates from Mexico reached Santa Fe. Vizcarra succeeded Melgares and Chavez in the combined civil and military command on December 21, 1822. Authority was divided again by decree of July 19, 1823, and Bartolomé Baca became jefe político in September, with Vizcarra continuing as military chief.⁴⁶

Soon after Vizcarra took over the united offices, the Navaho problem drew him into the field. At Laguna on February 5, 1823, he composed a four-point statement of appropriate terms for yet another treaty: 1) The Navaho should hand over all captives. 2) Navaho prisoners should be returned to the tribe unless they preferred to become Christians. 3) The Navaho must surrender every last thing they had stolen since the latest treaty. 4) The Navaho should be strongly urged to accept Christianity and to settle down in pueblos established for them in suitable places. He requested the opinion of the militia on this proposal.

Three days later at Pagate some forty New Mexican citizens replied. Captain Bartolomé Baca, who headed the list, said that he agreed with the governor, adding that any Navaho thief caught in the act after the treaty should be killed on the spot, or imprisoned if he surrendered. The rest followed Baca's lead; all signed the statement.

On February 12 an agreement with the Navaho was signed at the campo de Pagate by Vizcarra and by Captains Bartolomé Baca and Juan Antonio Sandoval in behalf of General Juanico and his tribe. The Indians handed over the captives they had with them. They protested the clause allowing the New Mexicans to keep Navaho allegedly ready for conversion, but Governor Vizcarra refused to cede this point. As for reparations, the Navaho claimed that they were dying of hunger and could not possibly repay what they were accused of stealing, although they did promise not to offend again. As for the final clause, they had to consult the entire nation and would reply within the four months dating from March 1.⁴⁷

The New Mexicans were not optimistic about the outcome,

and drew up a plan for large-scale action against the Navaho: 1) The governor would lead a thousand men into Navaholand; two hundred would be stationed within the province to guard the home front. 2) Local alcaldes were to provide replacements for the whole force every two months. 3) The booty would be divided pro rata among the men actually engaged in the fighting; as the only permanent force, the *compañía veterana* would be entitled to receive the best horses and mules, since to be properly mounted they needed a horse and a mule per man. 4) Even if there were no booty for distribution at the time of the bimonthly replacement, those who had not actually fought were entitled to none. 5) One-fourth of the spoils would be reserved for repairing arms and other necessary military expenses. 6) Rightful owners of stock recovered from the Navaho could claim animals bearing a known brand. 7) Officers and unit commanders would receive double booty.⁴⁸

Since, as Vizcarra had anticipated, the February agreement did not bring peace and the Navaho were soon on the prowl again, he wrote to the commandant general that he had resolved to march on June 18 with fifteen hundred men for a four- or five-month campaign. During his absence don Francisco Xavier Chávez, *primer vocal* of the provincial assembly and colonel of the militia, was to act as jefe político.⁴⁹

For ten weeks, from June 18 to August 31, Vizcarra hunted the Navaho. Following every trace of the elusive enemy, he carried the war west across the vast Black Mesa of present-day northeastern Arizona, and north into Utah. After various minor encounters the expedition reached First Mesa on July 17. As the governor had heard, Navaho Indians, including Delgadito, had taken refuge in the Hopi country with their livestock. Enlisting the aid of the Hopi, he spent the next two weeks in a determined effort to clean out all the Navaho in the area. In view of the Hopi appeal to Governor Melgares in 1819, they must have been glad to be rid of the Navaho. On the other hand, the presence of such a large Mexican force in their territory was a mixed blessing. Limited aid against the Navaho was one thing, but the risk of being subjected themselves was the last thing they ever wanted.

On August 8 Vizcarra attacked a *ranchería* of Paiute, mistaking them for Navaho. Afterwards one of these Indians guided the New Mexicans to the hiding place of Juanico, whose tracks they found the same afternoon. They overtook him the next day. Certainly, after the abortive agreement, Vizcarra had no reason to trust Juanico, and when the Indian shouted from above that he was ready to talk, the commander retorted that he had come to fight. In the skirmishes that followed the Navaho tactics were designed to frustrate Vizcarra. Alternately attacking and retreating they took advantage of their superior horses and their adversaries' preoccupation with rounding up stock, engaging in hand-to-hand combat with the small parties detached for this purpose. Finally, when two officers and two soldiers were wounded, Vizcarra began his withdrawal, still rounding up livestock.⁵⁰

Navaho spokesmen now approached the *alcaldes* at Laguna and Jémez. They wanted peace. Under the newly divided authority at Santa Fe this raised the question of the treaty-making power and the return of Christian Navaho captives. *Jefe Político* Bartolomé Baca took the initiative by summoning representatives of the village *ayuntamientos* to the capital, and on October 21 the majority voted for peace.⁵¹ Notes to the *alcaldes* instructed them to bring together the Navaho made captive during the Vizcarra expedition. The *jefe político* set up a meeting with the Navaho for December 2 to negotiate a treaty.

Colonel Vizcarra took exception to Baca's actions, claiming that declaring war and making peace were prerogatives of the military. The call for captives to exchange with the Navaho was wrong, for they had been taken in legitimate war while the Indians had stolen their New Mexican prisoners. Furthermore, "it is my belief," said the commander, "that if a liberal government like the one we have adopted were to hand over to infidels individuals who have entered our society, all or most of whom have received the health-giving waters of holy baptism, we might as well go on supporting the despotic government of which we are now free." If Baca persisted in holding the December 2 meeting at *Isleta*, Vizcarra would leave the capital November 25 and conduct it himself.

If Baca wished to be present, he would meet him at Isleta. In the meantime Vizcarra was reporting to the commandant general; Baca could do likewise.⁵²

Baca responded from Tomé on November 21. Vizcarra was sadly mistaken if he considered that Baca had arbitrarily deprived him of authority. The jefe político was simply carrying out the mandate of the province as a whole. "I am very far from being electrified by the heated expressions you have hurled at me in your letter." He too was writing to the commandant general.⁵³

The commandant general forwarded the conflicting opinions to Mexico City. In the meantime Vizcarra twice addressed himself directly to the ministro de guerra y marina. On December 17 he said that the Navaho who had come to him asking for peace requested the return of those taken captive. Because most of these were Christians, his conscience demanded that he refuse, but he asked for instructions. A month later he wrote that he and Baca had worked out a compromise. Nevertheless, in order to maintain harmony, he needed a document defining in detail the authority of his office. He believed that making war and peace fell within his jurisdiction, but this was the chief point in dispute.⁵⁴

On January 20, 1824, fourteen articles of peace resulting from the December meeting at Isleta were signed at Jémez by Vizcarra, Baca, and Antonio "El Pinto," general of the Navaho nation:

- 1) The Navaho shall surrender all New Mexican captives and any apostates living with the tribe.
- 2) The New Mexicans shall return Navaho captives, provided they wish to go, since to send back those who had received baptism or intended to was un-Christian.
- 3) The point raised in article 2 has been referred to the government in Mexico City.
- 4) Claims may be made against the Navaho for robberies committed in violation of the truce they themselves asked for at Isleta to give them time to consult their nation.
- 5) The Navaho shall avoid any abuse with regard to the horses stolen in time of war. The jefe político has acknowledged their ownership of said horses. The New Mexicans shall be bound by this.
- 6) The jefe político shall order the alcaldes to pursue Navaho marauders and recover property; in case

the Indians rejoin their rancherías, the petty captains shall force them to give satisfaction. 7) If any New Mexicans rob Navaho, the Indians shall ask for the aid of the local authorities; the jefe político shall order these officials to grant it, seizing the culprits, making them return the stolen goods, and punishing them accordingly. 8) Since these negotiations are undertaken in good faith, the Navaho may propose all those stipulations consistent with their way of life acknowledged on previous occasions. 9) In accordance with the preceding article the Navaho are free to appoint petty captains in their customary manner so that the latter may exact fulfillment of these treaties. 10) These petty captains shall be responsible for making the Navaho ranchos said to be on the other side of the Sierra Dátil rejoin the tribe, lest all Navaho commit robberies, putting the blame on them. They shall report the result of this effort so that the necessary measures may be taken. 11) Since the known chiefs of the tribe, such as Juanico, El Chato, and Facundo, have conspicuously absented themselves from the preliminary discussions, the petty captains appointed shall urge them to join in as proof of their peaceful intentions. 12) Once the Navaho ratify the peace they shall treat well any New Mexican traveling through their country and shall put aside all ill feelings towards their kinsmen who choose to remain with the New Mexicans. 13) Since the nature of peace is to quiet old grievances originating in time of war, both parties shall be obliged to behave accordingly because of the New Mexicans' generosity in not charging the Navaho with the innumerable robberies they have committed. 14) In accordance with the New Mexicans' Christian duty they urge the pagan nation to embrace the Holy Faith of their own free will.⁵⁵

The Navaho accepted the articles with little comment. As for Article 1, they said they had only one captive, held by La Gorda; he would be returned. With regard to Article 13, the Navaho did not want the individuals who killed the thirteen Navaho at Jémez subjected to further punishment after their long imprisonment. They had suffered enough.⁵⁶

NOTES

1. José Mariano de la Peña to Gov. Pedro María de Allande (1816-1818 ad interim), Pajarito, Aug. 20, 1816; SANM, no. 2668.
2. Ortiz to Allande, Laguna, Sept. 26, 1816; SANM-BLM, no. 668.
3. Bernardo Bonavia to Allande, Durango, Sept. 10, 1816; SANM, no. 2672.
4. Sánchez Vergara to Allande, Jémez, Aug. 20, 1816; SANM, no. 2669. Allande to Sánchez Vergara, Santa Fe, Aug. 21, 1816; *ibid.* Alcalde Sánchez Vergara served as Protector of the Indians from 1817 to 1821, having succeeded Felipe Sandoval in that capacity. Marc Simmons, *Spanish Government in New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1968), pp. 190-91.
5. Allande to alcaldes of Cochití, Alameda, Albuquerque, Belén, Santa Fe, March 2, 1818; SANM, no. 2714. A Navaho was held prisoner at Santa Fe at a cost of one real per day, which amounted to ten pesos, two reales for the period Aug. 11 to Oct. 31, 1817. SANM, no. 2699. In 1882 seventy-five-year-old Juan López of Peña Blanca, who had attended school there in 1817 at the house of Juan Antonio Cabeza de Baca, recalled that Navaho had attacked in the Cañada de Cochití sometime between 1817 and 1821. Cañada de Cochití Grant; S-G, BLM, no. 135.
6. Service record of Bernal, Santa Fe, Dec. 31, 1821; MANM.
7. Sánchez Vergara to Allande, Jémez, June 24, 1818; SANM, no. 2726. Allande to Sánchez Vergara, Santa Fe, June 25, 1818; SANM, no. 2727. Sánchez Vergara to Allande, Jémez, June 29, 1818; SANM, no. 2728. [Allande] to Sánchez Vergara, Santa Fe, July 1, 1818; *ibid.* Tomás Cabeza de Baca, Ojo del Espíritu Santo Grant; S-G, BLM, no. 44. Manuel Hurtado testified in 1860 that the Navaho had driven Baca away temporarily in 1816 or 1817. Cf. Part I, note 25.
8. Allande to Sánchez Vergara, June 25, 1818. Sánchez Vergara to Allande, June 29, 1818. Ortiz to Allande, Laguna, July 7, 1818; SANM, 2732. Allande to Ortiz, Santa Fe, July 10, 1818; SANM, no. 2733.
9. [Allande] to Sánchez Vergara, Santa Fe, July 1, 1818; SANM, no. 2728.
10. [Allande] to Ortiz, July 10, 1818. [Allande] to Miguel Ortiz, Santa Fe, July 10, 1818; SANM, no. 2731.
11. Sánchez Vergara to Allande, Jémez, July 21, 1818; SANM, no. 2736. Joaquín was evidently somewhat acculturated. He had accompanied the annual trade caravan to Nueva Vizcaya to sell skins and blankets. Unsigned letter to com. gen., n.d.; SANM, Misc. docs., vol. 1.

12. Manuel Rubí de Celis to Gov. Facundo Melgares (1818-1822 ad interim), Pajarito, Aug. 5, 1818; SANM, no. 2742. Matías Ortiz to Melgares, Cuyamungué, Aug. 21, 1818; SANM, no. 2739.

13. Melgares to García Conde, Santa Fe, Aug. 5, 17, 30, 1818; Providencias tomadas sobre invasión de la Provincia del Nuevo México proyectada por los facciosos de los Estados Unidos; AGN, Notas Diplomáticas, tomo 4. Allande handed the governorship over to Melgares on July 21. Com. Gen. García Conde believed that the new governor could handle the Navaho problem as effectively as Narbona had. García Conde to the Conde de Venadito, Durango, Sept. 23, 1818; *ibid.*

14. Gómez Sañudo to Melgares, Vado de Piedra del Río Puerco, Aug. 16, 1818; *ibid.* Baca to Melgares, Cebolleta, Aug. 16, 1818; *ibid.* Salvador García to Melgares, Zuñi, Aug. 21, 27, 1818; *ibid.* Fr. Mariano Peñón at Laguna complained on Jan. 31, 1819, that he had not been paid for the burials of José Antonio Valverde of Tomé, Pablo Ulibarrí of Sabinal, Justo Chávez of Belén, and Juan Trujillo of La Jolla. Neither the time nor place of their deaths is given. SANM, no. 2790.

15. Peña to Melgares, Taos, Aug. 30, 1818; AGN, Notas Diplomáticas, tomo 4.

16. Arce to Melgares, Taos, Aug. 31, 1818; *ibid.*

17. Declaration of Hernández, Santa Fe, Sept. 2, 1818; *ibid.*; translated by Thomas in "Documents bearing upon the Northern Frontier of New Mexico, 1818-1819," NMHR, vol. 4 (1929), pp. 147-55. See also Thomas, ed., "The Yellowstone River, James Long and Spanish Reaction to American Intrusion into Spanish Dominions 1818-1819," *ibid.*, pp. 164-77; and "An Anonymous Description of New Mexico, 1818," *South-western Historical Quarterly*, vol. 33 (1929), pp. 50-74.

18. Melgares to García Conde, Santa Fe, Sept. 6, 1818; AGN, Notas Diplomáticas, tomo 4.

19. García Conde to Melgares, Durango, Sept. 22, 1818; *ibid.*

20. [Conde de Venadito] to García Conde, México, Oct. 29, 1818; *ibid.* Arce's diary, Aug. 31-Oct. 10, 1818; translated in Thomas, "Documents bearing upon the Northern Frontier," pp. 157-64. Melgares to García Conde, Santa Fe, Sept. 18, 1818; AGN, Notas Diplomáticas, tomo 4.

21. Melgares to García Conde, Santa Fe, Dec. 18, 1818; AGI, Estado 33, Audiencia de México (Méx.), leg. 14. Antonio Cordero to Melgares, Durango, Jan. 12, 1819; *ibid.* Conde de Venadito to Cordero, México, Feb. 13, 1819; *ibid.* Service record of Capt. Manuel Aragón, Santa Cruz de la Cañada, Dec. 31, 1818; SANM, no. 2778. Service record of Alférez Felipe Griego, Santa Fe, Dec. 31, 1821; MANM.

22. Letter book of communications sent to the Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Sept. 7, 1840-Aug. 26, 1841, no. 11, MANM. Big Bead Mesa juts forth from the north end of the Sierra de Cebolleta. See Dorothy Louise Keur, *Big Bead Mesa, An Archaeological Study of Navaho Acculturation, 1745-1812, Memoirs of the Society for American Archaeology*, no. 1 (Menasha, Wis., 1941).

23. Melgares to García Conde, Dec. 18, 1818.

24. Cordero to Melgares, Durango, Jan. 12, 1819; AGI, Estado 33, Méx., leg. 14. Cordero to Conde de Venadito, Durango, Jan. 13, 1819; *ibid.* Venadito to Cordero, México, Feb. 13, 1819; *ibid.* *Gaceta del Gobierno de México*, tom. X, núm. 24 (Feb. 23, 1819).

25. [Melgares] to Cordero (place and date omitted by copyist); AGI, Estado 33, Méx., leg. 14. Cordero to Venadito, Durango, March 1819; *ibid.* Venadito to Cordero, México, April 10, 1819.

26. Matías Ortiz, Cañada, Jan. 31, 1819; SANM, no. 2789. Melgares to alcaldes of Alameda, Albuquerque, and Belén, Santa Fe, Feb. 1, 1819; SANM, no. 2791.

27. Letters of Melgares to Cordero, Santa Fe, March 18, 1819; AGI, Estado 33, Méx., leg. 14; printed in the *Gaceta del Gobierno de México*, tom. X, núm. 73 (June 10, 1819). Letters of Cordero to Melgares, Durango, April 13, 1819; *ibid.* Cordero to Venadito, Durango, April 14, 1819; *ibid.* Venadito to Cordero, México, May 25, 1819; *ibid.* Fray Angelico Chavez summarizes an 1819 document as follows: "No. 2 *Vadito*. Melgares to Custos Hozio, Feb. 20. *Cacique* and others of Moqui tribe hard-pressed at Ojo de la Vaca by Navajos; seek help from Spaniards, and so there is hope of founding a Moqui Mission; sending a division against Navajos and asks prayers for success." *Archives of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe* (Washington, 1957), p. 82.

28. As of Dec. 31, 1820, the government owed Andrés Ortega of the Santa Fe garrison 1,039 pesos in back pay. The will of Corporal Román Sánchez, June 28, 1825, listed 2,598 pesos, 4 reales due from the National Treasury. SANM-BLM, nos. 1212, 1200. One subscription list of May 1819 credited citizens with supplying 1,011 sheep, 94 head of cattle, 59 almudes of beans, and 130 strings of chile. SANM, nos. 2812, 2821.

29. Montes to Melgares, Jémez, March 31, 1819; AGI, Estado 33, Méx., leg. 14.

30. Melgares to Montes, Santa Fe, April 1, 1819; *ibid.*

31. Montes to Melgares, Jémez, April 10, 1819; *ibid.* Melgares to Montes, Santa Fe, April 13, 1819; *ibid.*

32. Melgares to Cordero, Santa Fe, April 18, 1819; *ibid.* García Conde to Melgares, Durango, May 11, 1819; *ibid.* García Conde to Venadito,

Durango, May 15, 1819; *ibid.* Venadito to García Conde, México, June 23, 1819, *ibid.*

33. Cañón de Chama Grant; S-G, BLM, no. 71. The Salazar brothers had been living at their mother's rancho. When she died it was divided among nine heirs living in other districts, and they had nowhere to plant their crops. Cañón de Pedernales Grant; *ibid.*, no. 113. Pedro Ignacio Gallegos to Melgares, Abiquiú, April 10, 1819, and reply, April 11, 1819; SANM-BLM, no. 1282.

34. García Conde to Venadito, Durango, Sept. 20, 1819, and Tratado de Paz, Santa Fe, Aug. 21, 1819; AGI, Estado 33, Méx., leg. 14; printed in the *Gaceta del Gobierno de México*, tom. X, núm. 144 (Oct. 27, 1819). The viceroy had approved the treaty Oct. 26. Ten copies were sent to the commandant general, who was to file two in Durango and send the rest to Santa Fe, two to be filed and the remaining six dispatched to the Navaho chiefs.

35. See Thomas, "The Yellowstone River." In October 1820 Alférez Felipe Griego had taken part in an expedition "a los países del Norte en reconocimiento del derrotero que traía una división de los Estados Unidos que mandaba el caudillo Benjamín Offalen [O'Fallon]. Service record of Griego, Santa Fe, Dec. 1821; MANM.

36. Montoya to Melgares, Jémez, July 6, 1821, and reply; SANM-BLM, no. 1213.

37. Melgares to alcalde of Santa Fe, Santa Fe, July 16, 1821; MANM.

38. Estado general que manifiesta el número de hombres reunidos en este pueblo de Jémez para operar en la expedición a Nabajo, Jémez, July 25, 1821; MANM. This troop was equipped with 136 escopetas, 3,500 cartridges, 150 lances, 155 bows, 3,625 arrows, 141 horses, and 126 mules.

39. Service record of Griego, Dec. 1821.

40. Diario of Juan Armijo, Oct. 23, 1821; MANM.

41. Service record of Pedro Sandoval, Santa Fe, Dec. 31, 1844; MANM.

42. W. W. H. Davis, *El Gringo; or, New Mexico and Her People* (New York, 1857), p. 83, says that Baca was the ringleader, Jémez the place, and the year 1820. Josiah Gregg, *Commerce of the Prairies*, ed. by Max L. Moorhead (Norman, 1954), p. 199, places the crime at Cochití. An inaccurate German translation of Gregg's account of the massacre appeared in A. R. Thümmel, *Mexiko und die Mexikaner* (Erlanger, 1848). This unhappy event may also account for the following curious news item: "The [Navaho] were not long since at war with the intendency of Santa Fe, on account of the perfidy of the commander under whom they served in an expedition against the royalists, near Durango. Fifteen of their

chiefs had been murdered, and they abandoned the republican cause for a time." *The Natchitoches Courier* quoted in *Niles' Weekly Register*, vol. 28 (July 9, 1825). The *Courier's* reporter had left Santa Fe in August 1824.

43. José Antonio Vizcarra to the ministro de guerra y marina, Santa Fe, Feb. 18, 1824, and reply, March 27, 1824; Archivo Histórico Militar Mexicano, México (AHMM), Secretaría de Guerra y Marina, D481.3/271. Ministro de guerra y marina to the Mexican Congress, México, March 27, 1824; *ibid.*

44. James, *Three Years Among the Indians and Mexicans* (Philadelphia and New York, 1962), pp. 95-96.

45. *The Journal of Jacob Fowler*, ed. by Elliott Coues (New York, 1898), pp. 123, 137.

46. Read, *Illustrated History*, pp. 366-67. Bloom, "New Mexico under Mexican Administration, 1821-1846," *Old Santa Fe*, vol. 1 (1913), pp. 150-55, 166. Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, p. 311, n. 2. *Colección de órdenes y decretos de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa, y soberanos congresos generales de la nación mexicana*, segunda edición, 3 vols. (México, 1829), vol. 2, pp. 147-48.

47. Vizcarra, Puntos interesantes, Laguna, Feb. 5, 1823; MANM. Dictámenes, Campo de Paguete, Feb. 8, 1823; *ibid.* Convenio, Campo de Paguete, Feb. 12, 1823; *ibid.* Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, vol. 2 (Cedar Rapids, 1912), p. 26, calls this preliminary agreement a treaty.

48. Plan . . . con que debe formarse la guerra a la tribu Navajo [Feb., 1823]; MANM.

49. Vizcarra to the ayuntamiento of Santa Fe, Santa Fe, June 17, 1823; MANM.

50. Vizcarra, Diario, June 18-Aug. 31, 1823; MANM; trans. and ed. by David M. Brugge as "Vizcarra's Navajo Campaign of 1823," *Arizona and the West*, vol. 6 (1964), pp. 223-44. The service record of Tomás Martínez (and others) stated that Vizcarra's men killed 50 Navaho and made 36 prisoners. Santa Fe, Dec. 1840; MANM. The death of Vizcarra's soldiers in the unfortunate battle with Paiutes, Aug. 8, 1823, was certified the following year. Chavez, *Archives*, p. 92. In 1875 Salvador Martín, referring to points in the Tecolote area of San Miguel County, testified that the "El Pueblo" ruin lay "near the place where one Colonel Vizcarra in about 1818 had a blacksmith shop, he being then a Colonel of Sonora or old Mexican troops." Town of Tecolote Grant, S-G, BLM, no. 7. For a favorable characterization of Vizcarra, see Fidelia Miller Puckett, "Ramón Ortiz: Priest and Patriot," *NMHR*, vol. 25 (1950), pp. 269-71.

51. Bloom, "Mexican Administration," pp. 166-67.

52. Vizcarra to Baca, Santa Fe, Nov. 17, 1823; AHMM, Guerra y Marina, D481.3/271.

53. Baca to Vizcarra, Tomé, Nov. 21, 1823; *ibid.* Baca to com. gen., Tomé, Nov. 21, 1823; *ibid.*

54. [Com. gen.] to Baca, Durango, Dec. 17, 1823; *ibid.* Vizcarra to ministro de guerra y marina, Santa Fe, Dec. 17, 1823, and Jan. 15, 1824; *ibid.*

55. Tratados de paz, Jémez, Jan. 20, 1824; *ibid.* The plural "treaties" was used presumably to demonstrate that both the military and civil chiefs of New Mexico, Vizcarra and Baca, concurred. This Antonio el Pinto was probably the son of the earlier one who during the 1780's was won over to a pro-Spanish position under the pressure of Anza's diplomacy and the enmity that developed with the Gila Apache. Antonio el Pinto the elder was killed by Apache in 1793. See Reeve, "Navaho-Spanish Diplomacy," pp. 224-34.

56. Contestación a los artículos; *ibid.* According to W. W. H. Davis, "the case [against the thirteen alleged murderers] was kept in court until 1824 without any decision being made upon it, when the parties were set at liberty. Ten years after, in 1834, these same men fell by the hands of the Nabajos, by which it almost appears that Divine Providence inflicted upon these murderers the punishment the authorities of the country had failed to mete out to them." *El Gringo*, p. 84.

