

By FRANK D. REEVE

For a period of a half century, from the 1720's to the 1770's, the Navahos and their Spanish neighbors lived at peace. The former wove blankets and baskets, cured skins, and raised corn, squash (pumpkin) and melons with the aid of rain fall that watered the canyons of their country. The durable goods were used in trade with the Pueblos in the Rio Grande Valley, the Spanish, and other folks to the north, west and south. The Navahos had acquired the sheep and horse, and managed to retain a few of the latter despite the occasional thefts of their neighbors, the Utah Indians, who lived north of the Rio San Juan.

During this era of goodwill, the Franciscan missionary labored to convert them to Christianity, but failed to achieve any solid results. The mid-century having passed, a westward movement of the Spanish from the Rio Abajo penetrated Navaholand. Ranchers slowly acquired land grants between the Rio Puerto of the East and Cebolleta Mountain topped by Mt. Taylor, and around the base of that geographical landmark on the northwest and southwest sides. The prior rights of the Navahos to the land were recognized by Spanish legal procedure, and there was no protest on their part against this encroachment of the white man that came increasingly close to their haunts around Cebolleta Mountain. To all outward appearance their only concern was with the Utah Indians to the north.¹ In the 1750's this became a serious matter.

Contemporary estimates of the number of Navahos ranged from 2,000 to 4,000, men, women, and children. Either figure implied sufficient fighting strength for protection, but their habitations were scattered in the canyons of the Province of Navaho near the Rio San Juan as well as Cebolleta Mountain far to the south, so the story of a Ute attack as

* A. G. I.—Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Spain; A. G. N.—Archivo General y Publico de la Nación, Mexico; B. L.—Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California; F. L. O.—Federal Land Office records, Santa Fe, New Mexico (There is a microfilm copy in the Coronado Library).

1. For a detailed story, see Frank D. Reeve, "The Navaho-Spanish Peace: 1720-1770's," *New Mexico Historical Review*, 34:3-40 (January, 1959).

related by Juan Joseph Lobato in 1752 may have a large measure of truth:

I am enclosing the printed Franciscan almanac which they brought. When you understand the reason, your lordship will have sufficient cause to appreciate the fine strategy of the Navaho Apaches and to laud the worthy actions of friendship of the Utes. The case is as follows: The Utes attacked the penoles of the Navajos with such force that the Apaches [Navaho] found the action bloody for them; some were killed, others captured, with no danger to the Utes, who strove for a complete victory by closing in to reach the top of the mesa. Then the Apaches came out, after stacking their arms, carrying a wooden cross above which was this almanac on a pole. They told the Utes: "The great chief of the Spaniards sent you this letter and the cross and ordered you to be our friends." (A matter worthy of admiration!) Thereupon those who before were lions became lambs, surrendered their arms, and received the cross and the false letter.²

It seems rather remarkable that the fighting Utes would have been tamed so readily, but the Navahos had long been familiar with the symbolic meaning of the cross due to their contacts with the Spanish, and the Utes of course had long enjoyed diplomatic and commercial ties with the Spanish. So the maneuver of the Navahos was not without reason, and the result not beyond the realm of possibility.³ The stratagem however did not afford them permanent protection from the wrath of the Utes, whom they stirred into action, because of the chronic condition among the Navahos whereby their right hand did not know what the left hand was doing.

On a comparative basis, the Navahos should have been interested in maintaining peace. They were a pastoral and farming people, and had much to lose in case of invasion. The Utes on the other hand lived primarily by the chase, trading skins for other commodities (particularly horses) with the

2. Lobato to Governor Cachuñin, San Juan de los Rios, August 17, 1752, in Alfred Barnaby Thomas, *The Plains Indians and New Mexico, 1751-1776*, p. 117. Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1940. *Audiencia de Mexico*, 82-5-5.

During the period of Navaho peace, the other frontier Indians were very troublesome in New Mexico. For examples see El Conde de Revilla Gigedo to Marqués de Ensenada, Mexico, June 28, 1753. *Ibid.*

3. When the Navahos sought peace with the Spanish in 1766, they came to Santa Fe bearing a large white skin painted with a cross. Cabildo of Santa Fe, "Certification," February 23, 1766. A.G.N., *Provincias Internas* 56, exp. 5, 1455v.

Pueblos and the New Mexicans. They were especially interested in the horse, and no doubt were not above stealing a Navaho animal when the opportunity was at hand. The presence of a few restless souls among the latter also was a latent source of mischief making.

Within a year or two after the peace of the Cross, a major episode was recorded between these two peoples:

The greater part of the native Apaches of the Province of Navaho to the west of New Mexico have abandoned it and taken shelter at Cebolleta, close to the pueblo and mission of Laguna, and in the mountain and vicinity of Zuni, fleeing from the war by which the Utes seek satisfaction for the injury done to them by the Navahos, who did not carry out in good faith the friendship that had been arranged between them through my offices. Therefore the malice of the Navahos taking advantage of the simplicity and confidence of the Utahs, they assaulted some Utah ranches and robbed them of what they had. For this vile traitorous action, the Utahs have so frequently made war on the Navahos and punished them that they have caused them to flee from the Province.⁴

Governor Tomás Véles Cachupín (1749-1754) tried to take advantage of the ill-fortune of the Navahos by offering them asylum in permanent settlements in the Rio Abajo, but the fugitives were not yet prepared to surrender their way of life in the mountains and mesas of Navaholand.⁵

Some Navahos had earlier settled in the Cebolleta region from their northern homeland, and others now migrated westward, if not earlier, toward the Canyon de Chelly, a one-time homese of the people of Moqui.

The abandonment of the Tsegi [Chelly] Canyon by the Pueblos is accounted for by the changing conditions of deposition and erosion of its streams. In the thirteenth century, or shortly thereafter, the region became barren and the inhabitants abandoned it, perhaps in favor of regions like the Hopi Country, less affected by this environmental change.⁶

4. Copy of instructions of Tomás Véles Cachupín to his successor, Francisco Martín de el Valle, August 12, 1754. A.G.N., *Proov. Intern.* 102, 1276. This document has been translated and published in Thomas, *op. cit.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. Ralph L. Beals, George W. Brainerd, and Watson Smith. "Archaeological Studies in Northeast Arizona," p. 158. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1945. (University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, vol. 44, no. 1.)

A later re-entry into this region by these western pueblo folk occurred in the early eighteenth century and a mingling of the two peoples took place. The Navaho absorbed some more Pueblo blood and benefited from peach trees introduced by the westerners.⁷ Whether the Pueblos were there to welcome the Navahos or vice versa is not clear at the moment, but the better version is that the former situation was the actual one.

Navaho legend implies that the migration from *dinshélah*, or Province of Navaho, to Chelly might have occurred before 1680, but it more clearly supports the history of a post-1680 movement.⁸ Evidence of Navaho occupancy in Canyon de Chelly is found in three ancient sites and dates their arrival after the mid-eighteenth century:

Near the Spider Rock Overlook in Canyon de Chelly, three groups of Navaho hogans, dated 1758, 1766, and 1770 respectively, were found during the summer of 1941. These dates confirm the Navaho occupation of Canyon de Chelly in a middle of the eighteenth century. With the exception of a six-sided hogan, and a possible four-sided one, the other structures were of the common forked stick type found in early Navaho sites.⁹

The insubstantial quality of hogan construction on the early Spider Rock site, the absence of sheep bones in the refuse,

7. J. Walker Fawkes, "Hopi Ceremonial Premises from Cañon de Chelly, Arizona," *American Anthropologist*, n. s., vol. 8, no. 4 (1906) "Preliminary Report on a Visit to the Navaho National Monument," Washington, 1911 (Bull. 50, Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution) "Prehistoric Villages, Castles, and Towers of Southwestern Colorado," Washington, 1919 (Bull. 70, Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution).

8. Father Bernard Heale to F. W. Hodges, n. d. *American Anthropologist*, n. s., 19:151 (1917).

9. Wesley R. Hurt, Jr., "Eighteenth Century Navaho Hogans from Canyon de Chelly National Monument," *American Antiquity*, 8:399 (July, 1942).

*It is noticeable that the year 1768 is the year of the last tree-ring date of Navaho occupation in Largo Canyon, a part of the *dinshélah* area." *Ibid.*, p. 97, citing Van Valkenburg 1941).

Another "digging" in Canyon de Chelly: "Although a few sherds of Navaho pottery were scattered on the site area, they were entirely lacking in the excavations. Sherds of an unreported type reminiscent of Zuni and Acoma wares were found both on the floor and on the refuse area. In addition, a ware identified by Mr. Watson Smith as post-Sikyaki Potchome was found only on the floor. These sherds probably date from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." D. L. De Harport, "An Archaeological Survey of Canyon de Chelly: Preliminary report for the 1951 Field Season," *El Palacio*, 60:23 (January, 1955).

and the lack of fortifications¹⁰ indicate that the earlier rivals were poor but had no further fear of attack from the hostile Utes.

Their poverty could be attributed to losses suffered at the hands of their northern enemies and in part to a drought in the year 1748. An Indian who had resided in the Province of Navaho for over a year arrived in Taos with a story of Navaho loss of crops. This forced them to draw heavily on their livestock, cattle and sheep for subsistence. As a result, some families were left destitute.¹¹ Their migration, therefore, whether westward to Canyon de Chelly or southward to Cebolleta Mountain, was marked by a sad lack of worldly goods, a situation that they managed to overcome in the course of a quarter century or less. In the year 1786 they numbered

seven hundred families more or less with four or five persons to each one in its five divisions of San Matheo, Zebolleta, or Cañon, Chusca, Hozo, Chelli with a thousand men of arms; that their possessions consist of five hundred tame horses; six hundred mares with their corresponding stallions and young; about seven hundred black ewes, forty cows also with their bulls and calves...¹²

The first two sites mentioned in 1786 were the old familiar ones that the Navahos had occupied for a goodly number of years. The last three named are in the new homeland (the Chuska mountains) to the northwest from Mt. Taylor. Spanish relations with the Navahos during the second half of the eighteenth century were largely confined to the Cebolleta area group. The old northern Province of Navaho passed into history as a region of activity in the joint affairs of the two people. The Navahos in the Chelly area were too far west to become an important factor in Spanish affairs for some time after their migration to that locality. Diplomacy became the

10. Hurt, *op. cit.*

11. Governor Córdallos y Rabál, "Statement," Santa Fe, July 20, 1748. R. E. Twitchell, *The Spanish Archives of New Mexico* II, no. 494, The Torch Press, 1914.

12. Pedro Garrido y Duran, "Report," Chihuahua, December 21, 1786. Alfred Barnaby Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers* . . . , p. 350. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1932. "This account is condensed and extracted from the official reports of the Governor of New Mexico to which I refer," P. G. y D.

art, therefore, of conciliating the Cebolleta Navahos; when fighting broke out, they bore the brunt of Spanish anger.

At the opening of the decade of the 1760's, the Cebolleta Navahos were still living in peace which the Spanish nourished with a prime item in diplomacy, namely tobacco.¹³ But as the decade ran its course, symptoms of pending trouble appeared. Thirteen residents of the settlement at Los Quelites, at the junction of the Rios San José and Puerco, petitioned the Governor for a grant of arms for protection against enemies. They advanced the plea of poverty for the request, and promised to return them when asked to do so or when they were able to buy their own arms. Only five escopetas in fair condition, four lances, and two pounds of powder were supplied in January, 1765.¹⁴ The worry of these settlers could have been due to the Apaches from the southwest rather than the Navahos at this particular time. In the words of Governor Pedro Fermín de Mendinueta (1767-1778):

The Comanche nation invades and attacks these [Rio Grande Valley] settlements by all routes, and the Apache from the west to south. Although on the northwest the Utes and Navahos live, these two nations are not always peaceful, and while they may be, the Comanches, because of this, do not refrain from attacking along the routes of their habitation.¹⁵

That is, by way of Taos or the Chama Valley. The Navahos were peaceful at the time of the above requests for arms by the people of Los Quelites, but about a decade later they fell from grace.

13. Governor Valle to Fortillo y Urrizola, Santa Fe, May 10, 1761. A. G. N., *Provi. Intern. 102* f141v.

14. *New Mexico Originals*, PB 48. (Bancroft Library). The place was named the "new settlement of San Raphael and San Francisco of Quelites [Quelites]." It was located on the west bank of the Rio Puerco of the East just below the junction with the Rio San José. Miera y Pacheco map (1776); United States Department of War, Departments of the Missouri, map (1873). The Rio San José as it approaches the Rio Puerco flows through Apache Canyon. *Ibid.*, which is the route of the present-day railroad. The University of New Mexico has a microfilm of these documents.

15. Mendinueta to Bucarell, March 26, 1772. A. G. N., *Historia* 16, f226v. This document has been translated by A. B. Thomas in *New Mexico Historical Review*, 6:27, but his translation "are not ever peaceful," should read "are not always peaceful." Mendinueta took office on March 1, 1767, and was relieved of office on May 16, 1778. *Ibid.*, 6:24 note.

The renewed trouble with them was like adding fuel to a sizable fire, so the picture in general presented by Governor Mendinueta in 1772 was not overdrawn. The position of the Spanish along the whole northern frontier of New Spain, and not least in New Mexico, was a matter of serious discussion in high governmental circles. The Marqués de Rubí, experienced soldier on the frontier, had vigorously recommended that a second presidio in New Mexico be established at Robledo with a detachment of sixty men. The site was at the southern end of the Jornada del Muerto. This presidio would afford better protection for the Rio Abajo and the El Paso district against the incursions of the Apaches. In addition, he recommended that the former pueblos of Senecu, Socorro, Alameda and Sevilleta be reestablished for additional defense, an idea in Governor Cachuypín's mind when he toyed with a plan to locate the refugee Navahos on those old pueblo locations.¹⁶ Rubí's proposals were never carried out.

The influx of refugees from the Province of Navaho into the Cebolleta Mountain area increased the likelihood of trouble with settlers who had gradually penetrated the Navaho country with their formal land grants and livestock. It was only a matter of time when some stock was stolen. The settlers complained to the Governor and military action was finally adopted to end the trouble, but that only increased the extent of the conflict, especially so because some of the settlers were entirely dependent upon their stock for a livelihood. The scarcity of water limited the possibility of raising grain, and they traded stock for bread.¹⁷

The conflict broke out in the spring or early summer of 1774. Governor Mendinueta reported under date of September 30 that

16. Gov. Cachuypín discussed the problem of hostile Indians and defense again at the close of his second term of office, 1762-1767. Cachuypín to Croix, Jalapa, April 27, 1768. A. G. N., *Prov. Intern.*, 108.

Alfred Barnaby Thomas, "Antonio de Bonilla and Spanish Plans for the Defense of New Mexico 1772-1778," C. W. Hackett, ed., *New Spain and the Anglo-American West*, p. 197. Lancaster, Pa., 1932. This item is the report on the northern frontier situation prepared by Antonio de Bonilla in 1776. With the introductory essay by Thomas, the general situation is quite clear. The Spanish document is in A. G. N., *Historia* 55, 115f.

17. Eleanor B. Adams and Fray Angelico Chavez, eds., *The Missions of New Mexico, 1776*, p. 254. Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1956. This publication contains the detailed Report on the Missions made by Fray Francisco Atanasio Domínguez and additional documents relating to the Report.

Against the Navaho tribe, which up until the present has continued making war, two expeditions have been made by the militia and Indians of the Jurisdiction of Albuquerque, Laguna, and Queres. On these they killed twenty-one barbarians and seized forty-six individuals, men, women, and children, two of whom, after being baptized, died. Our people lost four killed and thirty-one wounded. In the different attacks which in this time they have committed, they have killed six Indians and wounded two and stolen and killed some cattle and horses. They have been pursued four times, and of these they were overtaken and deprived of the stolen property on three occasions.¹⁸

This same year, the attacks of the Apaches from the southwest and the Comanches from the east enhanced the difficulties of the situation.¹⁹ And again in October, on the fifth of the month, a large party of Navahos struck at some ranches near Laguna, killing four people, taking two captive, and killing some sheep. The Alcalde gathered a body of men and pursued the marauders, killing two of them; but twenty-two of the avengers were wounded in the fighting.²⁰ In November, the Navahos attacked near Zia pueblo, killing one shepherd and capturing another. On the sixteenth they captured a boy near Laguna, and on the twenty-sixth of December stole thirteen sheep near the same place. This last exploit was carried out by two Navahos under cover of darkness. Pursuit followed on the first and third of these three actions. The last one was an all-out effort with disappointing results.

A body of 100 Pueblo Indians, forty-three militiamen, and two squadrons of soldiers, pursued the enemy to a stronghold. There

18. Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, September 30, 1774. Thomas, *The Plains Indians*, p. 178. *Prov. Intern.* 55, exp. 10, 45.

19. The Gila Apaches made three forays against the Jurisdiction of Albuquerque and Laguna. They killed a settler and stole some animals. Pursuit resulted only in recovery of two animals abandoned by the Apaches.

On the afternoon of August 18, about 100 Comanches raided the Albuquerque district when the bulk of the militia were out chasing the Navahos. These marauders killed two settlers, three Indians, captured four shepherds, killed 400 sheep, and took a few horses. Mendinueta to Bucareli, *op. cit.*

The Governor in this report stated that there were scarcely 250 men with arms to supplement the eighty presidials at Santa Fe.

20. Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, October 20, 1774. A. G. N., *Prov. Intern.* 55, exp. 10, 111.

they found a branch of this nation fortified in a tower built upon an almost inaccessible mesa, being the only one that had a very steep ascent. The summit was defended with stone breastworks on both sides whereby they could hurl insults (ofendian) without being seen; to this was added the fact that our forces were too far distant from the water supply for the horses. Consequently it was not possible to remain in that position. Notwithstanding these circumstances, our troops established a blockade and fought for a period of twenty-four hours, trying repeatedly to overcome the obstacles of the ascent to attack the defenders. But due to the advantageous situation of the defenders, every effort was ineffective, and the attackers got what was offered, that within a certain time, as stipulated, the chiefs would come with the captives, who are in their possession, to the Pueblo of Zunii to establish peace. With this proposition accepted by our side, they withdrew with one soldier and three militiamen slightly wounded.²¹

The experience of the Spanish in assaulting this fortified place on Big Bead Mesa at the north end of Cebolleta Mountain was a repetition of the experience of the expedition that Captain Roque de Madrid led against them in 1705, and the results were about the same. Any understanding with the enemy that the Spanish on this later attack arrived at in regard to peace, proved to be another will-o-the-wisp. The Governor's letter of March 30 scarcely had time to reach its destination before he was ready to report more troubles.

On the 19th and 24th of the same month [April], five Navajos who were found with three horses that they had stolen were captured by the Indians of Jémez and Cochiti. On the 3rd of the current month [May], some of this nation stole some mares and horses from the neighborhood of the Pueblo of Santa Clara. They were followed by the Indians, who were unable to overtake them.²²

Again in the month of August, 1775, the Governor sent a story of sorrow to Chihuahua:

21. *Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, March 80, 1776. Prou. Intern. 65, exp. 10, 136v.* In reporting this action, Mendinueta also informed the Viceroy that since his report of October 20, 1774, there had been five invasions by the Comanches, eight by the Gila Apaches, and the three already mentioned by the Navajos.

22. *Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, May 12, 1776. Thomas, The Plains Indians. . . . P. 179. Or A. G. N., Prou. Intern. 65, exp. 10, 112v.*

In this same month of April, the Gila Apaches carried off thirty animals from Albuquerque and Bernalillo. Pueblo Indians failed to overtake them. *Ibid.*

Thieves from the Navaho Apaches have come on six occasions to steal cattle and horses from the pueblos of Xémas, Sia, San Yldefonso, the district of Abiquiú, and the jurisdiction of Albuquerque. Each time they were pursued by the settlers and Indians. In one attack the latter killed two Navahos and a woman and retrieved the loot stolen from the Xémas Indians. On another occasion the Navahos were only deprived of the theft by the San Yldefonso Indians. A Navaho was killed by the lieutenant of Abiquiú, another one wounded, and the animals which they were driving off gotten back; the rest escaped over bad land. The lieutenant of Albuquerque, following those who had stolen some of the horse herd, overtook them, recaptured the horse herd, killed three of the enemy, and took some women and children prisoners. He came out of the action with three militiamen wounded.²³

The struggle in the early 1770's drove in the frontier line of settlements and settled down to a war of attrition. The Navahos, and probably the southwestern Apaches to some extent, expelled the settlers from their ranches in the Cebolleta region. The frontier pueblo of Acoma almost reached the point of abandonment due to disease and war. And in the valley of the Rio Grande a number of settlers decided to move southward to safer regions.²⁴

The events of those years lived long in the memory of the people who suffered and of their descendants. José Matéo Durán, if memory served him right, recalled at the extraordinary age of 108 that he had been born in a Rio Puerce settlement on September 21, 1762, and lived there for sixteen years. Then the settlers all left, "being compelled to do so on account of the hostilities of the Navaho and Apache Indians, who were continually massacring men, women and children at that place. The government sent a force of men to escort the settlers to safety to another residence in the Rio Grande valley."²⁵ And also abandoned was "Navajo, which is 11 leagues

23. *Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, August 18, 1776. Ibid., 119.*

On July 26, the Gila Apaches stole the horse herd from Laguna pueblo. On the 27th, they invaded the Belen-Tomé district, killed fifteen persons, and took ten animals. Pursuit failed in both cases. *Ibid., 118v.*

24. Adams and Chavez, *Missionary*, pp. 196, 277.

25. F. L. O., Report 48. J. M. Durán probably erred a bit in his dates. Dominguez reported the abandonment of the settlements in the year 1774 which seems correct in the light of other evidence. Adams and Chavez, *Missionary*, p. 284.

from the mission [Albuquerque] in the same direction as Rio Puerco . . . It is called Navajo because it belonged to Navajo Apache Indians. It was abandoned at the same time as said Rio Puerco."²⁶ And, as Morfi stated a few years after these events, "four leagues from the pueblo [of Sia] at the spring which they call the Holy Spirit, there were formerly large estates [*haciendas*] but today ruined." Or, in more detail, "abandoned ranches, such as San Diego, Lagunitas, the Garcías at Guadalupe, the Montoyas at Cabezon, Mestas' Ranch, Ventana, Nacimiento, etc." The farm lands at Cebolleta were appropriated by the Navahos to the loss of the Laguna Indians. Likewise at Eñchinál where Spanish ranchers had located. Writing of Cebolleta, Morfi remarks: "The Indians of Laguna and the Apache Navaho were accustomed to plant at Cebolleta. Today, according to José de la Peña, the Navaho occupy it."²⁷

In a war of attrition, the frontier foes were bound to win in the long run unless assistance was extended to the Province by the central government or the situation could be resolved by diplomacy. The actual loss in Spanish man power in the war was not great, but the Province would have been in dire straits without substantial aid from the Pueblo fighters. Nor were the Navahos suffering any serious loss in man power because they received some strengthening from the Mocuqui,²⁸ either through peaceful intermarriage or capturing women and children. At any rate, there was no apparent decrease in

Ramón Baca, born in the settlement of San Blas on the Rio Puerco, gave testimony similar to that of J. M. D.

Nurtias, south of Belen, and Carnué in Tijeras Canyon, east of Albuquerque, were abandoned in 1772. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

27. Descripción geográfica del Nuevo Mexico, escrita por el R. P. Fr. Juan Agustín de Morá Lefel'cor Jubliado, é hijo de esta Provincia del S. to Evangelio de Mexico. Año de 1782. Documentos para la Historia del Nuevo Mexico. *Historia* 25, 1108v. Translated in Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, which must be used with caution. Hereafter referred to as Morfi, *Descripción geográfica*.

28. Anna to Croix, January 17, 1781. Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, p. 241.

"The Navahos and Utnahs have killed, captured and robbed the Mocuquis, and are at war with them at present." Dominguez-Escalante to Mendinueta, Zuni, November 25, 1776. A. G. I., *Guadalupe*, 104-6-18.

Surveying the general frontier problem, Spanish military judgment concluded that the Apaches alone had about 5,000 fighting men, the largest groups being the Jímanas (in Texas), the Navahos and the Gila Apaches; and that they were interlocked through blood relation, alliance, and close friendship. Junta de Guerra, Monclova, December 11, 1777. *Ibid.*, 103-4-18.

their numerical fighting strength in the eighteenth century. On the score of weapons and subsistence, the New Mexicans on more than one occasion throughout their history had been forced to appeal to the central government for assistance. The time was now ripe for extending it again, especially in replenishing the supply of horses. The number of arms in the Province was not abundant, but not dangerously low. The poverty of the people, of course, was the main reason for whatever deficiency existed in this matter.²⁹ Governor Mendinueta was of the opinion that scarcely 250 men were equipped with arms, aside from the presidials at Santa Fe, as of the year 1772, although he was not too pessimistic on this point. A few years later he wrote:

the resident population is not so bad off in regard to arms which number about 600 guns and 150 braces of pistols in fair condition in the whole kingdom. But it is not so in regard to horses. Because of the wasteful destruction of colts by the enemy, the resident population does not have saddle horses for defense. Consequently the Province needs, if you wish to aid it, 1,500 horses at the royal expense and not at the expense of the residents who are, in short, poor, at foot and harassed by the enemy. It is impossible to interest them at prime cost, or on the contrary [for them] to recover from their desolation.³⁰

An inventory of military equipment in the first administration of Governor Cachupin does not reveal in comparison any significant change in the following quarter century. In 1752 the Province had 1,370 horses, 388 guns and fifty-three pistols. There were 3,400 persons, but only 676 heads of families. Some of the older boys were no doubt eligible for military service, but at the most this was a very small body

29. The Pueblos and Navahos "devote themselves peacefully to cultivating their lands and to the care of some cattle and sheep from which the increase is so high that it is a rare year that they do not drive 2,000 head for sale to the Presidios of the Line, besides other effects as hostelry, *frezadas* and woven goods." *Informe de Hugo de O'Conor sobre el estado de las provincias internas del Norte*, 1771-1776, p. 106. Ed., Enrique González Flores and Francisco R. Almada. México, D. F., 1952.

Hugo O'Conor's analysis of frontier conditions was a matter of controversy. See A. B. Thomas, *Teodor de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941.

30. En la Junta de Real Hacienda, México, October 26, 1776. A. G. N., *Prov. Intern.*, 65, exp. 10, f. 24v. The Governor of New Mexico was cited when the Junta drew up its report.

of men to draw upon for defending the Province. These figures do not include the El Paso district; only the region from Tomé on the south to Taos on the north. In addition to this force, the Pueblos numbered 2,174 men. They were much better off in horses, owning 4,060. They had a few lances and swords, but their chief weapon was the bow and arrow.³¹ Both Spanish and Pueblo used the lance, especially the former.

In reply to the plea for help from New Mexico, the central government did not overexert itself, although this Province had more than a local interest to them; it was looked upon as a protective outpost for the main frontier region from Sonora on the west to Texas on the east. 1,500 horses were finally promised to be distributed among the people; but of this number only 1,047 animals were actually sent and they were partly a gift from wealthy men.³² The quantity of help no doubt reflected a mild feeling of irritation toward the frontier settlers. Viceroy Bucareli judged that the last series of depredations in New Mexico by the Navahos were petty thefts, and perhaps many would be avoided if the residents of the Province "lived with less abandon and carelessness in a country where danger must always be feared on account of the enemies that surround it."³³ The "abandon and carelessness" mentioned probably referred to the New Mexicans' practice

31. A. G. N., *Prov. Intern.*, 102, exp. 9, f1.

Antonio Bonilla, in his study of the situation, believed that "It cannot be denied that in the province of New Mexico (not including the pueblo of El Paso and its old missions) there is an abundance of men, both Spaniards as well as Indians, very fit for war, but lack of arms and horses make them useless." Thomas, "Antonio Bonilla," p. 196. Or A. G. N., *Historia*, 25, f119. Bonilla also wrote that the Navahos' skillful use of firearms and successful attacks "have made them unconquerable." *Ibid.*, f124.

I do not know how many firearms the Navahos had acquired. They could not have secured them from trade with the Pueblo Indians because the latter did not possess them.

32. Mendinueta to (Bucareli?), Santa Fe, September 4, 1776. A. G. N., *Prov. Intern.*, 103, f282. Croix to Joseph de Galvez, Arispe, December 23, 1780. A. G. N., *Guadalupe* 277 (103-4-19).

33. Bucareli to Galvez, Mexico, August 27, 1776. A. G. N., *Guadalupe* 516 (104-6-18). Bonilla recommended military training for the New Mexicans: "Teach them the use of firearms, which really is general is unknown in these lands." Thomas, "Antonio Bonilla," p. 203, or A. G. N., *Historia*, 25, f125. A rather surprising statement at first glance, but the Spanish certainly did not have powder to waste, so they probably never fired a gun unless against Indians. Those with any real training would have been the presidials.

of living scattered on their farms and ranches³⁴ rather than in compact groups a-la-pueblo Indian, a point that became seriously considered by the government in the 1780's. Meanwhile, so far as the Navahos were concerned, they drifted into another but short period of peace with the Spanish and pueblo folk.

There is no evidence at hand to indicate that the Navaho leaders ever went to Zuni in keeping with the agreement that marked the failure of the Spanish to capture their stronghold in the midwinter assault of 1774, but otherwise the fight was influential toward peace. On September 22, 1775, two Navaho chiefs arrived at Laguna with two captives. In keeping with orders, the Alcalde took them to Santa Fe for talks with the Governor. The parties exchanged two captives and the Governor expressed his desire to remain at peace with them provided they reformed their behavior. Subsequently, the Indians released eleven captives.³⁵

For the next five years an uneasy truce existed between the two parties. The Navahos sowed their fields as usual, cared for their sheep, and traded with their neighbors.³⁶ Their peace and prosperity was attested by Vizente Troncoso who visited them in the spring of 1778. His host was Antonio el Pinto who was to play a prominent and at times annoying part in the relations of his people with the Spanish. The homes of El Pinto and his people on Cebolleta Mountain "were located on a plain which begins at the edge of the

34. "a congregation of dissident, discordant, scattered people, without subordination, without horses, arms, knowledge of their handling and governed only by caprice!" Bonilla, *Historia*, 25, f125.

35. Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, December 1, 1775. A. G. N., *Prov. Intern.*, 65, exp. 10, f40. Also see "Extracto de las ultimas noticias de Provincias Internas," Mexico, February 25, 1776. A. G. N., *Guadalupe*, 104-6-17.

Two Navaho families (thirteen persons) were taken into the fold of the Church and became residents in the pueblo of Zuni. The missionary wished that God would move others to follow this good example and thereby abandon their troublesome way of life. Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, May 12, 1775. *Ibid.* This letter is translated in Thomas, *The Plains Indians*, p. 180.

36. Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, June 5, 1776. A. G. N., *Prov. Intern.*, 103. Bucareli to Galvez, Mexico, August 27, 1776, op. cit.

There was some belief in military circles that the general campaign launched against the Apaches was the reason for the Navahos making peace. But Mendinueta was positive to the contrary, and attributed the peace to punishment meted out to the Navahos by New Mexicans. The general campaign did not penetrate the Navaho country. Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, August 12, 1776. A. G. N., *Prov. Intern.*, 103, f804.

mountain; to reach it one must climb a very steep hill." The laborious climb ended, he received a hospitable reception and spent a day visiting with leading dignitaries who came from the nearby rancherías of Guadalupe and Cebolleta. Outside the circle of officials in conference, the young men and women gathered around, seeking to hear and to see what was going on.⁸⁷

In October of the following year, Fray Andrés García journeyed to Cebolleta to buy some fat sheep for his needs at Zuñi. He also planned to check on rumors that many Moquinos had moved into Navaholand. This proved to be untrue,⁸⁸ but the Moquinos did present a problem for the next governor of New Mexico, just as they had been for many of his predecessors.

Thus, when Juan Bautista Anza (1778-1788) took the oath of office at Chihuahua on August 8, 1778, the Navahos were at peace, a happy state of affairs that continued for some time after his arrival at Santa Fe. However, the state of the province was unsatisfactory, and the Apaches and Comanches were troublesome. Any plans therefore to solve the frontier Indian problem in New Mexico required attention to all three groups.

The Apaches were the major problem. They not only invaded the region of the Rio Abajo from the southwest, but were troublesome all along the frontier line that extended from Tucson on the west to El Paso and points beyond. A continuation of their activities incited the restless elements among the Navahos to once more cause trouble because a main route of invasion lay past their neighborhood, or just to the east of the pueblos of Laguna and Acoma. Along this line

the Apaches enter continuously to rob and kill as far as the center of this province. Through it also they have a clear and pernicious communication with the Navaho nation with whom the Apache nation made a close alliance in the last war it had with us. This nation, although small, possesses a very rugged land to the west of this government in a recess which the three

87. Vizente Troncosas, "Report," Santa Fe, April 12, 1778. A. G. N., *Prova. Intern.* 65, esp. 10, 128.

88. Fray Andrés García to Anza, Zuñi, November 8, 1778. A. G. N., *Historia* 25, 129f.

pueblos referred to, Acoma, Laguna, and Zuñi, form. The latter establish their frontier against the Gilas but leave open highways for Gila incursions and communications. For this reason each day sees the Navaho nation becoming more suspicious of ourselves and I consider them (not without reason) as a hidden enemy.³⁹

Governor Anza first turned his attention to the Moqui who were in distress due to a prolonged drought. It was thought advisable to transfer them to a new home in the valley of the Rio Grande, but the project was hampered by Navaho intrigues. Former Governor Mendinueta had long advised against the use of force to accomplish the end because it might not only irritate the Moquinos, but also cast a shadow of renewed fear over the Navahos and even the Utes. If all three of these groups should be scared into an alliance for mutual protection, they would be capable of causing as much harm as the Gilas to the southwest, so it was believed. The proper approach, therefore, was through the agency of missionaries supported with a supply of gifts.⁴⁰

There was little chance of a three-fold Indian alliance against the Spanish, but there was sufficient evidence to warrant a feeling of uneasiness toward the Navahos. Fray

39. "Governor Mendinueta's Proposal for the Defense of New Mexico, 1772-1778," New Mexico Historical Review, 6:37 (January, 1931). Translated by A. B. Thomas from A. G. I., *Guadalupe* 276.

In January 1776, the Apaches captured a young herdsman and twenty animals. They were pursued by militiamen from the Rio Puerco, but heavy snows and the poor conditions of their mounts made it impossible to overtake the Indians. Bucareli to Galvez, August 27, 1776, *op. cit.* In the winter of 1779 the Apaches attacked Jarales and Belen. They wantonly lanced 1,500 sheep, 280 cows, killed 24 men including the Alcalde, "who was a valiant officer of the militia," and captured some others. Croix, "Statement," A. G. I., *Guadalupe* 271 (102-4-13).

The names and locations of the numerous bands of Apaches are listed in Huso O'Conor, "Gallada de Indios que hostilian la Frontera," July 22, 1777. A. G. I., *Guadalupe* 516 (104-6-18). Published in O'Conor, *Informe*, see note 29 above.

Details of Comanche raids on the Rio Abajo in 1775, on May 26, 1777, August 27, 1777, and June, 1778, are noted by Fray Atanasio in Adams and Chavez, *Misiones*, pp. 146, 154.

40. Mendinueta quoted in Croix to Galvez, February 23, 1780. Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, p. 143.

"... after long discussion in the king's council, the northern region was amputated from the viceroyalty and placed under a single military government to be known as the Commandancy-General of the Interior Provinces of New Spain. For the office of commander general, Charles III appointed Teodoro de Croix on May 16, 1776, in recognition of his long services and more recently for the distinguished merit displayed as captain of the port of Acapulco. Thomas, *Teodoro de Croix*, p. 17.

Andrés was delegated to bring back the Mochinos who had expressed a willingness to be transplanted, and he returned to the Valley in March with seventy-seven who were distributed among the pueblos for the time being. More could have been brought back if the Navahos had not intimidated them. Because of this action and due to some minor robberies recently committed, the Governor was incensed enough to give strong expression to his feelings: "What happened was that the nation excused their bad conduct with insubstantial pretexts. I learn it is not reformed so that I intend to strike terror among them and their allies, the Gila. . . ." And he also determined to visit Mochi himself to complete the project for their transplantation.⁴¹

Anza departed on September 8, 1780. He had received assurance that forty families were willing to abandon their homes for new ones, but his mission was a failure. On arrival, he learned that the forty families had left for Navaholand to await him there, confident that their neighbors to the east would alleviate their suffering temporarily. "In this belief they had put themselves in the power of the Navajo, but these barbarians had committed the crime of murdering all the men and making prisoners of the women and innocent children. This lamentable event was learned through two of the former who had succeeded in fleeing and returning to their country."⁴²

This horrendous tale is hard to believe, but the source of information is valid enough. More important, it strengthened the notion in Spanish minds that the Navahos would be a stronger foe to contend with if hostilities again broke out because their overall strength was growing with the addition of Mochinos to their numbers, either through an occasional foray against those people or by such an act of violence as Anza recorded. Since they had been enemies before, "it is to be presumed," the Governor wrote, "that they would aspire to be so again, when they realize their strength, as is proved in every Indian tribe which considers itself numerous."⁴³

41. Anza to Croix, May 26, 1780, *Ibid.*, p. 223.

42. Anza, "Diary of Expedition to Mochi," *Ibid.*, p. 282.

43. Anza to Croix, January 17, 1781, *Ibid.*, p. 241.

En route to Mochi, Anza encountered a party of Navahos on the Rio Puerco of the East and took advantage of the opportunity to urge them to continue in the path of peace, giving them along with the advice a bit of tobacco, a common practice in meetings with Indians. His friendly overtures were repeated when leading an expedition down the Rio Grande to Sonora in the November following his western jaunt. At Santo Domingo, two Navahos in company with a Gila woman sought to exchange a young Spaniard, a native of El Paso, for a little girl recently taken prisoner by the New Mexicans. The Governor was agreeable to the proposal so the exchange was effected, and he continued on his journey, having taken some precaution to conceal his purpose from the visitors who could readily turn informers.⁴⁴

But these brief meetings and courtesies with a few Navahos did not conceal the fact that minor annoyances had been committed by other members of that scattered people. And more important, the annoyances were attributed to the influence of the Gila Apaches with their northern kinsmen. "In May of 1780, induced by the Gileños, the Navahos, who enter the province in peace, stole from different districts thirty horses and a greater number of sheep." And again in July they "continued their hostilities by stealing six horses from Acoma, and killing three Indians from Zuñi and Pecos."⁴⁵ In January of 1783, additional thefts were reported. Marauders stole nine animals from the Queres Pueblos on the ninth of January, although they finally lost out when the owners recovered their stock. And again, when they raided the Abiquiñ region on the second of March, their thefts were recovered by the residents who had promptly pursued them.⁴⁶

The real shock came when, on March 15, Anza learned

from a Navaho that the Navahos of Encinal, Cebolleta, and San Mateo had set out to join the Gila Apaches in order to attack the Presidio at Janos. This news appeared certain, likewise the attack, and in this view I have given Governor Anza

44. "Diary of Expedition to Mochi," *Ibid.*, p. 229. Anza, "Diary of Expedition to Sonora," *Ibid.*, p. 197.

45. Croix, Report to Galvez, Arispe, March 23, 1781, A. G. I., *Guadalajara* 871 (108-413). And Croix, "Extracto," Arispe, March 26, *Ibid.*

46. Croix to Rengel, Arispe, February 24, 1783, A. G. I., *Guadalajara* 518 (104-8-20).

the most seasonal counsels to force the Navahos to break the alliance and friendship with the Gileños or to hold them respectful [toward us] in case that he does not carry out the first."⁴⁷

In other words, the proposal was for peace through diplomacy, even to the point of appeasement in the modern meaning of that word, which presumably meant toleration of minor depredations. And since minor depredations continued to take place,⁴⁸ and were never acceptable to those individuals immediately injured, it was essential that diplomacy be tried.

The immediate goal was the breaking of the alleged alliance between the Navahos and the Gila Apaches in preparation for another all-out drive against the latter which was planned for the spring of 1784. Governor Anza was instructed in letters of December 1783 and January 1784 to accomplish this

by all means possible, inciting the Navajos to declare war on the other, warning them to this end, that if they continued violating the good faith with which they are countenanced in that province, not only would they be denied the protection which was dispensed them, but that they would be persecuted at the same time until they were destroyed and driven out of the country which they occupy. From this would follow the loss of their possessions and they would see themselves reduced to live in the hills a poor and wandering life which the Gilas and the rest of the enemies of this province lead.⁴⁹

This was indeed a serious threat, but if the Navahos can be credited with any judgment at all, in the light of past experience they could take it with a grain of salt. Spanish arms had not proved too terrible so far. But the denial of protection

47. Neve to Galvez, "Acompaña Extracto y Resumen de Novedades de Indios Enmigos," Aritape, January 26, 1784, A. G. I., *Guadalajara* 519 (104-6-21).

The Spanish had of course more than once expressed the suspicion that the Navahos mingled with the Gila in depredations, despite the fact that they had a fixed abode and property which was open to attack. This serves to strengthen the idea that only a few of the Navahos were the troublemakers who allowed themselves to be persuaded by their southern kinsmen. See Croix, "Ynforme," Aritape, October 30, 1781, *Guadalajara* 105-24, 183. Published in A. B. Thomas, *Teodoro de Croix*.

48. On June 7, 1783, eleven beasts, probably horses. Both Navaho and Gila were accused of this act. On September 9, the Navahos took fifty-five animals from Jémas and Zia pueblos. *Ibid.* Phelipe de Neve to Galvez, Aritape, January 26, 1784, *Audencia de Guadalajara*, 519 (104-6-24).

49. Rengel to Galvez, August 17, 1785, Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, p. 288.

also implied that the Spanish would turn the Ute warriors against them, which was more realistic and not to be taken lightly by the Navahos. The idea of using the Utes did not originate at this moment, but had played a part in Spanish thinking on Navaho affairs at least for a decade.

Governor Mendinueta had followed this policy in the closing years of the last major struggle with the Navahos. By letter of June 20, 1774, he

explained to your excellency that I was working towards making the Utah nation our ally and that I would remain neutral if war should break out between them and the Navahos so that with the Navahos it would require less action and be more easy to bring it [the Navaho Nation] to observe its obligation, which in effect I carried out in as much as on the eleventh of last November they [Utes] came to make their annual exchange of skins, and at that time they informed me that they had begun the war and had one encounter with the Navahos in which they killed many individuals

and captured five boys.⁵⁰

The initial move by Anza to break the Navaho support of the Gilas did not produce marked results. The Alcalde Mayor of Laguna led an expedition into the Gila country in October, 1784, and penetrated as far as the headwaters of the Rio San Francisco. A few Navahos accompanied him, but he suspected that others had warned their kinsmen of his approach. At any rate, the Gilas were not at home.⁵¹ The Navahos may have engaged in similar activity again, but on the whole much remained to be done by the Spanish toward changing the Indian political situation. This led Rengel to reiterate the instructions to Anza in February of 1785.

The Governor proceeded to adopt sterner measures. He forbade the Navahos to pass south of the Rio San José. To put

50. Mendinueta to Bucarell, Santa Fe, March 30, 1775, A. G. N. *Provs. Internas*, 66, esp. 10, 137v. "In order to curb the Navahos, no better expedient has been found than that of protecting ourselves with the arms of the Yutas, and it is sufficient that they may declare war for the Navahos to desist from what they do to us, notwithstanding the fact that in the midst of peace they do commit small robberies and are accustomed to mix in the incursions of the other Apaches who cannot subsist without robbing because of the great sterility of the country where they live." Croix, "Ynforme," Aritape, October 30, 1781. *Op. cit.*

51. Rengel to Margués de Sonora (José de Galvez), March 2, 1786, Chihuahua, A. G. I., *Guadalajara* 521 (104-6-28). This included a resume of enemy hostilities from August 1784 to the end of October 1785 for New Mexico.

teeth into this measure, the region south of the line was patrolled by a body of forty men under the instructions to seize any Navahos encountered and to bring them to Santa Fe for suitable punishment. He also forbade all trade with them.

As a result of this action, forty-six Navahos, among them seven of their chiefs, presented themselves on June 5 to the Alcalde Mayor of La Laguna, indicating that they had determined to set out on the 12th on a campaign against the Gilas. For this purpose they asked him to aid them with eighty of our Indians. Their request with our compliments acceded to, they set out on the 16th, numbering one hundred and twenty horse, thirty foot, and ninety-four Indians from the pueblo who went to reinforce their detachment and witness their operations. It was noted that among the first were five chiefs of major popularity and those who had contributed most to the treason of their nation.

They had two clashes with the Gilas, and claimed to have inflicted far more punishment than they had received. "On their return on the 25th, the governor ordered them rewarded opening to them as a sign of appreciation, and as a stimulus to the continuation of similar acts, commerce and communication with the pueblos of the province which he had before closed to them."⁵²

After this they made two other campaigns with less important results, with the virtue of having inspired the Navahos more with the desire for war which that governor was trying to keep alive. To him later fourteen leaders presented themselves in Santa Fe, two of them chiefs and among them one very famous called Antonio, who because of the authority of his vote had suspended for a long time the rupture with the Gilas, and the very one who personally had been seen with his people in the camp of these enemies before Janos [Sonora]. Fourteen accompanied the Alcalde Mayor of La Laguna; and Antonio, confessing to the governor his infidelity and past alli-

52. Rengel to Galvez, August 17, 1786. Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, p. 260. There is some discrepancy in details about this Navaho venture, but it does not mar the significance of Anza's accomplishment. In a later communication, the expedition departed on the 18th with 180 Spanish and Pueblo warriors, and ninety-four Navahos. Rengel to Marqués de Sonora (José de Galvez), Chihuahua, March 2, 1786. A. G. I., *Guadalupe 521* (104-6-23).

Meanwhile, in March, some Navahos raided the Albuquerque district. They killed two persons, stole twenty-seven horses and killed twelve others. Pursuit followed; three horses were recovered at Los Quellas. *Ibid.*

ance, asked pardon and promised him that as much as he had been opposed to us, before, he would be devoted and faithful in the future.

In return for aid then promised on the next campaign, the Governor agreed "to furnish to each one of the auxiliaries who presented himself an *almud* of pinole, mounts to carry them, and two head of cattle for the groups, because Antonio had indicated to him that without this aid they could not subsist the length of time required on" the expedition.⁵³

In the campaign of August, only thirty Navahos accompanied Lieut. José Maldonado, and for only ten days. But they did make a joint foray with some Utes against the Gilas, and also aided the Alcalde Mayor of Zuñi with three trackers. Meanwhile, the appetite of Rengel for results had only been whetted, not satisfied, and he was willing to pour more supplies into the Province as part of a concerted plan for a knockout blow at the Gilas. To this end, he promised to send horses, mules, and 200 firearms to equip the militia and Navahos for the campaign. And he urged Anza not to relax the effort to keep the allegiance of the Utes and to incite the Navahos against the Apaches; in other words, "to oblige both to the fulfillment of the word which they had given to your lordship of aiding you in the war because of the benefit that may result to them by living in the shelter of these settlements and enjoying their commerce. . . ."⁵⁴

In the summer of 1785, Rengel rejoiced at Governor Anza's claim that the Navahos had broken their alliance with the Gilas, but the rejoicing was only fainthearted. The few-

53. Rengel to Galvez, August 17, 1786. *Op. cit.*

54. July 15, 1785, fourteen Navahos, including four captains, appeared before Anza, offering to continue making war on the Gileños. On the 27th, the captain and six men from the Rancharia of Guadalupe made the same offer. Rengel to Marqués de Sonora, Chihuahua, March 2, 1786. *Op. cit.*

55. Rengel to Anza, August 27, 1786. Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, p. 267. Rengel to Anza, January 18, 1786. *Ibid.*, p. 266.

At the end of February, 1785, Anza had negotiated a treaty of peace and alliance with some Comanches. The Utes, apprehensive of their own security in the light of this development, accused the Governor of double-dealing, but he promptly made a similar agreement with them. Otherwise, they had been at peace with the Spanish for a decade. Relations with these two tribes can be studied to a considerable extent in Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*.

More mounts for the militia were needed "because those no longer exist which, bought by the royal treasury in the years of 1778 and 1779, were sent for the same purpose by order of the king." Rengel to Galvez, August 17, 1786. *Ibid.*, p. 261.

ness of Navaho warriors who appeared for the several forays indicated that their support was also only faint hearted. The trouble was believed to lie in divided counsels among these potential allies, and the particular group of dissidents was thought to be the band of Captain Antonio, alias El Pinto.

Notwithstanding, the series of attacks to which your lordship refers, and the reflection which you make, establishes that although these Indians know well the advantages of having us as friends and the ruin which would come to them by obliging us to declare war upon them, this does not yet save them from fear of the Gilas and the repugnance they feel in sacrificing to our friendship the ancient ties of kinship and alliance which they have maintained with them. In this opinion, Captain Antonio fortifies and assures them because he is the one who has been most opposed to the Spaniards and has made himself respected among the others because of his great riches, and large number of relatives and partisans. Thus the body of the nation balancing itself between the influence of this chief and its own interest, the effects of both impressions have been seen without their having come to a decision at this time.⁵⁵

In view of the suspicions held concerning Antonio El Pinto, the Spanish authorities turned to a present-day international political maneuver popularly called a "fifth column." Another chief was to be stirred into action as a rival to El Pinto. Cotton Negro was tentatively considered, but the final choice fell upon another by the name of Don Carlos. The basic purpose of course was to instill into the minds of these people the concept of unity and responsibility of leadership. The lack of these concepts was an important factor in the difficulty of arranging permanent or even temporary peace between the two foes. Since the Navahos, or any other people for that matter, could not change their beliefs and way of life overnight, the Spanish policy was doomed to failure. The proposed alternative was extermination of the Navahos, and that was a task too that lay beyond Spanish power.

In preparation for this major diplomatic move, Rengel forwarded in the winter of 1785 some presents for the meritorious Navahos: some scarlet cloth, some colored bayetta

⁵⁵ Rengel to Anza, August 27, 1785. *Ibid.*, p. 266. Rengel to Anza, January 18, 1786. *Ibid.*, p. 269. Rengel to Galvez, February 4, 1786. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

(baise), long sheathed knives and bridles; the latter item probably for the few horses that might have to be given to the leaders. In addition he sent two large and one small medal. The bust of his Majesty was stamped on one side and on the other a crown of laurel with the words *Al Merito*. The large medal was intended for a chief of all the Navahos, and the small medal either for a secondary Navaho or Comanche chief. The other large medal was intended for the top Comanche leader. A colored ribbon enabled the medal to be worn around the neck. They were understood to be "insignia of authority and honor."⁵⁶

Anza was instructed to accompany the lure of honor and prestige with a show of force, traditionally the fifth ace in the game of diplomacy. Arms and ammunition could be sent to the pueblo of Laguna and vicinity "as if to threaten them [Navaho] with some hidden design against them if they do not decide shortly, or to reassure them against the terror they have of the vengeance of the Gilas."⁵⁷ In keeping with his instructions, Governor Anza arranged a meeting with the Navahos for March 22, 1786, at the crossing of the Rio Puerco of the East southwest of Sia Pueblo.

On the appointed day, only the Alcaldes of Laguna, Zuñi and Jémez and one Navaho met with the Governor. The other Navahos had been kept away by a rumor that the real purpose of the meeting stemmed from an order to exterminate them that supposedly had been brought with the annual spring caravan from Chihuahua, so they had fled to the mountains when the Alcaldes called at their several rancherías to notify them of the Governor's instructions. The flight at least was real; the rumor was without foundation. The Navahos were indeed suspicious of Spanish motives as the latter had in-

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 270f.

⁵⁷ Governor Anza had previously asked for four canes with silver points and an equal number of medals for Antonio and three other chiefs who had visited him in Santa Fe in the spring of the year. Rengel to Anza, August 27, *op. cit.*, pp. 261, 268. But Rengel had only sent medals to be distributed as above, although he did say that he might send more medals and the canes in his letter of January 18, 1786. *Op. cit.*, p. 271.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 272. "The Navahos are not entirely resolved to break with the Gilas, although they do not refuse it knowing our friendship is more useful to their interests than that of the latter; but they might wish to enjoy the one without losing the other. This being incompatible with our principles, it is necessary that they decide." Rengel to Conde de Galvez, February 4, 1786. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

ferred long before this meeting. However, the Governor's intentions were still achieved. The lone Indian promised to find his people and return with them in two or three days. He was as good as his word, and about eighty Navahos came with him; a small turnout in comparison with their total numbers, and a good indication of their disunity.⁵⁸

The Governor succeeded in his plan in-so-far as surface indications proved it. These Navahos promised to be ruled by one governor, and Don Carlos (not Cotton Negro) became the recipient of the large medal. In view of the scattered nature of Navaho living, Anza decided that a sub-ordinate chief should be appointed and the honor, symbolized by the small medal, was conferred on Don Joseph Antonio, not to be confused with Antonio alias El Pinto, the troublemaker. The two official "chiefs were sons of the two old men most friendly to the Spaniards." Individuals regarded at the time as captains of rancherías were left untroubled in their positions except the ones who had a reputation for opposing the Spanish. This proviso without doubt applied to El Pinto, and it may be that he was arrested at this particular time. At any rate, he was lodged in the calaboose at Santa Fe at some unspecified date.

The Navahos having been organized in the political sense, agreed to the following:

1. That they maintaining as they proposed the required subordination and fidelity, the protection of the king would be sought and declared in their favor.
2. That to bring about the declaration of war against the Gilas one of the chiefs named with only Navajos and the interpreter should set out on a campaign at the will of the governor at the end of July of this year, so that besides their performance in the past year, the enemies might have this new proof that the Navajos were now moving frankly and voluntarily against them.
3. That from the people who might not be inclined in this expedition, that chief should hold out those whom he might

58. While the Cebolleta Navahos were getting into a mood to dicker with the Spanish, their kinsmen to the north could be committing mischief. For instance, they stole some animals in the Abiquiní region. The local official organized a pursuit and managed to kill one Navaho and recover twenty-two horses. Rengel to Marqués Sonora, Chihuahua, March 2, 1786. A. G. I., *Guadaluajara 521* (104-6-23). The incident of course happened many weeks before Rengel's report.

consider fit to go as auxiliaries with the monthly detachments of troops; this reinforcement he fixed right there at thirty individuals each month; for these individuals the Navajos accepted with much gratitude the aid of horses and supplies dispensed by the Commandancy-General.

4. That from the moment the council was dissolved they should go down to occupy their old camps to plant their seeds, and that, concerning the security which the governor guaranteed them in conserving and sustaining them in that situation, they could proceed to build sod huts.

5. Lastly, that for these ends proposed and to prove their acquittance, they received and assured on their part the life of the interpreter offering to be directed by his advice.

To strengthen the seriousness and importance of this agreement in the minds of the Navahos, two Comanches in the Governor's party stepped forward and exhorted them to be faithful to the agreement, otherwise they would suffer not only the wrath of the Spanish but also that of their allies, the Comanches.⁵⁹

In order to make the new understanding more workable and to avoid future trouble, Anza proposed that he appoint a person to reside among them with the title of Interpreter. The Navahos assented to this, and suggested that the member of their party who was then interpreting be selected for the permanent job. The Governor agreed, settled upon him a monthly salary of eight pesos, and supplied the necessary equipment—a horse, arms and other supplies. Months later, beginning January 1, 1787, he was named on the military rolls in order to regularize the payment of the salary. At that time also a second Interpreter was provided to serve on campaigns; Interpreter number one was expected to reside among his people and serve as a listening post for the Governor.⁶⁰

The Navaho leaders were surprisingly prompt in completing part of their bargain. They were obligated to report the terms of the agreement to the rest of their nation for approval. On March 30, Don Carlos and the Interpreter appeared in Santa Fe and reported that their people were

59. Pedro Garrido y Duran, in Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers*, p. 345ff.

60. *Idid*, 347. Urzarte to Anza, October 5, 1786. *Twitchell, Spanish Archives*, II, No. 943.

carrying out the agreement; that is, they were returning to resume planting operations. It required more time to conform to the full understanding. Again, on June 8, Don Carlos, Don Joseph Antonio and the Interpreter visited the Governor and reported that they had visited all the Navaho rancherías from Cebolleta to the Chuska Mountains. Everywhere their people had agreed to the terms of the March treaty in-so-far as it applied to them. There was just one trouble spot in the person of Antonio El Pinto. But they had dealt with him in a way that no doubt pleased Anza and was quite in conformity with modern democratic principles, if that is not stretching the point too far. They had deposed him as a chief "because of certain suspicions that he had given us [the Navaho] of his restlessness and infidelity."⁶¹

El Pinto's stubborn reluctance to go along with Anza's wishes had already led to his imprisonment at Santa Fe. At the time of the April visit of his associates to see the Governor, he had been released by Anza with the delegation vouching for his good conduct in the future. He took his leave for home "with affectionate display of love and gratefulness, to which I [Anza] replied in kind, and with strong advice conducive to his new life. . . ." ⁶² But this pretty picture did not reveal the whole of the truth.

There was a gap in the understanding between the Navaho and the Spaniard concerning proper conduct, and the latter was prepared to take sterner measures than imprisonment to fill the void. Scarcely six months later Urgarte concluded to advise Anza that "If previous facts justify this concept [of unreliability], your lordship will search for the most secure and prudent means of destroying this individual or exiling him from his country without which the complete pacification of this nation will never be secured."

In civilized pueblos [communities] [Urgarte added], disgruntled individuals are not lacking. With much more reason

61. Pedro Garrido y Duran, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-50.

The visit to all the rancherías had been delayed because a party of Gilas stole a Navaho horseherd. "As far as the salinas of Zuñi, the Navajos followed without overtaking them. One of these enemies who presented himself at the rancharía of Encinal with the same accustomed confidence as before, they strangled at once." *Ibid.*, p. 348.

62. Concha, "Informe," June 26, 1788. *Proc. Friedm.*, 65, esp. 5, 111.

they could be among the barbarians who never have known the rules of obedience or the bridle of laws. Likewise, although the Navajo may have manifested to your lordship the greatest submission and universal conformity to the method of government which your lordship has imposed upon them, I will not be surprised if many others remain rebels who, because of their known domiciles have been or still are distant from the others without possession which may oblige them to prefer a tranquil spot to an ambulant and liberty-loving life, may attempt to use force to maintain their independence. Your lordship being justly suspicious of all of these will oblige the good chiefs of the nation to make them come into their rancherías, using arms against them in case of opposition until reducing them and compelling them to their duty.⁶³

Urgarte wrote with greater truth than he realized.

With political arrangements out of the way, and El Pinto at large, Governor Anza turned his attention to carrying out the long planned expedition against the Gilas with the aid of his new allies, the Navahos and Comanches. Rengel had forwarded in the spring caravan the necessary equipment in the form of 200 carbines, 400 horses and 20 mules. These mounts were not for the regular soldiers! They were to be used by Pueblo and allied warriors, and only for the duration of a campaign. In addition, 1,000 pesos was sent northward for other expenses. The supplies were accompanied with instructions to employ Navahos equal in numbers to the rest of the fighters drawn from the militia, settlers and Pueblos.⁶⁴ If not too optimistic about the employment of Navahos, dis-appointment was certainly in store. When Salvador Rivera set forth in July from El Paso to scour the mountains northward toward Socorro, he led a troop of only twenty Navahos and twenty-two Comanches as against sixty other men.⁶⁵ Otherwise, the proportion of allies was high.

To further strengthen the new ties between the Navahos and Spanish, trade was reopened in June at the request of

63. Urgarte to Anza, October 5, 1786. *Twitcheil, Spanish Archives II*, No. 948.

Don Jacobo Urgarte y Loyola, distinguished soldier and administrator, succeeded Rengel as Commander-General of the Internal Province on October 5, 1786, and held the post until 1790. Thomas, *Forrolden Frontiers*, p. 884, note 102.

64. Rengel to Anza, January 18, 1786. *Ibid.*, p. 269.

65. Pedro Garrido y Duran specified 25 Navahos, 37 presidials, 90 militiamen, 60 Pueblos, and 22 Comanches in Rivera's command. Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

Don Carlos when he visited Anza in Santa Fe. They were also given permission to attend the summer fair held with the Comanches where they hoped to dispose of their blankets which had already become well known in the eighteenth century as a quality article. "The reciprocal trade and commerce between the mentioned three nations [Navaho-Ute-Comanche] and the residents of New Mexico is one of the most essential and adequate means for clinching them in our friendship."⁶⁶ This friendship held broader horizons for Urigarte than mere trade. He even dreamed that Christianizing them was not beyond the realm of possibility, or organizing them into formal settlements a-la-pueblo Indians, all conducive to intermarriage and thereby creating the firmest of all links between two people, a fusion of blood.

The system of barter had long been abused to the disadvantage of the Indians unless emphasis is placed upon psychological satisfaction. If a white man traded the colored plumes of a tropical bird, costing him the equivalent of ten dollars, for goods worth \$500, he made a handsome profit to say the least. If the Indian were equally satisfied, then judgment on ethical grounds will be colored by the standard followed in judging. Since the tariff established in 1754 had become out of line with the change in values that had taken place through the years, a new one was drawn up to assure equity.

In order to forward these desirable ends, whether results would be remote or not, the Commander-General favored better treatment for the Navahos, both in trade and in general relations with the Spanish people. Justice and fair dealing should be the ideal and practice. The Navahos should be encouraged to seek the former when wronged by appealing to the white man's judiciary, the Alcalde or the Governor; in the market place sharp practices should be curtailed by fair-trade regulations; and the poor should be assisted when in need. Urigarte envisioned the pueblo folk trading in the Navaho rancherías at stated times and under regulations yet to be framed, including the tariff of prices.

66. Galindo Navarro (Assessor), Chihuahua, September 4, 1786. *Prov. Intern.*, 65, exp. 4, f3v. Garrido y Duran in Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

Although this method [he believed], curbing free dealing, would produce in other circumstances and with other nations some ill feeling which would hold back the progress of commerce, it is here a bridge necessary for containing the greed of the more enlightened party until the universality of experience in our heathen neighbors may place them in position to understand their interests and know how to appreciate the productions of their country and of their industry, to establish by themselves the equilibrium of values in their goods with what they need from our hand."⁶⁷

He was indeed an eighteenth century dreamer of Utopia—but a product of the Enlightenment.

The Commanding-General also adopted measures for the further strengthening of political ties in the fall of 1786. The mounting costs of diplomatic and military relations with the frontier people led to the earmarking of 6,000 pesos annually "for all the extraordinary attentions of" New Mexico. He also dispatched for the general and lieutenant general of the Navahos "legal titles which I augment with two hundred pesos salary to the first, and one hundred to the second, each year, to be paid them in effects for their use. . . ."⁶⁸

The high hopes of the Spanish officials that they had broken the Navaho alliance with the Gilas, and that the former would settle down as peaceful neighbors and allies in time of war, were often dampened in the months following the Spring meeting at the Crossing of the Puerco, but they were never completely destroyed for a number of years. As Urigarte explained to Galvez, "I shall not be surprised that, even though the body of the nation [Navaho] have maintained themselves in the undertaking to campaign against the Gila in our behalf, there may be at the same time separate rebellious groups who may continue treating with them and

67. Urigarte to Anza, October 5, 1786. *Spanish Archives*, II, No. 942. Urigarte's instructions to Anza concerning the Comanches revealed a policy similar to that adopted toward the Navahos. In addition, he proposed that Apaches under fourteen years of age held captive by the Comanches should be ransomed; adults could be killed; there should be a gratuitous return of Christian captives; children of the chiefs could be sent to Mexico City for education; "the same is to be understood with respect to the Utes, and Navajos if it is possible." Urigarte to Anza, October 5, 1786. *Spanish Archives*, II, No. 943.

68. *Ibid.*, II, 942. *Prov. Intern.*, 65, exp. 1, f46. I assume that by legal title he meant some kind of an official paper indicating the appointment and the office of the new Navaho leaders.

raiding different settlements where they believe they may not be discovered." If only a few indulged in such nuisance tactics, their own leaders could restrain them. But if large numbers once again assumed their former maurauding, "which would not be foreign to their false and inconstant natures," then the final break between the Navahos and Gilas would have to be achieved by force, drawing heavily upon the Ute and Comanche allies for this purpose.⁶⁹ Urgarte, enlightened statesman that he was, could face reality and act accordingly.

There was some small indication that a few Navahos had not accepted the general understanding in full faith, but all told the defections were not serious. A few of them raided Abiquiú and the Rio Abajo in September and October of 1787.⁷⁰ A more serious charge was made by friendly Apache informants that the Navahos had attacked Arispe in company with the Gilas in July of 1786, the very time when Rivera was seeking hostiles in the mountains west of Socorro. But specific proof of this accusation was never furnished. On the contrary, Urgarte received nothing but refutations of the charge as late as December. "Nevertheless," he said, "I am suspending judgment until seeing the results of the inquiry entrusted to the governor" of New Mexico.⁷¹

The one Navaho who continued in the ill-favor of the Spanish was El Pinto. They suspected that he was the weak link in the chain of friendship and alliance forged around the Navahos, a suspicion that had existed since the accusation

69. Urgarte to Marqués de Sonora, Chihuahua, December 21, 1786, *Ibid.*

70. Urgarte, Arispe, January 14, 1788, *Spanish Archives*, II, No. 990.

71. Urgarte to Marqués de Sonora, December 21, 1786, *Thomas, op. cit.*, p. 344. Urgarte also indignantly wrote, "Everything fits into the perdition character of those Indians, and is very well in accord with their distinguished malice. . . ." Of course he was weighing Navaho behavior against the white man's concept of moral behavior, or legal for that matter; whereas the two peoples were on different planes of what constituted right and wrong. This attitude of the white man toward the Navaho carried on long after Urgarte and his contemporaries had ceased to be worried about the problem. Doubt is cast upon Navaho participation in Gila raids this year by the lack of any such accusation in the Instructions issued by Galvez in August of 1786. "Documentos Históricos de la Nueva Vizcaya," *Historia II*. Nor was there any positive information as late as December in the hands of southern officials of any Navaho raid on the southern frontier, although Antonio el Pinto had been seen at Janos in early 1788. And Urgarte to Concha, Arispe, January 14, 1788, *Prov. Intern.*, 65, 124.

that he had been observed among a group of hostiles on the southern frontier in 1783. Several months or maybe a year after his release from prison in Santa Fe in April of 1786, he was again picked up and kept in custody. He had started for Isleta with three other men and a woman to trade in the belief that peace reigned and trade relations had again been restored. He was correct in his understanding of the situation, but was not aware of his own status in Spanish eyes. Conforming to orders, Francisco Lovera, Alcalde of Laguna, arrested El Pinto and took him to Santa Fe. His companions were promptly released, but they followed their leader to Santa Fe where they received assurances that El Pinto would be well treated, so they returned to their homes. El Pinto denied that he had been hostile to the Spanish, and claimed that enemies had brought false charges against him.

In the course of time, the Spanish-appointed General of the Navahos and his Lieutenant, along with a varying number of followers, made repeated trips to see the Governor about El Pinto's release. On November 1, 1787, they were once more in Santa Fe for the same purpose. But the Governor was not yet ready to yield to their request because of plans for another campaign against the Gilas. Whether or not the charges of defection since the peace treaty could be proved against El Pinto, it was a matter of prudence to keep him under control for the time being. So the prisoner remained in custody until April 4, 1788. He was then accompanied home by Vizente Troncoso, already a familiar figure among the Navahos.

Troncoso not only accompanied El Pinto, but also made it a point to visit the leading men in the rancherías of Guadalupe and Cebolleta. They were very expressive in rendering thanks for the release of their associate, but the New Mexican's real mission was of a more serious nature. Once more an attempt was made to strengthen the general policy envisioned over two years before; Troncoso urged upon the Navaho leaders that they "strictly observe total separation in intercourse and commerce with the Gileños and moreover they should foment and encourage the declared war and hostilities against this common and obstinate enemy. . . ."

They agreed to this, and also promised to be responsible for El Pinto's conduct.⁷²

Meanwhile, in the fall of 1787, Governor Fernando de la Concha (1787-1794) had roundly scolded the General of the Navahos, Don Carlos, for dragging his feet in not living up to the agreement to furnish a monthly contingent of fighters for action against the Gilas. It had had some effect, so the Governor claimed when the campaign of September was launched, because the Navahos were present in more reasonable number. In December, the Navahos engaged in two skirmishes with the Gilas. In the first one they invaded Gila territory and seized forty-nine horses. The southerners in turn attacked the Navahos and captured nine horses, but they suffered the loss of a captain. Finally, in the month of May, 1788, the Gileños stole the horse herd of the Guadalupe Navahos, including in the number the four horses of the Interpreter, Francisco Garcia.⁷³

These several episodes brought joy to the Spanish authorities. They really believed in the summer of 1788 that the break between the Navahos and the Gilas was clear and final. And more important, the three major frontier people were at peace with the Spanish, sometimes cooperating together in forays against the Gilas. But efforts were not neglected to maintain the favorable situation, and rewards were offered for military assistance. In June, the Navahos and Comanches were offered "a horse with bridle and two large knives" for each Apache prisoner brought to Santa Fe,⁷⁴ in keeping with the general instructions that had been formulated nearly two years before (October 5, 1786). In the campaign launched in August, the Governor left Laguna with a small body of men, including Antonio El Pinto and nineteen other Navahos. Fifty-three Navahos appeared at Laguna for

72. Vicente Troncoso, *Report to Concho*, Santa Fe, April 12, 1788. *Prov. Intern.* 65, exp. 5, ff. 5.

73. Concho to Urzarte, Santa Fe, November 10, 1787. *Ibid.*, exp. 8, ff. 11. El Pinto apparently had been well treated in Santa Fe. The Governor spent over 18 pesos on clothes for him on March 27, 1788. A. G. N., *Prov. Intern.* 103.

74. Concha, "Informe," Santa Fe, June 20, 1788. *Prov. Intern.* 65, exp. 5, ff. 112. Concha to Urzarte, Santa Fe, November 10, 1787. *Ibid.*, exp. 8, ff. 11.

75. Concha to Urzarte, Santa Fe, June 26, 1788. *Prov. Intern.* 65, exp. 6, ff. 22. The Navahos received a few presents at rare intervals. In January they were given twenty fanegas of wheat and twelve of corn. In April twenty Navahos and a chief received a donation of cloth, metal buttons, cigars, and knives. *Prov. Intern.* 103.

the undertaking, but only twenty were retained in order to reduce costs.⁷⁵

The presence of El Pinto from the Spanish point of view clinched the matter of the separation of Gila and Navaho. Many had doubted the wisdom of releasing him from prison, but now he was high in favor. The Navaho assaults on their kinsmen and former friends, the Gilas, had brought reprisals. El Pinto had risen to the actual leadership of his people, that is, the portion of Navahos who had really come under the influence of the Spanish (although the Spanish authorities spoke in terms of the whole nation). He was outstanding in efforts for the defense of their homes. In the fall of 1788, he directed the construction of stone forts to ward off invaders, and was forward in volunteering for campaigns. In short, his status had undergone such a change that he was credited with being a man of extraordinary talent. Governor Concha finally concluded that he should be given the title of General that had long been held by Don Carlos. The latter had fallen into the descriptive classification of a weak leader. If a change were made in the command, his feelings could be assuaged with the title of "retired" general.⁷⁶

For the next several years the situation was fairly satisfactory to the Spanish authorities. Their Indian allies, the Comanches, Utes, Navahos, and even the Jicarilla Apaches, occasionally visited Santa Fe, a few at a time, and received gifts while enjoying the hospitality of the Governor. For the year 1789, the cost of entertaining visitors amounted to 5,906 silver pesos. The Comanches were the most expensive, costing 4,248 pesos. Expenditures for the Navahos amounted to 842 pesos, the Utes 416, Jicarillas 320, and a few southern Apaches (not the Gilas, of course) 80 pesos.⁷⁷ The following year, Navahos called on the Governor several times. A captain and twenty-two followers arrived on June 22. They received some indigo, cloth, a bridle, smokes, hatchets, and

76. Concha, "Diary," *Prov. Intern.* 103, exp. 2. Translated and annotated in *New Mexico Historical Review*, 84:286-304 (October, 1959) by Adlai Feather.

77. Concha to Urzarte, Santa Fe, November 12, 1788. *Spanish Archives*, II, No. 1022. Concha, "Informe," Santa Fe, June 20, 1788. *Prov. Intern.* 65, exp. 5, ff. 19v. I do not know whether or not a formal change was made in the generalship of the Navahos.

78. J. N. Chavez, "Memorandum," Santa Fe, December 31, 1789. *Prov. Intern.* 103.

some knives. On July 8, a leader and three associates arrived. On September 15, a party of eleven came for a visit and on November 12 the usual captain with nine followers were in the capital.⁷⁸

In the winter of 1792, the Utes and Navahos combined against the Comanches and raided one of their camps in the eastern buffalo country when the men were absent. The Comanches promptly retaliated against the Utes. In order to strike at the Navahos it was necessary to cross through the heart of the Spanish-Pueblo country. The Governor did not want intra-Indian friction at any time, and least of all did he want the Navahos stirred up in general, so he arranged for a meeting of leaders from both sides in Santa Fe to patch up the quarrel.⁷⁹ But the more sorrowful event occurred a year later when El Pinto was killed by a raiding party of Gila Apaches. They attacked the Navaho rancheria of Guadalupe and killed him with an arrow. A party of twenty-five Navahos, with two Jémez Indians and the Interpreter, overtook the raiders in the San Mateo Mountains, but no punishment could outweigh the death of El Pinto. In the words of Pedro de Nava, he was a fine person, obedient to the Spanish authority; he in turn had received respect and obedience from his own people, and moreover he had been an implacable enemy of the Apaches, "circumstances," Nava mourned, "that would never be found in another person."⁸⁰

The closing years of the nineteenth century marked another era of good will between Navaho and Spanish. The friction over use of land in the Cebolleta area came temporarily to an end. In keeping with the terms of peace arranged by Governor Anza, the Navahos had returned to their old planting fields, and arrangements were made whereby New Mexican pastors could move their stock into acknowledged Navaho territory, the one understanding being that the stock should not be permitted to range on the Indian farm land. The dire poverty of the New Mexicans in the decade of the 1770's, largely owing to losses suffered in war with frontier

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Prov. Intern.* 103.

⁸⁰ Letter to Pedro de Nava, Santa Fe, November 19, 1793. Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, II, No. 1266.

foes, gave way to a measure of prosperity. The Navahos likewise were enjoying to a much greater extent the fruits of their toil. From the viewpoint of a distinguished soldier and close student of frontier problems, the Navahos "were at another time the enemies of the Spanish. Today they are faithful friends, and are governed by a general named by the Governor. They suffer some annoyances from their countrymen the Chiricahua and Gila Apaches who mark the southern limits for the Navaho."⁸¹

Underneath the surface, however, of this era of good feeling were basic problems that could not be solved in the lifetime of any one individual or governmental administration. The notion that the Navahos had acquired responsible government was unsound, and the effort to reconcile Navaho and Spanish interests in land around the Cebolleta region was doomed to failure. Consequently, the era of peace finally came to an end and the old problems were reborn, except for one. The Navahos no longer were a keen source of worry to the central Spanish authorities in dealing with the Gila Apaches. They were to be a Provincial problem.

81. El Teniente Coronel Don Antonio Cordero, "Noticias relativas a la nacion Apache que en Año de 1796 extendio en el Paso del Norte," *Documentos Historicos sobre Durango*, mss. 93 (B. L.). Concha, *Relacion*, Santa Fe, May 1, 1793. A. G. I., Mexico, 82-6-53. Letter to Pedro de Nava, Santa Fe, July 15, 1796. Twitchell, *Spanish Archives*, II, No. 1335.

Other documents of general interest for these last years are Fernando de la Concha, "Informe, 1787-1788," *Prov. Intern.* 264. And Concha, "Advice on Governing New Mexico, 1794," translation by Donald E. Worcester, *New Mexico Historical Review*, 24:236-254 (July, 1949).