

WESTERN BASTION:  
LAGUNA MILITARY AUXILIARIES  
1698 - 1886

BY

AUSTIN NELSON LEIBY

B.A., University of New Mexico, 1968

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts in History  
in the Graduate School of  
The University of New Mexico\*  
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When the Spaniards returned to New Mexico in the last decade of the seventeenth century, the fundamental problem confronting them was the conquest and control of the Indian Pueblos. By the end of the century this task had been essentially accomplished, and progress had been made toward cooperation with the Pueblo Indians.

A group of Keres Indians, and some of other Pueblo origin, resettled in an ancient Pueblo on the banks of a small river in west-central New Mexico. For the most part they were people who were tired of war and the disruption of war, but who were willing to fight for peace and order. On July 4, 1699, officials of the Pueblo formally acknowledged the sovereignty of Spain and of the Province of New Mexico, and the Pueblo was named San Jose de La Laguna.

The military problem in the Province changed. The Spaniard now became embroiled in a defensive struggle, with semi-barbarous tribes, which was to outlast them in the Province and on the continent. By 1704 the Governors had begun to coordinate Spanish and Pueblo military operations against the "indios barbaros," and from that time on the use of Pueblo auxiliaries in defense of the Province and State became standard practice.

During the final conquest of Acoma, the Spanish military force of Diego de Vargas Zapata y Lujan was accompanied by a group of Pueblo Indian auxiliaries who later comprised the majority of those Keres who resettled Laguna. These Scouts, as they were subsequently referred to, later assumed a semi-

permanent status. In March of 1702 they formed an independent unit to defend a Spanish missionary, Fray Juan de Gariacocha, at Zuni, and augmented the military force which Juan de Ulibarri commanded during that same month in his efforts to restore peace in the troubled western Pueblo. From that time onward, the Laguna Scouts continued to supply a dependable military auxiliary force for the defense of the western New Mexican boundaries, until final disbandment in 1893-94.

The role of the Laguna auxiliary military force in the history of New Mexico was significant. Employment of the force was almost constant. During the Spanish Period of sovereignty, from 1702 to 1821, Laguna Scouts participated in no less than fourteen campaigns - an average of one every eight years. During the Mexican Period, from 1821 to 1848, Laguna Scouts participated in seven major expeditions, against both the Apache and the Navajo. During the American Period, the Laguna Scouts became in reality a fully equipped company of militia, the backbone of a battalion of cavalry which contributed significantly to the final solution of the western Apache problem.

The role played by Laguna auxiliary military forces in the history of New Mexico cannot be measured by victories in battle; there were few battles and fewer victories. The significance lies rather in the strategic importance of having a constant defensive bastion in a central location astride both the western Apache and the Navajo foray routes, and in the fact that neither of these marauding peoples were able to

penetrate in depth the defensive line centered on Laguna.

TABLES OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . .	viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . .	ix
PREFACE . . . . .	1
I. THE SPANISH PERIOD, 1702-1821 . . . . .	4
II. THE MEXICAN PERIOD, 1821-1846 . . . . .	59
III. THE AMERICAN PERIOD, 1846-1881 . . . . .	70
IV. THE LAST CAMPAIGN . . . . .	85
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	113

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	PAGE
FIGURE 1. THE APACHE FRONTIER OF NEW SPAIN . . . . .	5
FIGURE 2. PLAN OF THE INTERIOR PROVINCE OF NEW MEXICO, 1779 . . . . .	9
FIGURE 3. THE JOURNEY OF JUAN DE ULIBARRI TO CUARTELEJO, 1706 . . . . .	16
FIGURE 4. EARLY PUEBLO AUXILIARY; WESTERN PUEBLO SCOUTING PARTY . . . . .	18
FIGURE 5. SPANISH ESCOPETA; TYPICAL EARLY CARBINE; LANCE BLADE . . . . .	20
FIGURE 6. THE GILA APACHE CAMPAIGN OF 1747 . . . . .	29
FIGURE 7. GOVERNOR VELEZ CACHUPIN'S DEFENSE PLAN - 1754 . . . . .	35
FIGURE 8. TROOP F, COMPANY I, AUTUMN 1917 . . . . .	86
FIGURE 9. LT. WALTER G. MARMON, 2nd OHIO VOLUNTEERS CIRCA 1864 . . . . .	88
FIGURE 10. THE ROSTER OF COMPANY I, DECEMBER 1882 . . . . .	94
FIGURE 11. TROOP F, COMPANY I, CIRCA 1882 . . . . .	96
FIGURE 12. THE APACHERIA REGION IN 1885 . . . . .	103

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AG	ADJUTANT GENERAL
AGI	ARCHIVO GENERAL DE INDIAS
AGN	ARCHIVO GENERAL DE LA NACION, MEXICO CITY
AGO	ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
AIHRP	AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORICAL RESEARCH PROJECT
BMH	BIBLIOTECA DEL MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA, MADRID, SPAIN
BNM	BIBLIOTHECA NACIONAL DE MEXICO
CL	CORONADO LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
NMHR	NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
N.M.V.M.	NEW MEXICO VOLUNTEER MILITIA
SANM	STATE RECORD CENTER & ARCHIVE, SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

## PREFACE

Spain utilized Indian auxiliaries to assist in the conquest of the New World. Some historians have deduced from this fact a certain disunity among Indian tribes or Nations. Others have reflected upon the fact that disunity facilitated conquest and in doing so have implicated the Indian in his own demise. But; was the end result demise, or painful re-birth and progress?

Francisco Vasquez de Coronado utilized Mexican Indian auxiliaries in the original exploration of the norther regions which included the present State of New Mexico. One can readily imagine what effect their contact later had on the formation of New Mexican Indian military auxiliaries. Juan de Oñate Ponce de Leon too was accompanied by Indian auxiliaries from Mexico, and they played a major role in the subjugation of the Pueblos. Mexican Indian auxiliaries also accompanied Diego de Vargas Zapata y Lujan when he began the reconquest of New Mexico in 1692; but now, significantly, he was also aided by Indian auxiliaries native to the Province.

Immediately preceding the Reconquest, a bitter and devastating war broke out between New Spain and the Indian tribes best described by the term - Apache. Historians of north-west Mexico and of south-west USA now realize that, at least in the context of region and time, these tribes cooperated in cogent military campaigns in defense of their confederated nation - Apacheria. The war continued intermittently for

almost two hundred years, traversing in time changes of sovereignty in New Mexico. The war was always typified on the part of the Apache by an ancient military axiom: to take the offensive is the best defense.

The Pueblo Rebellion of 1680 and subsequent Reconquest of New Mexico ended an era. Except for isolated instances which are better explained in terms of brigandage than rebellion, the Pueblos of New Mexico consequently became an integral part of the total social, economic, and political life and problems of the Province.

The Reconquest consequently began a new era. The Pueblo Indians increasingly began to adopt Spanish dress and economic practices. The political term for the region became the internal province of New Mexico, replacing the former term - northern province.

Pueblo military auxiliary participation in defense of New Mexico encompassed four periods: the Reconquest Period, the Spanish Period, the Mexican Period, and the American Period. Laguna Pueblo Indians undoubtedly participated in the Reconquest, but only as members of the Keres group whose role is so well described in Jack Forbes' Apache, Navajo, and Spaniard. With the "Zuni Incident" of 1702, the Laguna Tribe began a distinguishable and significant role in the defense of New Mexico.

Certainly the Laguna military auxiliary forces were not the only units which contributed significantly to the defense of New Mexico. The Spanish military units, the Mexican units, the American Army units in the final campaigns, are ade-

quately described in Luis Navarro García's Don José de Gálvez y la Comandancia General de las Provincias Internas del Norte de Nueva España, in Max Moorhead's The Apache Frontier, in Three New Mexico Chronicles by editors H. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard; and in The Conquest of Apacheria by Dan L. Thrapp. The fame of other Pueblo military auxiliary units is fully portrayed in Major Oakah L. Jones' Pueblo Warriors & Spanish Conquest. The present study, while relying heavily on the cited works for background and atmosphere, results primarily from archival research and oral history recordings and specifically portrays the role of Laguna military auxiliary forces in defense of New Mexico from the Reconquest to the final solution of the Apache problem.

If civilization and progress leading to greater happiness for all is truly the constant goal of most of mankind, then the transition of any race from period to period must be evaluated in the total historical sense rather than in the cultural and social concepts so prominent today. The Laguna Indians contributed significantly to the defense of the Province and State of New Mexico. That the enemy in the centuries-long struggle was of their own race, should not and cannot be permitted to dim the luster of their contribution.

## CHAPTER I

### LAGUNA MILITARY AUXILIARY PARTICIPATION

#### DURING THE SPANISH PERIOD, 1702-1821


After the Reconquest, the defense problem in New Mexico acquired a new dimension. By 1698 the Spaniards had restored a sense of unity to the Pueblos. Surprisingly, that unity had turned to support Spanish civilization rather than to oppose it. No longer was there an internal threat of major importance. The Apache, Navajo, Ute, and Comanche Indians became an ever more pressing threat to existence of the isolated province and to the Pueblo Indians themselves. The settlers, the military forces, and the Pueblos faced a common threat from hostile tribes which enclosed the province from at least three directions. At times they were completely surrounded and cut off from the rest of New Spain, as when Apache raids severed the supply route to Chihuahua. A contemporary report of the menacing Apache position by a Spanish officer, Antonio Jorge, declared that

"from where one leaves this said place [of El Paso] are the Apaches of the Sierra de los Organos [and of] the Sierra de Jila which is extensive because it begins at the Peñol of Ácoma ... and comes to an end at the Sierra Florida ... and [that region] is populated by the [Apacheria]...."<sup>1</sup>

The defense situation, in addition to being complicated

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<sup>1</sup>Declaration of Antonio Jorge, August 12, 1691, AGI, (see List of Abbreviations), Guadalajara, 139.



**THE APACHE FRONTIER  
of  
NEW SPAIN**

Adapted from Max L. Moorhead, *The Apache Frontier* (Norman, 1968), p. 5.

Figure 1

by isolation, was aggravated by the need to maintain not only the defense line across north Mexico proper, but also by the fact that the New Mexican province was in reality a deep protrusion into enemy territory and had both an eastern and a western frontier. It was the Apache menace on the western frontier which was to last the longest and be, for New Mexico, the most devastating.

Astride the Apache corridor in the west which Antonio Jorge had described, was located a small Keres settlement, overlooking a small fresh water lake, which had not even been noted by historians prior to the Reconquest. The pre-history of the Pueblo did not reflect martial spirit, nor did it predict the long military service which the auxiliary forces of Laguna would render to the State.

Following the uprising of 1696, a group of Keres rebels from Zia, Santo Domingo, and Cochiti settled in the Pueblo. On July 4, 1699, that Pueblo's officials formally acknowledged the sovereignty of Spain and of Governor Pedro Rodriguez de Cubero. The Pueblo was christened "Senor San Jose de La Laguna."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Documentos para servir a la historia del Nuevo Mexico, 1538-1778, Ediciones José Porrúa Turanzas, Madrid, 1962. p. 408. "Of the Queres Indians, originally from the Pueblos of Cieneguilla, Santo Domingo, and Cochiti, who during the year 1696 had taken refuge on the Rock of Acoma, most of them came down toward the end of the year 1697, and established themselves four leagues towards the north of the said Rock ... a stones throw from the lake, on a high rise of ground. The 30th day of June of the next year Cubero went there ... the 4th day of June [July] they pledged their obedience - the Queres of the new Pueblo which Cubero named "Senor San José de La Laguna." Translated by the author.

The western Pueblos had cooperated with Apache groups during the years between the Rebellion of 1680 and the Reconquest of 1692, and indeed the Apaches had provided both encouragement and armed forces to the Pueblos during the first years of the Reconquest. The Keres located above an east-west line at Bernalillo, however, had not been in close association with Apache groups (the distinction between Apache and Navajo now becomes important), and the Pueblo of Zia had suffered combined Navajo-Pueblo attacks both for failure to cooperate and because of supplies and auxiliary support which had been given to Spanish forces under Diego de Vargas.<sup>3</sup>

The Keres who resettled Laguna during the time of the Reconquest included many refugees from Zia and Santa Ana, Pueblos which had cooperated with de Vargas. The Spanish early instituted a political control structure in the Pueblos of New Mexico which was predicated on emasculating the ancient control of the most powerful native officer, the Cacique. The plan worked well with the disenchanted Keres of Laguna, and bore fruit much earlier and to a greater extent than in any other Pueblo.<sup>4</sup>

Laguna was located on the main east-west road from the Rio Grande to the western regions where Spanish explorations increasingly revealed the presence of mineral deposits which

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<sup>3</sup>Jack D. Forbes, Apache, Navajo, and Spaniard, Norman, 1960, pp. 237-39 and 282-85.

<sup>4</sup>Florence H. Ellis, "An Outline of Laguna Pueblo History and Social Organizations," The Southwest Journal of Anthropology, v. 15, 1959, pp. 325 and 346.

could be exploited to diversify the economy of the Province. As travel increased, Laguna became more and more important, both as a supply point and as a strategic defense point.


The degree to which the importance of Laguna increased during the eighteenth century is indicated by the fact that by mid-century it became an *Alcaldia*, the seat of justice in a Spanish realm roughly equatable to a county, as reflected in figure 2.

It was perhaps natural that Laguna should early develop an auxiliary military force. Ethnohistorian Florence Ellis has described the Laguna Indians of that period as being "unusually energetic, forceful, and aggressive, establishing far-reaching settlements, making herding a major industry." There were ethnic reasons for a desire to combat Apache intrusions in the west; Acoma had closely cooperated with them in the past and "Jealousy is old between Acoma and Laguna."<sup>5</sup> Laguna already had one main Pueblo and several subsidiary ones, including Seama which is some seven miles to the west. Seama means "place of the Zias," and was populated by the Keres who had cooperated with the Spanish during the Reconquest. They undoubtedly felt it just as important to fight to maintain order and progress as they had to bring it about.

The situation which brought on the centuries-long conflict with the Apache was unfolding at this time. The

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<sup>5</sup>Florence H. Ellis, "An Outline of Laguna Pueblo History ...", pp. 325 and 346.



Plan of the Interior Province of New Mexico  
By Bernardo Miera y Pacheco  
1779

from a photostat of the copy of BNM

Figure 2

Spaniard had begun the unending battle, for him, of driving the Apache back from the edges of civilization and of crushing their dominion over the region. That the Apache did have dominion over a vast region is ably documented, and little understood by some contemporary historians who tend to equate the final small but terribly devastating campaigns of the 1880's as resulting from unbearable pressure from the whites rather than the final convulsions of a domineering confederation being beaten into acceptance of peace and civilization. Apache domination was adequately commented upon by Fray Damian Massanet, Padre to the Jumanos, who in May of 1691 wrote that

"The Apaches are a cordon running from west to east, and they are at war with all; ... in the end they dominate all the nations, and the other nations say that they are not valiant, because they fight with armed horses, and they have defensive and offensive arms ..."<sup>6</sup>

The first organization of a Laguna military auxiliary force in defense of the civilization to which they had only recently pledged political fealty is not easily explained, especially in view of the fact that clearly the endangered persons were a Catholic priest and the Spanish garrison at Zuni. In February of 1702 a Navajo reported that the Indians of Laguna, Acoma, and Zuni were planning an uprising.

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<sup>6</sup>The Diary of Fray Damian Massanet, 1691, BMH 974, (see List of Abbreviations), as quoted in Forbes, Apache, Navajo, and Spaniard, pp. 221-22.

Governor Cubero dispatched Captain (Sergeant Major) Juan de Ulibarri, with a small force from the Presidio at Santa Fe, to investigate. Captain Ulibarri arrived at Laguna on March 4 and found that the native officials of Laguna and Acoma had mustered a force to march on Zuni in defense of the Franciscan Father, Fray Juan de Garaycoechea, and the Spanish garrison of twelve soldiers who were threatened by a group of Apache-Navajo-Moqui marauders. The Spanish-Indian unit marched to Zuni where a show of military force was sufficient to quiet the disturbance.<sup>7</sup>

The reduction of the threat at Zuni must be evaluated in the light of the effect that it had on the situation on the western frontier just four years after the final battles of the Reconquest. While the Zuni Incident of the following year did weaken frontier defense, cooperation of the Laguna-Acoma auxiliaries must have given warning to the Apaches of the region that the situation had changed in west-central New Mexico. No longer would the enemy consist only of small Spanish military forces. They could now count on assistance from Pueblo auxiliaries.

Laguna and Acoma auxiliaries were again offered during the Zuni Incident of 1703. The reasons why are not clear. Certainly the Zuni's were the aggrieved party.<sup>8</sup> A group of

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<sup>7</sup>Investigacion del levantamiento de Indios, SANM, (see List of Abbreviations), documentos 84 y 85.

<sup>8</sup>Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, San Francisco, 1889, pp. 225-26.

Zuni's had attacked three Spaniards in the church and killed them, and the majority of the Pueblo fled in fear to Thunder Mountain nearby. Governor Cubero again dispatched Captain Ulibarri and a force of nineteen soldiers. The force departed Santa Fe on March 4 and arrived in Laguna on March 10. According to the report of Fray Antonio Miranda, minister of Laguna and Acoma, officials of the Pueblos had again organized a military force to proceed to Zuni. Writing on March 12, Fray Miranda stated that "yesterday, the 10th [11th] of this month, the Governor of Cia arrived at this pueblo of Laguna with his people [armed force?] to aid me, an action which I have greatly appreciated; also fifty Indians of [Laguna] Acoma have armed themselves to go to Zuni and remove the Father, Fray Juan ... The attempt to remove the Father is a very pious action ..."<sup>9</sup>

A message from Fray Garaycochea at Zuni, received at Laguna by Ulibarri, begged the Governor not to precipitate further hostilities, but to remove the offending soldiers. Fray Miranda at Laguna counselled the Governor to move with the military force and reduce the Pueblo of Zuni. Cubero, now alarmed by the situation which he had allowed to occur, sent forty more soldiers to Laguna, and the augmented Spanish-Indian force proceeded to Zuni and safely removed Fray Garaycochea and the Spanish garrison.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Documentos para la Historia de Mexico. Mexico, 1853-57, 4 serie, 20 tomos. Tercera serie, tomo I, folio 21.

<sup>10</sup>Documentos para servir a la historia del Nuevo Mexico, 1538-1778, pp. 417-422.

The defense of the interior province acquired increased vigor under Governor Francisco Cuervo y Valdés who, shortly after his arrival, conducted a review of the military situation and determined that it was dangerous. Having been denied the financial support which he deemed necessary to organize and equip a Spanish militia defense force, Cuervo relied even more heavily than his predecessors on Pueblo integration and military assistance. Cuervo had not hesitated to utilize what Spanish military strength he possessed. On his way to New Mexico he carried out a vigorous campaign against the Apaches on the El Paso route, which he reopened, and he divided the Santa Fe garrison of 100 soldiers into seven squadrons similar to the famous "Flying Escort" squadron of Sonora. He stationed these in the most threatened areas, including one at Laguna.<sup>11</sup> The association of Laguna auxiliaries with this and later Spanish military units probably fostered their martial spirit and contributed to the heritage which obviously motivated formation of their splendid military organizations in the American Period.

Governor Cuervo called a council of war of all the political jurisdictions on April 16, 1705, and the defense position of the Province was analyzed and debated. A series of offensive moves were planned to strengthen the internal situation, including the request for thirty more Spanish Army soldiers. This was also denied, and Cuervo and the inhabitants of New

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<sup>11</sup>Documentos para servir a la historia del Nuevo Mexico,  
pp. 425-28.

Mexico were made aware by the Audiencia in Mexico that they must be more self-reliant. Cuervo replied that "the forces of this realm do not have sufficient strength to punish ... enemies,"<sup>12</sup> and appropriately decided that combined Spanish militia-Pueblo auxiliary forces would have to do. They did just that; in June and July they struck south and west against the Gila Apaches, and in early fall chastised the combined Navajo-Jemez forces in the northwest. That the campaign was in earnest is indicated by the ferociousness of the auxiliaries; on one occasion they halted the killing of an Apache just long enough for the accompanying Spanish chaplain to baptize her.<sup>13</sup>

Following these campaigns, New Mexico enjoyed a period of calm. The Villa de Alburquerque was founded. Governor Cuervo chose this period to prove his interest in the unity and defense of the Pueblos by acceding to their requests that the Picurís rebels, captives of the Apaches at Cuartelejo (in what is now eastern Colorado), be rescued by a military expedition. Laguna auxiliaries participated in the campaign.<sup>14</sup> Again, Juan de Ulibarri was in charge of the expedition. The command included forty Spaniards (28 soldiers and 12 militia)

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<sup>12</sup>Cuervo y Valdes to Viceroy Duque de Alburquerque, Santa Fe, May 18, 1705, AGN (see List of Abbreviations), Provincias Internas 36, Expediente 5.

<sup>13</sup>Fray Silvestre de Escalante, Noticias de lo acaecido en la custodia ... en el Nuevo Mexico ..., BNM (see List of Abbreviations), Legajo 3, Documento 2.

<sup>14</sup>Cuervo y Valdes to His Majesty, Santa Fe, AGI, Guadalajara 116, no. 261. Cuervo cited Laguna auxiliaries, among others, for their "great enthusiasm."

and one hundred Pueblo Indians. The amount of Laguna Indians is not indicated. The expedition assembled at Santa Fe, about one hundred and twenty miles from Laguna. Departing on July 13, 1706, the force proceeded by the general route indicated in figure 3 to the Cuartelejo Apache region of Colorado-Kansas. No fighting occurred. Departing on Friday, the 13th of August, the expedition returned by the same general route used in the advance, arriving back at Taos Pueblo on August 31 with sixty-two repatriated Picuris Indians.<sup>15</sup>

The Cuartelejo Expedition was very significant. It was the first joint Spanish-Pueblo auxiliary campaign into territory totally unknown to the Pueblos.<sup>16</sup> It was the first extensive campaign of long duration, for which routine but meticulous preparations had been made. It built prestige for the Spaniard, and Pueblo estimation. The Apache backed down at the confrontation and gave up what in the law of frontier warfare was obviously his - the captives. For the Laguna warriors it must have constituted a valuable training mission, during which they first became aware of the white man's march discipline and European methods of scouting and deployment.

In 1707 the Spanish garrison was withdrawn from Laguna,

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<sup>15</sup>Juan de Ulibarri, Diario, AGN, Provincias Internas 36, Expediente 4. Comparison was made with the translation of Alfred B. Thomas in After Coronado: Spanish Exploration North-east of New Mexico, 1696-1727, Norman, 1966, pp. 59-77. There is no significant difference.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid. Ulibarri revealed that the expedition became lost on July 31 and on August 1, and describes the fears of the Pueblo auxiliaries in an obviously unknown region.

The Journey of Juan de Ulibarí  
to Cuartelejo, 1706

. . . Route of the Expedition




Figure 3  
Adapted from Alfred B. Thomas (ed.)  
After Coronado . . . , Notman, 1932, p. 261

and from Santa Clara, Cochiti, and Jemez; indicating either that the threat had diminished in those areas, or that the auxiliary forces were sufficiently proficient to cope with the threat without continued regular army assistance.

The most numerous force in the defense organization in New Spain during the eighteenth century was not the regular army nor the militia units, but rather the Pueblo-type military auxiliaries. The potential numbers of such forces is indicated by the Zuni incidents of 1702 and 1703, when the Laguna-Acoma pueblos raised auxiliary units of about fifty warriors and an unknown quantity of Zia warriors arrived opportunely. At that time the populations of Laguna and Acoma approximated 500 persons in each.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the auxiliary forces raised were about five percent of the population. The total auxiliary forces involved in all of New Spain must have been quite large. While there were some regular enlisted Indian military units in New Spain, the Pueblo auxiliaries were actually volunteer militia units. They served under their own native officers, selected in accordance with native procedures.<sup>18</sup> They had no prescribed uniform, but they early adopted those articles which provided greater safety and greater offensive capabilities. Jones emphasizes the similarities between Pueblo and Opata auxiliaries, stating

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<sup>17</sup>Ellis, "Laguna Pueblo History," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, p. 327.

<sup>18</sup>Oakah L. Jones, Pueblo Warriors & Spanish Conquest, Norman, 1966, p. 25.



Early Pueblo Auxiliary

Adopted from: Oliver LaFarge, *The American Indian*  
(New York, 1960) p. 111; and, Andrew K. Gregg, *New Mexico . . . A Pictorial History* (Albuquerque, 1968),  
p. 53.



Western Pueblo Scouting Party

Figure 4

that the fundamental difference was that Opata auxiliaries were enlisted for specified periods of time and that their officers were almost always Spaniards or Criollos. Auxiliaries were early furnished arms; muskets, the first so-called carbines, and lances. They also retained their native bows, arrows, and shields, giving them a rather formidable offensive and defensive arsenal. The auxiliaries, including those at Laguna, were mounted early in their careers.<sup>19</sup>


These early campaigns and the rescue of the Picurís had a beneficial effect on the safety and well being of the Province. Although the war-torn Pueblos could ill-afford the loss of manpower on campaigns, the internal peace that these few years brought must have contributed to larger crops and an increase in herds and flocks. This is revealed in a report of an Indian council held at Santa Fe on January 6, 1707, with Governor Cuervo officiating. The war captains, who presumably were the officers in charge of each Pueblo's military auxiliary force, attended. The Pueblo Governors remarked upon the general tranquility of the realm, on the frontiers now apparently safe, and on the utility of the coordinated defense system.<sup>20</sup>

Except for what apparently were isolated attacks in

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<sup>19</sup>In Thomas, After Coronado, there are uncountable references made to the horseherds of the Pueblo auxiliaries, and even the poor remaining Picurís who met Ulibarri's expedition at that Pueblo gave some horses for the return transportation of those who would be rescued at Cuartelejo; see pp. 58, 60, 61.

<sup>20</sup>Jones, Pueblo Warriors . . . , p. 79.



Spanish Escopeta



Typical Early Carbine



Lance Blade

Figure 5

Adopted from Sidney B. Brinkerhoff & Odie B. Faulk, Lancers for the King (Phoenix, 1965), pp. 72 and 73.

the Zuni area, the western Pueblos were relatively free from assaults during 1706-1716. Available documents do not indicate participation by western Pueblo military auxiliaries in any eastern or northwestern campaigns of that period. There was a general increase in population of the Pueblos, and the Spanish made forceful attempts to destroy Pueblo estufas (kivas) and to stamp out native religious practices. Governor José Chacón Medina Salazar y Villaseñor was reprimanded by Viceroy Fernando de Alencastre because of deteriorating relations with the Pueblo Indians. Finally, in 1714, Governor Juan Ignacio Flores Mogollón attempted to disband the Pueblo auxiliaries and disarm all Indians. The attempt failed, largely because of the strenuous objections to Viceroy Alencastre of the Franciscan Fathers, including Fray Miranda at Laguna. They reminded the Viceroy of their isolated locations and that frontier defense rested largely on the use of armed Pueblo military auxiliaries. At a council of war held in 1715, it was decided that the Keres, and the Laguna, military auxiliaries would not participate in eastern campaigns that year. In July of that year a punitive expedition was conducted against Apache bands hiding in the Ladrones Mountains about forty miles southeast of Laguna.<sup>21</sup>

In 1716, interim Governor (Captain) Felix Martínez

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<sup>21</sup>Jones, Pueblo Warriors . . ., pp. 79-91; and, Documentos para servir . . . del Nuevo Mexico, pp. 447-456; T.M. Pearce, New Mexico Place Names - A Geographical Dictionary, Albuquerque, 1965, p. 81: "They are very rocky and trails are passable only on foot or single file on horseback."

turned his attention to the western frontier. The Moquis had never been subdued, and had constituted a continuing threat to the Province ever since the Reconquest. The Tanos of Hano, a Moqui village to which they had fled from the Rio Grande region during the Rebellion of 1680, were particularly troublesome. Their independent existence fomented obstinacy in the Zuni's, and they provided assistance and sanctuary to the Navajos when campaigns drove them westward. Martínez ordered that a force of seventy Spanish soldiers of the Santa Fe garrison be dispatched to Albuquerque, where they were to be joined by citizen militia called to active duty and by 282 Pueblo military auxiliaries. Martinez ordered activation of the auxiliaries through the Alcaldias, the first use of a political jurisdiction for that purpose.

Assembly was required on August 18 in the Plaza de Armas in Albuquerque. The presidial force departed Santa Fe on August 16. A Laguna military auxiliary force of ten warriors reported for assembly and participated in the campaign. They must have passed by their Pueblo on the long march to the Hopi villages. At the foot of the most western Hopi Mesa, Martínez selected sixteen Keres Indians to negotiate with the Moqui leaders. The Moquis objected to the religious stipulations which Martínez demanded. The Keres delegation was led by a Zia chieftain carrying a large cross; eighteen years after the settlement at Laguna of a large group of Zia Indians. Since the Zias were unsuccessful in the first peaceful gestures, Martínez sent a delegation of Tanos from the Rio Grande Pueblos

to negotiate with those of Hano. The Tano delegation was also ordered to advise the Hano people and the Moquis that failure to reach an agreement would result in the Spanish assaulting the villages on the mesas. The ultimatum was refused, and the combined Spanish and auxiliary army attacked. Eight of the Moqui-Tano forces were killed, and three Spaniards were wounded. The battle was not decisive and did not carry the mesa. Martínez' army besieged the Moquis for sixteen days, destroying all crops and cutting off water supplies from the outside. Determining that the cost did not justify the expenditures, Martínez ordered withdrawal of the army. Failure of Martínez to press the campaign through to victory was a serious mistake. It resulted in a serious loss of prestige, both to the Spaniard and to Pueblo military auxiliary forces. The religious leaders of the Province were particularly disappointed. Martínez was replaced as Governor and Captain-General the following year,<sup>22</sup> probably because he no longer had the confidence of the Viceroy.

The Laguna military auxiliary force did not participate again in an organized campaign until the winter of 1744. During the early summer and fall of that year the settlements of Rio Abajo area had experienced increasing small attacks from Faraon Apache.<sup>23</sup> Oral history records of Laguna and Acoma

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<sup>22</sup>Felix Martinez, Diario de los acontecimientos y las operaciones, 11 de mayo - 20 de noviembre 1716, SANM, Documento 250; and Documentos para servir . . . del Nuevo Mexico, Gobierno de Don Felix Martinez, pp. 457-60.

<sup>23</sup>Frederick W. Hodge, & Charles F. Lummis, in an annotation to the Memorial of Fray Alonso de Benevides, 1630, by

indicate that it was during this period that Laguna began to suffer the ruinous raids on their villages, as well as on their sheep and horse herds, which later made them such implacable foes of the Apache tribes.<sup>24</sup>

Late in 1744, Governor Joaquin Codallos y Rabat decided to mount a campaign against the Faraones. Lieutenant Manuel Sanz de Garbuzu was directed to proceed with 20 Spanish soldiers from the presidio of Santa Fe to Isleta. They arrived on December 10 and were joined by citizen militia of La Cañada and Albuquerque. One hundred Pueblo Indian military auxiliaries from Laguna and other Keres Pueblos were ordered to duty. They were required to bring their horses, arms, and enough provisions for an extended mountain campaign. On this campaign the Lagunas performed some special duties: they operated in separate parties, reconnoitering water holes and scouting out the Apache lairs.<sup>25</sup> They did not have much success finding the Apaches; evidently they had fled to their homelands

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Mrs. Edward E. Ayer, translator, Chicago, 1916, p. 264, states that the Faraones "i.e. 'Pharaohs' are no longer known, but they were very troublesome to the Rio Grande settlements in the eighteenth century, when they lived . . . in the Sierra de los Ladrones [Mountains of the Thieves] west of that stream. The name was probably collective . . . including [in it] several vagrant bands of Mescaleros, Mimbrenos, and probably Mogollones."

<sup>24</sup> AIHRP, UNM Project, Laguna Records (see List of Abbreviations). The files, tape recordings and transcripts of interviews of elderly Pueblo and Navajo Indians, are too numerous to cite individually, but see: Florence H. Ellis, Anthropological Study, 1967, VIII, Summary and Conclusions, from AIHRP, BIA Records Group.

<sup>25</sup> Codallos y Rabat, Ordenes, December 2, 1745, SANM, Documento 495.

in the southeast and southwest regions.

In addition to military-auxiliary campaigns sanctioned by a junta de guerra (council of war) and approved or directed by the Governor, the Lagunas now began to send out autonomous war parties, with native religious preparations and ceremonial scalp taking. They waged relentless warfare on the Apache, although the war parties were usually organized for revenge and not for preventative purposes or glory. These war parties were not subject to the rules imposed upon military auxiliaries, although they did adopt some of the regulations which insured group safety, such as the posting of point and rear guards. This unsanctioned warfare against the Apache was brutal, designed to thoroughly chastise the wild tribes for their raids and to make them fearful of committing further depredations. War parties, as opposed to military-auxiliary participation, did not usually ride horses, because "the horse might be shot out from under the rider." A medicine man accompanied the party, to remove ceremoniously arrows from wounded warriors. The Lagunas used arrows poisoned with the "blood of snakes" which were collected for that purpose by the War Captain. Each Laguna warrior carried a chamois pouch which contained boiled meat and paper-thin bread (probably similar to the "piki" prayer bread). They did not stop to eat, as did the auxiliaries, each brave eating as he desired while enroute. They also carried extra bows and arrows, and an extra pair of moccasins. The war parties did not carry firearms on these early raids. This savage warfare was not internecine; the purpose of Apache

raids was to secure plunder: cattle, sheep, horses, precious metals, even corn from the fields. However, the Apaches did not hesitate to kill, and sometimes did mount a murderous raid just to chastise the Lagunas for an earlier reprisal raid. This "tit for tat" system which evolved was responsible for creating an unbridgable gap between the Apache and the western Pueblos. Usually, Apache raids were conducted by individual bands, but occasionally several bands united, and then the most famous or the most powerful chief assumed command. In combined raids the Apache strength sometimes exceeded 100 warriors. If the purpose of the raid was reprisal, the war parties tried to kidnap women and children.<sup>26</sup>

In late 1747, the Laguna military auxiliary force participated for the first time as an autonomous unit in a coordinated campaign of all the military forces of northern New Spain against the Apache tribes. Jones, in Apache Warriors, emphasizes that this campaign was unique in the history of New Spain, because it was one of the few centrally planned and coordinated mass military efforts undertaken from different locations against a common enemy. Figure 6 graphically portrays the regions of the Apache tribes, at this time, which were the object of the campaign; it is interesting to note the plan of attack which was very advanced, militarily, and used a pincer-like principle. Unfortunately, regional defense

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<sup>26</sup> AIHRP, UNM Project, BIA Group Records, Ellis, Anthropological Study, XIII, transcripts of Lorenzo D. Vallo and Swyme, of Acoma.

apparently was not considered in the over-all offensive plans, and a diversionary attack by Navajo and other warriors in the north deflected New Mexican strength until very late in the year. The northern Apache attack could not have been better timed. The New Mexican portion of the campaign was to have been directed against the Gila Apaches.<sup>27</sup> Grand strategy was coordinated and directed by the Viceroy, Juan de Güemes y Horcacas, first Conde de Revilla Gigedo. The Governor of New Mexico was directed to mobilize and prepare for a four-month campaign and he was to furnish thirty presidio soldiers, forty militia, and sixty Pueblo Indians for the expedition. The New Mexican force was to advance southward, invest the Gila region, and campaign until contact was made with the other forces converging on the region. However, in late September, just before the scheduled date of the campaign start, this force was dispatched to the north, to cope with the diversionary attack. But Laguna mustered an additional and independent force and marched southward to the attack.<sup>28</sup> As soon as the diversionary raids at Abiquiú had been repulsed and the attackers

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<sup>27</sup>Hodges & Lummis, in Memorial de . . . . Benevides . . . ., p. 265: "Gileño . . . this name was first applied by Benevides to the Apache of the upper waters of the Gila in New Mexico - possibly those who later became known as the 'Tchishi-dinne,' or Warm Springs Apache, of whom Victorio and Nane were famous warriors in 1880-82. Forty or fifty years ago [i.e. circa 1866] the name of Gileño specifically designated a small band living east of the Chiricahua, about the Rio Gila in southwestern New Mexico, and generically all of the Gila river Indians including parts of the Coyeteros, Mogollones, Pinal Coyeteros, and Mimbresos, and even the Pima of another stock."


<sup>28</sup>Bernardo Antonio de Bustamante, Diario, December 24, 1747, SANM, Documento 483.

scattered, the main campaign force of 155 soldiers, militia, and Pueblo Indians, including Laguna military auxiliaries, proceeded to Isleta, arriving there on December 10. After gathering supplies for the campaign, the main army marched southwestward under the command of "Lt. General" Bernardo de Bustamante. Following the trail of Apache bands west of the Rio Grande, the main army met the independent "army" of 65 Laguna warriors which had been chasing Apaches west and south toward Mexican forces driving up from presidios at El Paso, Janos, Fronteras, and Terranate. The two New Mexican forces combined and continued the southwestward drive until late in the month when, hindered by heavy snow and dwindling supplies, the entire command turned north and marched back to Isleta.<sup>29</sup>

The Gila Apache campaign of 1747 was much more important than Professor Jones attributes to it in Pueblo Warriors & Spanish Conquest. The diversionary attack by Apache-Ute groups at Abiquiú did not entirely succeed in its purpose. While the campaign force turned north to face the unexpected threat, the Laguna independent army succeeded in blocking the path of Apache bands into the northern escape route, and it drove Apache bands south and west into the waiting jaws of the trap which had been prepared by the Mexican forces trying to encircle them from the south and west. This in itself must have been a great blow to the cunning leaders of the Apache

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<sup>29</sup>Despacho del Superior Gobierno de este Nueva Espana . . . , SANM, Documento 479.



conspiracy. The ability, the desire, of peaceful western New Mexican Pueblos to mount an independent offensive was another blow. This must have been a time of great crises in Apacheria, because for the first time they were obviously faced with a counter-confederation. They could no longer count on a diversionary attack succeeding in its primary purpose: to draw off the military strength of the province and leave other areas unprotected. It appears likely that this lesson was observed by both sides, for Spanish officials most certainly felt a greater confidence in the future, and Laguna-Acoma forces, both independent and military-auxiliary, increasingly took over the primary role in western New Mexican defense. Laguna became a bastion which had to be reckoned with.

Laguna military auxiliaries, and other western Pueblo military auxiliaries, were not again called out for active campaign duty until 1772, a period of fifteen years. During this period the western Pueblos prospered. While they did suffer from continuing raids by small Apache bands, these were of diminishing intensity. Particularly, the horse herds of Laguna grew until they were the largest in the province and probably supplied a great part of the horses used in the increasing Comanche campaigns on the eastern frontier. The population of the western Pueblos increased. Their arsenal of weapons were increased and diversified.<sup>30</sup> Unsanctioned

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<sup>30</sup>Estado general y particular . . . del Nuevo Mexico . . . en el año de 1752, AGN, Provincias Internas 102,

and independent reprisals campaigns were mounted against the western Apaches, and they were kept too busy to become a great danger while the eastern Comanche campaigns were concluded.

Laguna military auxiliary forces were used for escort duty on the western frontier. Laguna and Acoma twice contributed to a force of eighty auxiliaries who escorted Fray Carlos Delgado of Laguna into the Moqui region, and to other areas of the western frontier, where he expended great efforts to Christianize the Moquis and western Apaches, and to resettle them in the Rio Grande region.<sup>31</sup>

Laguna military auxiliaries were used in punitive campaigns against Navajos to the northwest of the Pueblo, who had been slowly encroaching on the area. The Laguna forces operated independently during these expeditions, but were augmented by militia mustered from Spanish citizens of the region.<sup>32</sup>

During the period of relative calm on the western frontier of New Mexico, the intensity of campaigning on the

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Expediente 3, Foja 1. The report indicates that auxiliaries were getting some items of protective equipment such as leather (cuero) coats, tougher shields, and even some newer firearms which could be purchased by local militia at crown prices through official channels.

<sup>31</sup>Kelly, Henry W., "Franciscan Mission of New Mexico, 1740-1760," NMHR (see List of Abbreviations), v. XVI, No. 1, January 1941, pp. 41-69. Also: Codallos y Rabal, September 14, 1745, SANM, Documento 465.

<sup>32</sup>Frank D. Reeve, "Navajo-Spanish Diplomacy, 1770-1790," NMHR, v. XXXV, No. 3, July 1960, p. 207.

eastern frontier increased. This campaigning was very important and significant. It resulted in the temporary pacification of Comanches in the northern and northeastern regions of the province. But it also resulted in a domino-like struggle in the southeastern regions and across the south of New Mexico. Comanche was driven in upon Apache; Apache drove upon other Apaches further south; and the Gileños, who had experienced some respite and freedom, were again constricted into the southwestern regions. They did not forget the "safety-valve" corridor towards Laguna and Zuni and on into eastern Arizona. Raids in that area began to increase.

The relative quiet resulted from Pueblo military auxiliary strength and readiness on the western frontier, but overall it resulted from the planned preparedness system of Governor Tomás Velez Cachupín. His plan was well organized and integrated. It is preserved in his instructions to his successor, Francisco Antonio Marín del Valle.<sup>33</sup> It proposed that defense of the province be primarily based on military preparedness and upon an "early-warning" system to give the alarm prior to appearance of raiding bands in populated areas.<sup>34</sup> This included a defense in depth principle.

The defense in depth principle encompassed all inhabited

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<sup>33</sup>Copia de Yinstruccion . . . a D<sup>n</sup> Francisco Marín del Valle, August 12, 1754, AGN, Provincias Internas 102, Expediente 2, Foja 270, y ff; hereinafter referred to as Velez Cachupín, Instruccion.

<sup>34</sup>Jones, Pueblo Warriors . . . , p. 128.

regions of the province. In the north and northeast, Pueblo military auxiliaries were maintained in key positions where they could reconnoiter strategic passes and routes which provided gateways into the Rio Grande valley.<sup>35</sup> In the south (i.e. south of Albuquerque), roving patrols were maintained, drawn from Keres Pueblo military auxiliaries, including a complement from Laguna. They were sometimes augmented by presidio soldiers from Santa Fe. Their headquarters were located at Quarai and Tajique in the Manzano Mountains. Their primary mission was to observe and give the alarm. Since the Laguna military auxiliary force was some fifty miles west of Albuquerque, the Gileños might still penetrate through the Ladron Mountains from the southwest.<sup>36</sup> In addition to the patrols and stationed lookouts, further depth was provided by the system of ready reserves (i.e., Pueblo military auxiliaries) in each region. As outlined in Figure , page , the province was politically organized into Alcaldías, each Alcaldía being an integral part of the defense system and each maintaining control of the military auxiliaries through the alcalde mayor (both a political and judicial position representing the state in the region or Alcaldía).<sup>37</sup> If the sentinels or roving patrols observed attacks developing which their strength could not cope with, fast couriers were

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<sup>35</sup>Velez Cachupín, Instrucción.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Jones, Pueblo Warriors . . . , pp. 82, 83, & 134.

to be dispatched to the alcalde mayor of the region. The mobile reserve of 200 presidial troops at Santa Fe, and Pueblo Indian auxiliaries, could then be swiftly moved to meet the threat. Trained citizen militia could also be called up as the situation required.<sup>38</sup>

The fierce struggle which began between Laguna and the Navajos in 1774 seems to have resulted from Ute pressure in the northwest of the province. It was preceded by a period of warfare in the northeast and by diversionary Apache attacks in the west.


The unwanted peace which Governor Pedro Fermín de Mendinueta had successfully pressed on the Comanches in 1771 by the use of Ute auxiliaries, did not last long. By the spring of 1772 eruptions were breaking out all around the defense perimeter of New Mexico. Mendinueta described his province to Viceroy Bucareli in mid-year: "Everywhere along the 55 leagues from Taos to Tomé, and along the 70 leagues from Pecos to Zuni, the frontier is uneasy."<sup>39</sup> The Comanches were celebrating the peace by committing civil excesses: in March of 1772 they committed many robberies and murders in Pecos, Sabinal, and San Ildefonso.<sup>40</sup> In addition to the

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<sup>38</sup>Jones, Pueblo Warriors . . ., ch. 5. For a full portrayal of the threat to northern New Spain, including New Mexico, and the defense plans of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, see: Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783.

<sup>39</sup>Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, May 26, 1772, AGI, Guadalajara, 276.

<sup>40</sup>Luis Navarro García, Don José de Gálvez y la Comandancia General de las Provincias Internas de Norte de Nueva España, Sevilla, 1964, p. 244.



Governor Velez Cachupin's Defense Plan - 1754

Figure 7

military threat of a renewed outbreak of dreaded Comanche warfare, the province was experiencing a severe epidemic of respiratory sickness.

On July 22, 1772, the eastern frontier erupted and Mendinueta alerted the Alcaldías and the entire defense perimeter. More than 500 Comanches attacked Pecos, a unit of 200 assaulted Picurís, and another force of more than 100 surrounded and threatened Galisteo. Governor Mendinueta mobilized the Santa Fe defense sector and forces were sent to each segment under attack. He lamented that he could not take the chance of calling on the western Pueblos; to do so would leave them defenseless should the Apaches attack in that sector.<sup>41</sup>

In early August, 1772, an Apache force of about 50 braves attacked Zuni. Laguna and Acoma military auxiliaries were hurriedly dispatched to assist in the defense. Seven defenders were killed, but the Apaches were repulsed with "twenty-two killed and many wounded." Bucareli was particularly elated with this victory, writing to Mendinueta that the valor of these western Pueblo warriors "always overcomes their fears," and that after the Spanish completed the line of presidios in the south, the defense line of the western Pueblos would have an even greater preventive value.<sup>42</sup>

The defense line of the western Pueblos, the premise

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<sup>41</sup>Jones, Pueblo Warriors . . . , p. 152.

<sup>42</sup>Luis Navarro Garcia, Don José de Gálvez . . . , p. 245.

of a defensive bastion in the west preventing Apache contact with the northern tribes and at the same time constricting the Gila tribes ever more south-westward, has been little understood and even less commented upon by historians. It has great significance to later developments in western New Mexico and particularly in eastern Arizona. Beginning in the early 1770's and extending through into the late Spanish Period, influential frontier specialists and defense experts advocated either the extermination of the Gileño Apaches or driving them southwest into the upper regions of Baja California. This was an inherent part of the proposals of Adjutant Inspector Antonio de Bonilla in 1772, which included moving the presidio at San Bernardino to the northwest and construction and garrisoning of a presidio at the junction of the San Pedro and Gila Rivers. Father Francisco Garcés recommended a strong presidio at the junction of the Gila and "the Rio Asuncion,"<sup>43</sup> and specifically outlined the need for a closer relation with "the Tejuas of the north" in order to close the line constricting the Apaches.<sup>44</sup>

That these recommendations were widely known at the time can be safely assumed: Baron Alejandro de Humboldt, in

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<sup>43</sup>This must have been the river reached by Fray Juan de la Asuncion, in 1538. The little-known exploration of Fray Juan and Pedro Nadal is outlined in Thomas Edwin Farish, History of Arizona, v. I, Phoenix, 1915, p. 7; and in Rufus K. Wyllys, Arizona, The History of a Frontier State, Phoenix, 1950, p. 18.

<sup>44</sup>Thomas, Teodoro de Croix . . . , pp. 165-213.

his 1805 report to Charles IV, after outlining the situation in the southwest and defensive plans, remarked "it is to be hoped that as the population and public prosperity increases in the Interior Provinces, the warlike hordes will soon be retired behind the Gila, later to the west of the River Colorado that flows out into the Sea of Cortes, [Gulf of California]." <sup>45</sup> It would appear that this plan, whether officially accepted or not, became a base for development of the region. It is safe to assume that the people of Arizona did not forget it. The plan ultimately backfired, for the Gileños' escape route to the west, if they ever wanted one, was later cut off by heavy settlement in the west, and the Gila tribes fought back and forth between the Laguna-line and the Sonora-Chihuahua-line until the final solution in 1886. Bucareli feared that something like this would occur, because in 1773 he wrote that he "suspected that perhaps the Indians pushed out of the frontier areas of New Viscaya and Coahuila by the Commander-Inspector General Hugo O'Conor might fall with even greater strength on New Mexico." <sup>46</sup>

In the spring of 1774 a Navajo band settled on some land, north of the village, which had long been claimed by the Lagunas. By summer the situation was tense, the Lagunas

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<sup>45</sup> Alejandro de Humboldt, Ensayo Político sobre el Reino de la Nueva España, 1822, edited by Juan A. Ortega y Medina, Mexico, 1966, pp. 562-63; hereafter referred to as Humboldt, Ensayo.

<sup>46</sup> Bucareli to Arriaga, September 26, 1773, AGI, Guadalajara 512, as reported in Navarro García, Don José de Gálvez . . . , p. 246.

threatening to force the Navajos out by military might. In early autumn several skirmishes occurred between groups of the two tribes. Evidently the pressure forced the Navajo band to leave, but Navajo raids immediately increased against Laguna herds. In late fall Laguna military auxiliaries mounted a sanctioned expedition against the Navajos. It ended in late November, without much fighting, but with the Navajos requesting peace terms.<sup>47</sup>

During 1775 the western frontier was subjected to a series of assaults by the Gileños, and by combined Gileño-Navajo-Comanche war parties. Laguna, Acoma, Zuni, even Albuquerque and Alameda were hit hard by running bands. In March the Gileños attacked Laguna and other villages in the immediate vicinity. These battles resulted in the death of three Pueblos and thirteen were captured and taken off. The Gileños also captured and ran off eighty horses. But the Pueblos did kill thirteen Gileños and put the rest to flight.<sup>48</sup>

The Lagunas had an organized system to cope with the Apache raids. It included early warning and defense in depth features. Sheep and horse herds were scattered all over the Laguna grant, which contained something over 75,000 acres of

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<sup>47</sup>Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, October 20, 1774, AGI, Guadalajara 515, as cited in Frank D. Reeves, The Navajo-Spanish Peace: 1720's - 1770's, NMHR, v. XXXIV, No. 1, January 1950, p. 40.

<sup>48</sup>Bucareli to Arriega, Mexico, July 20, 1775, AGI, Guadalajara 515, as cited in Navarro García, Don José de Gálvez . . . , p. 48.

land. Within the vicinity of a herd the Lagunas usually built a fort-like structure or tower. Whenever the herders observed or heard the approach of a war party, they dispatched the fastest runner to the Pueblo, by secret trails. The other herders barricaded themselves in the structure, not giving notice of their presence but prepared to fight if discovered. When the Laguna runner got within shouting distance of the Pueblo, he began to stop periodically and give an agreed-upon signal cry. When his cry was heard, it was answered and he discontinued his shout so that the possibility of the Apaches being forwarned would be lessened. When the war cry was received, or when the runner arrived, the War Captain would go to the cave near the top of the hill and give an alarm cry. The Laguna Scouts would then assemble with their arms and provisions in the Plaza. If the Apaches had turned and were retreating, the auxiliaries formed and chased them. If the Apaches were pressing an attack, the auxiliaries formed a defense in accordance with the situation and relative strengths. If the Apaches were repulsed and chased, the auxiliaries endeavored to turn them by the herd structures, where the herders could also fire or shoot arrows and increase both the consternation and the losses of the Apaches.<sup>49</sup> According to the Informe of Tomás Velez Cachupín of February, 1762, previously cited in footnote , each Pueblo

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<sup>49</sup>Oral History Recordings & Transcripts, AIHRP, UNM Project, December 12, 1968, Mrs. Walter K. Marmon, Apache Raids; also, BIA Records Group, Florence H. Ellis, XIII, Notes on . . . Raids Upon Pueblos . . . .

which was the seat of an Alcaldía had been issued a small brass cannon together with supplies of powder, and if these were still in possession of Laguna in the 1770's it must have made their defense system formidable indeed.

In the fall of 1776 the Gileños attacked again in the west with brutal perseverance. On the 24th of August, over 300 warriors assaulted the peñol at Acoma, killing fifteen Acomas and taking three away prisoner. The combined military might of Laguna-Acoma totaled possibly some five hundred warriors, but the Apaches had destroyed the Acoma crops before Laguna military auxiliary forces arrived. The Gila Apache force turned east, split into two groups, and attacked Belen and Alameda, presumably with the Laguna auxiliaries closing fast behind them. They combined with the military auxiliaries and militia of the Albuquerque region, and all sped south under the command of Lieutenant Diego Borica. Numerous skirmishes occurred in a reconnoiter of the Magdalena and Ladron Mountains. The command continued the campaign until mid-October, when the tribes of the Mimbres and Gila river drainage sent to the Alcalde at Zuni and asked for peace.<sup>50</sup> In the south, at Janos and other presidios of the northern defense line, Gila and other western Apache tribes came in and sued for peace.

The Peace of 1779 did not long endure. By 1784, wars between tribes had again spilled over into adjoining regions.

Governor Juan Bautista de Anza of New Mexico had suc-

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<sup>50</sup>Navarro García, Don José de Gálvez . . . , pp. 249-250.

ceeded in severely chastising the Comanches in their home lairs to the north and northeast of New Mexico in 1779. Over 250 Pueblo Indian auxiliaries accompanied the expedition, presumably including the normal complement from Laguna. The Comanches were caught by surprise, hundreds killed, and many of their best chiefs killed or captured. Afterwards, financial difficulties in New Spain prevented delivery of promised subsistence supplies to them. Chastised in the north, fearful of another such attack, and hungry, the Comanches began raiding in southeastern New Mexico and southwestern Texas. Under Comanche pressure, Lipan Apache fought Mescalero for living space, and all pressed south and south-west to escape the scourge of the north. Some fled west, and joined the dreaded Gileños.<sup>51</sup> Nomadic again, the southern Apaches began to raid settlements.

Laguna and the other western Pueblos experienced repeated hit-and-run raids by Apache groups from the southwest during 1780-1785. Finally, Governor Anza directed that an expedition be prepared to chastise the Gileños. The campaign force assembled and departed from Laguna on June 5, 1785. For the first time, Laguna and Navajo fought side by side. In addition to 94 Laguna military auxiliaries, the campaign force consisted of 30 Spanish militia and 120 mounted Navajos. After marching into the upper Gila River region, several skirmishes

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<sup>51</sup>Navarro García, Don José de Gálvez . . . , p. 373: "Another, named Barbitas, deserted the pueblo and fled with his band to the Mogollon Mountains."

were fought, and forty Gileños were killed and many wounded.<sup>52</sup>

Early in 1786, Comandant-General Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola received orders to mount a concerted campaign against the Gileños. Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez directed "swift and vigorous warfare,"<sup>53</sup> and a massive and simultaneous assault from New Mexico in the north and from Sonora-New Viscaya in the south. The drive was again planned to smash the Gila Apaches between the jaws of two converging forces.

Preparations for the New Mexican campaign were extensive and meticulous. Horses and mules were sent to New Mexico from Sonora, and were allocated under special regulations only to the Pueblo Indian military auxiliaries. A shipment of 200 new-style carbines arrived and were distributed, mostly to military auxiliaries. Nine of the two hundred were distributed to Laguna military forces. Comanche, Navajo, and Jicarilla Apaches were recruited as auxiliaries. Supplies were purchased, a departure from previous requisitioning practices. The 340 personnel of the expedition, including 34 Laguna Scouts, were organized into four divisions under the over-all command of Governor Anza. For the first time, the military auxiliaries were paid for their services. The expedition proceeded into the upper and lower Gila river systems,

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<sup>52</sup> Alfred B. Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers, A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of New Mexico, 1777-1787, Norman, 1932, pp. 259-60.

<sup>53</sup> Bernardo de Gálvez, Instructions for . . . New Spain, 1786, trans. and ed. by Donald E. Worcester, p. 23.

driving the Gileños south toward waiting Mexican forces.<sup>54</sup>

The combined campaign was partially successful, the Gileños remaining relatively quiet for the succeeding two years.

The 1785-1786 Gileño campaigns were a turning point in the defense of western New Mexico. The Navajos, who had finally agreed to terminate all political and military ties with the Apaches of the Gila, rendered signal service during the two campaigns. Allied with the nearby Laguna auxiliaries, they could effectively block the Gila Apache access to the north and northwest. They continued the alliance and served in local campaigns for many years. In 1794, their beloved leader, Antonio - "El Pinto," died from wounds received in a Gileño raid.<sup>55</sup>

The Gileño campaigns of 1785-86 were a turning point in another way. Between November of 1786 and June of 1787, eight Gileño delegations were escorted to Santa Fe or to Albuquerque by Laguna-Acoma alcaldes to request peace and the cessation of warfare. But their previous record of treaty violations, coupled with the obdurate refusal of the Comanches to agree to any Apache peace or alliance, caused the Spaniard to be obstinate also. The Viceroy, Manuel Antonio Florez, ordered that no peace be made; if the Gileños wanted

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<sup>54</sup>Jones, Pueblo Warriors . . . , pp. 159-60.

<sup>55</sup>Fernando de La Concha to Comandant-General Pedro de Nava, November 19, 1793, SANM, Documento 1266. Perhaps the best consolidated record of this period and of the Navajo-Spanish alliance, is contained in Ronald J. Benes unpublished M.A. Thesis, Spanish Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1778-93, University of New Mexico, 1964.

peace, they must apply for terms on the southern frontier. They never did.<sup>56</sup>

The Gileños continued to attack on the New Mexican western frontier. During the spring of 1788, over thirteen settlers were killed in the Laguna-Cebolleta region.<sup>57</sup>

In August, 1788, the Governor, Fernando de La Concha, newly arrived from defense conferences with Comandant-General Ugarte in Sonora, determined on a massive campaign of castigation. There were at this time some 2,354 trained and armed Pueblo auxiliaries in the Province of New Mexico, and La Concha planned to use as many as necessary for this campaign. Two-hundred and six of these auxiliaries resided in the Laguna villages, including a captain and a lieutenant.<sup>58</sup>

Governor La Concha departed Santa Fe on August 22, 1788, accompanied by sixty-four cavalrymen from the presidio at Santa Fe and sixteen Comanche and Jicarilla auxiliaries. At each camping place along the line of march, each Pueblo, he integrated the Pueblo military auxiliaries into the expanding army. At Isleta he dispatched a detachment of twenty soldiers and

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<sup>56</sup>Benes, M.A. Thesis, Spanish Indian Policy . . ., pp. 66-68. Benes rightly points out that this was a contradiction in Bernardo Gálvez' policy of 1776 - "the olive branch in the left hand." The significance of this decision to Laguna was perhaps another hundred years of warfare on the New Mexican western frontier.

<sup>57</sup>Estado que . . . esta provincia . . . , Santa Fe, June 20, 1788, AGN, Provincias Internas 65, Expediente 7.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid. The figures are not exaggerated: Jurisdicciones, Provincia del Nuevo Mexico, November 18, 1794, SANM, Documento 1295b presents the population of Laguna-Acoma-Zuni as 3,736; 1,391 men, 1,226 women, etc.

twenty Comanche and Jicarilla auxiliaries to reconnoiter the Ladron and Magdalena Mountains. The army proceeded to Laguna. Laguna and its surrounding satellite villages provided horses, cattle, sheep, maize for the long campaign. The scout detachment returned from the Ladron-Magdalena region without having found any sign of the enemy. On August 28, in the Plaza de Armas of Laguna, La Concha held a military review of the army, and then proceeded to march south. At Acoma, La Concha became ill, but the army continued the march under the command of Lieutenant Manuel Delgado. La Concha joined the army on September 5, and they entered the "Gila Mountains" (perhaps the Fox-Mogollon chain). On September 10 a battle was fought near the "Gila River." Eighteen Gileños were killed, four captured, and an unknown number wounded. The Gileños retired southeard. The army's horses now began to suffer in the craggy mountain terrain. The army continued to scout and marched south until early October, when La Concha began the return, disbanding each military auxiliary as the army reached the vicinity of their Pueblo. The final detachment reached Santa Fe on October 6.<sup>59</sup>

The Gileños had again been chastised and would seek peace, or at least a respite. But now the Viceroy changed his decision: negotiations could be conducted in the Internal Provinces, but not in Nueva Vizcaya. The Gileños could only have

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<sup>59</sup>La Concha, Diario, November 19, 1788, AGN, Provincias Internas 193.

peace on one frontier at a time.

On May 3, 1789, the alcalde mayor of Isleta presented to La Concha four Gila Apaches who sought peace in the name of their captains and rancherias. They came from the "Sierra Blanca."<sup>60</sup>

La Concha proposed conditions for peace. First, the Apaches were not to raid or attack Spanish or Pueblo Indian villages or herds. Second, the agreement would be for a test period of six months, during which La Concha promised that the Gileños would not be attacked from New Mexico. Third, the Apaches were to report immediately when any bands refused to abide by the agreement. Fourth, the Gileños were to send representatives to Santa Fe within two months, and would report exact information about the bands which did not accept the agreement.

On June 10 two Apache chiefs, one from the Sierra de los Mimbres (Mountains) and the other from the Robledo area of southern New Mexico, reported to La Concha at Santa Fe that their bands would also accept the agreement.<sup>61</sup> They reported too that the Gileños were planning a general meeting of all bands to decide on the agreement.

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<sup>60</sup>Sierra Blanca, White Mountains, are located in south-central New Mexico, and in southeastern Arizona.

<sup>61</sup>Concha to Ugarte, No. 97, Santa Fe, June 24, 1789, AGN, Provincias Internas 193. La Concha also wrote that "Since the first missionaries have come in May, there have been no raids by Gileños in New Mexico." This must have been a reference to the little known exploration of Fray Menchero from Tubac to Laguna; Ltr. No. 15, Anza to Croix, November 1, 1779, File No. 1, Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers, p. 173.

By the spring of 1790, the Gileños were making frequent trading trips to Santa Fe. In July the four leading Gila Apache chiefs signed a treaty of peace. Their names were Hanagesni, Hascheinate, Tansquieductchs, and Nasbachonil. The treaty contained seven articles: a firm and constant peace, to report and join in the pursuit of raiding bands, to deliver violators to Santa Fe for trial, to participate in campaigns against those Apache bands not party to the treaty, or who might violate the treaty, to "establish themselves along the Rio Grande del Norte from the Place called La Cebolla opposite Acoma Pueblo to that formerly called Socorro," and "all kinds of goods and some workmen will be assigned to them so they can begin planting in the coming year."<sup>62</sup>

The Gila bands, now settled near Sabinal, assisted in campaigns against Apaches bands still at war.<sup>63</sup> La Concha permitted them to leave the rancherias to gather mescal in the spring, and he provided them with weekly rations of meat and maize.<sup>64</sup> Spanish settlers of the area were required to assist in the construction of dwellings and to provide feeder cattle to begin an Apache herd. By 1792 the Gileños had sown three fields of maize. By late 1793 there were 1,420 Gileños

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<sup>62</sup>La Concha to Ugarte, No. 177, Santa Fe, July 13, 1790, SANM, Documento 1085.

<sup>63</sup>La Concha to Revillagigedo, Santa Fe, July 1, 1791, SANM, Documento 1129.

<sup>64</sup>La Concha to Revillagigedo, No. 33, Santa Fe, May 6, 1793, AGN, Provincias Internas 102, Expediente 2.

at peace, 300 of whom were settled in the Sabinal area.<sup>65</sup>

In late autumn of 1793, La Concha had to go to Chihuahua for medical treatment. During his absence the Sabinal Experiment deteriorated. By the end of 1794 the Gileños were beginning to desert Sabinal, and were filtering back south into their previous homeland.<sup>66</sup>

In early 1795, Gileños raids began again on the western New Mexican settlements and Pueblos. In 1796, the Navajos also began to raid. The experiment to bring a permanent peace to the western frontier of New Mexico had failed, and the assaults on the western bastion began all over again. It would be ninety years before the final solution occurred.

The remaining period of Spanish sovereignty in the province was one of almost continuing change, but for the Lagunas and the western frontier it was interspersed with the same old problem - Apache raids. By mid-summer of 1795, Laguna's complaints had again moved the Governor in Santa Fe to organize a campaign in the southwest.<sup>67</sup> The plan followed those of previous years: an army of about 60 soldiers with 200 militia and auxiliaries was organized, marched south from

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<sup>65</sup>La Concha to Revillgigedo, No. 17, Santa Fe, July 22, 1792, SANM, Documento 1203.

<sup>66</sup>Pedro de Nava to Fernan Chacón, Chihuahua, October 11, 1794, SANM, Documento 1290; also, Pedro de Nava to Fernan Chacón, Chihuahua, December 31, 1794, SANM, Documento 1303.

<sup>67</sup>Pedro de Nava to Governor of N.M., 10 August 1795, Chihuahua, receipt of report of campaign against the Apaches, SANM, Documento 1341. Actually, five Apaches were killed in a skirmish in Magdalena Mtns., some wounded.

Laguna, down between the Datil and Gallinas Mountain ranges, with detached patrols on either side, east and west, scouring the North Plains and the Ladron Mountains. The force stopped north of the Plains of San Agustin, while patrols tried to locate, trail, and decide in which direction the main Gileño rancherías lay. Then, on to the upper Gila, and if signs indicated the possibility of good hunting, down to the lower Gila basins. Sometimes there were skirmishes, at others only the sight of fleeing Apaches in the distance.<sup>68</sup> The main force of the Gileños was never reached, much less defeated.

But, as in the past, these campaigns had their favorable side effects. Almost always, Apache prisoners were taken, usually women and children. These were returned with the army, cared for and instructed, and later released in exchanges with the Apaches which usually took place in the El Paso area. Both the castigation of the campaigns, and the possession of prisoners acted as a deterrent for a time.

There is reason to believe that after 1794 the Spanish high command in Mexico, and Comandant-General Pedro de Nava in particular, began to become more business-like and professional in thought and manner. The pressing financial crises, the obvious storm of social change on the horizon, the arrival of veterans from Europe, all contributed to a stricter attitude in the pursuit of extermination or peace on the northern

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<sup>68</sup>Pedro de Nava to Governor of New Mexico, 13 August 1795, Chihuahua, comments on Report of Apache and Comanche affairs, SANM, Documento 1342.

frontiers. In letters dated 4 February and 26 June 1795, General Nava castigated Governor Chacón, telling him that he should "prevent raids" by stationing patrols along a line south of Albuquerque-Laguna, to weed out "the useless ones, the perpetuals" in the militia and in the auxiliaries, and to "insure economy."<sup>69</sup> If his advice was heeded by the Governor, it didn't seem to hinder the Gileños.

During 1796, the alcabala, a 10% tax on all sales, was suspended in New Mexico. Undoubtedly, this had a beneficial effect on defense, for it meant that 10% more of the wealth would remain in the province.<sup>70</sup> Succeeding "Records of Armament" and "Expense for Friendly Indians" accounts rose each year until 1807. The annual weapons reports indicate frequent supply of new escopetas and pistolas, and they were increasingly issued to alcaldes mayores for the use of militia and military auxiliaries.<sup>71</sup> In the summer, a junta de guerra was held in Chihuahua because of Apache raids in Sonora, Laguna, and Isleta. Suspicion was voiced that the Navajos, in some cases, were joining the Apache raiding parties.<sup>72</sup>

In the summers of 1798 and 1799, campaigns were

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<sup>69</sup> Pedro de Nava to the Governor of New Mexico, Chihuahua, SANM, Documentos 1311 and 1330.

<sup>70</sup> Pedro de Nava, Valle de San Bartolomé, 24 September 1796, Act suspending the Alcabala for 10 years, SANM, Documento 1368a.

<sup>71</sup> Royal Presidio of Santa Fe, Weapons Report, 31 December 1798, SANM, Documento 1433.

<sup>72</sup> Pedro de Nava to the Governor of New Mexico, Chihuahua, 8 July 1796, SANM, Documento 1366.

carried into the Gila regions, with the usual Laguna auxiliary participation. In January of 1799, a peace was requested in the south, but the raids in western New Mexico continued. In June of 1800, General Nava sent a circular letter of instructions to each governor and presidial commander, requiring a more standard approach to Indian warfare. Greater emphasis was to be placed on better training for militiamen and auxiliaries. At the same time, more friendly Indians were to be recruited. More reliance should be placed on these militia and military auxiliaries. Both the auxiliaries and prisoners were to be treated in a more professional manner, firmly - but justly.<sup>73</sup>

Under the new rules, a long three month campaign was carried out against Apacheria. From July through September, detachments from the southern presidios and from the Laguna-Isleta starting area, pushed north and south into the Gileño regions, destroying rancherias, killing here and there an Apache,<sup>74</sup> but not succeeding any better in bringing the Apache forces to battle than had the expeditions of the previous hundred years. On September 23 the campaign ended, and about 100 Laguna-Acoma auxiliaries trudged wearily home.

In the summer of 1801, 1802, and 1803, campaigns were conducted by the combined New Mexican military forces against

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<sup>73</sup>Pedro de Nava to the Governor of New Mexico, Chihuahua, 4 June 1800, Instructions for Apache campaigns, SANM, Documento 1489.

<sup>74</sup>Chacón, Diary of the Apache Campaign, El Paso, 30 September 1800, SANM, Documento 1507.

the Gila Apaches in the southwest. The reports of these years are fragmentary, some pages partially destroyed, others missing. In some cases, only the folio pouch remains. The "Summary of Events" for each of these years indicate that Laguna's plaza de armas continued to be the mustering point, and that the campaigns had only just ceased when renewed raiding began.<sup>75</sup>

In 1804, a radical change took place on the New Mexican western frontier. In January, reports began to arrive of Navajo movements, and raids in the Jemez, Zuni, and Laguna-Cebolleta areas were attributed to them. In March, Chacón received a report from the now Comandant-General, Nemesio Salcedo y Salcedo, suggesting renewed vigilance on the western frontier because of a rumored alliance at Janos between Gileño and Navajo-Apache chieftains.<sup>76</sup> On March 26, Chacón reported to Salcedo that Navajo bands had attacked Laguna and Jemez, and were scouting in the Cebolleta region.<sup>77</sup>

On May 16, 1804, Governor Chacón advised General Salcedo of a planned summer campaign against the Navajos in the region northwest of Laguna and Cebolleta. Salcedo sent a detachment of cavalry under the command of Lt. Nicolas Farín to assist

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<sup>75</sup>Summary of Events in New Mexico, Santa Fe, 29 June - 29 August 1803, SANM, Documento 1673, Also: Chacón to Salcedo, The Continuing Apache Campaign, 10 October 1803, SANM, Documento 1685.

<sup>76</sup>Diario, Santa Fe, 2 January - 30 March, 1804, SANM Documento 1715.

<sup>77</sup>Chacón to Salcedo, Santa Fe, 26 March 1804, SANM, Documento 1712.

in the campaign. In July the campaign began. Two combined groups were placed in the field. That of Lt. Farín, numbering some one hundred men, operated from the Cebolleta area, proceeding west by northwest. Another group of about two hundred soldiers and Laguna auxiliaries, under the command of Captain Antonio Narbona, operated from Laguna, marching west to the Zuni area where Navajo bands had been raiding. By November 20, Narbona's group had doubled back, was at Paraje, west of Laguna. On December 19, Narbona reported to Chacón from Laguna, where he had returned for provisions. In January Narbona reported to Governor Chacón from Zuni. The two groups had pursued Navajo bands, combining then separating, into the region of Canyon de Chelli (Chelley). There, a battle had been fought in December and a great victory won.<sup>78</sup> But in the same month Salcedo wrote a blistering letter to Chacón, castigating Narbona and Farín for not using good military tactics ("Narbona should have attacked from the west, and Farín from the east"), blaming them for losing a chance to bring peace, requesting Chacón to report further plans, and suggesting that a regular patrol be set up on the Rio Puerco, east and south of Laguna, to "rustle out the few inhabitants from time to time and prevent them from spying for the Navajos."<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup>Narbona to Chacón, Zuni, 24 January 1805, SANM, Documento 1792.

<sup>79</sup>Salcedo to Chacón, Chihuahua, 11 January 1805, SANM, Documento 1788.

On March 27, 1805, the newly arrived Governor, Joaquin del Real Alencaster, reported to Comandant-General Salcedo that peace terms had been agreed to by the Navajos. One of the terms was that the Navajos would evacuate the Cebolleta area and give up all claims on the canyon to the northwest.<sup>80</sup> The Spanish would station a detachment of soldiers at Cebolleta to insure that the terms were kept. They weren't for very long.

In July of 1805, a new campaign was mounted against the Gila Apaches, whose raids during the recent Navajo depredations, against both Laguna and Zuni settlements, suspiciously appeared to indicate complicity. Under the command of Lt. Juan de Diós Peña, a small army of some three hundred soldiers, militia, and Laguna-Acoma military auxiliaries again marched south. Scouting parties preceeded the main group. The army passed through the Magdalena Mountains, south into the San Mateos, west across the Plains of San Agustin, and into the Mimbres River headwaters region. The signs indicated that the Apaches had turned east. The army followed; into the White Mountains, back up into the Plains of San Agustin, southeast into the eastern White Mountains, northwest into the Datils south of Laguna-Acoma, west into the Zuni salt lake area, south to the San Francisco Mountains on the present Arizona-New Mexico border. There the trail ran west, and the army returned to Laguna and disbanded.<sup>81</sup> Lt. Peña's

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<sup>80</sup>Real Alencaster to Salcedo, Santa Fe, 27 March 1805, SANM, Documento 1801. See also: SANM, Documentos 1810, 1828, 12 April and 15 May, 1805.

<sup>81</sup>Diary of the Campaign, Juan de Diós Peña, Santa Fe, 14 August 1805, SANM, Documento 1874.

report is incomplete, and worn with age; but whatever the Gileño losses, they remained in their mountain lairs.

In October, the Alcalde of Laguna, Jose Manuel Aragón, reported to Alencaster that severe Navajo attacks had been suffered at Cebolleta. Evidently the army detachment there was no more capable of keeping the peace than had been the Laguna auxiliaries. The alcalde recommended that Cebolleta be abandoned.<sup>82</sup>

In November of 1805, the first vaccinations (?) were made to all the willing residents of Laguna, and other villages of the region.<sup>83</sup> It would be interesting to know what effect these vaccinations had on the future health of auxiliaries on campaign.

In July of 1806, Salcedo reported to Governor Alencaster the results of an exploratory mission of a Sonora presidial detachment, through eastern Arizona, into the Mogollon Mountains and the upper Gila River region, to determine the veracity of reports concerning a council of Gileños and Navajos in that region.<sup>84</sup>

During the spring and summer of 1807, Apaches raided in the El Paso area, at Socorro, in the Sabinal region, and at

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<sup>82</sup>Aragón to Alencaster, Laguna, 11 October 1805, SANM, Documento 1902.

<sup>83</sup>Alencaster to Salcedo, Santa Fe, 20 November 1805, SANM, Documento 1925.

<sup>84</sup>Salcedo to Alencaster, Chihuahua, 5 July 1806, SANM, Documento 1998.

Laguna-Acoma. Governor Alencaster ordered another campaign. Marching to Santo Domingo, the presidial troops under the command of Lt. Juan Sotelo began the process of collecting an army. Auxiliaries were added at Alameda, Albuquerque (Sandia?), Laguna, Sabinel. The army proceeded south to meet the main detachment under Captain Jose Manrique, commanding the presidial detachment of San Eleciario, north of El Paso. Lt. Sotelo's group scouted the Ladron, Magdalena, and San Mateo Mountains, on the way south. The two groups joined just north of the White Mountains in south-central New Mexico, turned west, crossed the Plains of San Agustin, north into the area of Escondido Mountain near present-day Pietown. Again finding that the Gileños were heading north toward Laguna-Acoma, the army turned in that direction, scouted the area of Alamos, where a small skirmish was fought with the Apaches (Navajos?). For almost two months the army sped, or trudged, back and forth, north and south, from Laguna to Isleta, from Isleta to the Gila, from the Gila to Laguna, then down into the Black Mountains. There, in late November, the Captain gave up the chase. The return process began, dropping off the military auxiliaries at or near their respective pueblos.<sup>85</sup> Meanwhile, Lt. Sotelo left with his group for Zuni, where an Apache party had attacked on October 13.

The fall and winter campaigns of 1807 were the last big organized attempts to meet the threat on the New Mexican

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<sup>85</sup>Alencaster to Sotelo, Santa Fe, 24 August 1806, Instructions, SANM, Documento 2005. See also: Diary, Jose Manrique, San Eleciario, October - November, 1807.

western frontier during the Spanish period of sovereignty. With the Napoleonic struggle in Spain sapping the strength and the order of the Empire, New Mexico became a distant province and Laguna was on a forgotten frontier. Manrique became ad-interim governor in 1808, Lt. Sotelo took the title of "Comandante-General of New Mexico." The western frontier of the province was left to fend for itself. The Laguna military auxiliaries appear to have been disbanded. But the Lagunas didn't forget. War parties were sent out to avenge each Gileño and Navajo raid.<sup>86</sup>

In late 1813, the Lagunas were able to turn the Navajo menace in the north against the Apache menace in the south.<sup>87</sup> On July 9, 1821, at Cebolleta, a Laguna war party and the rag-tag Cebolleta detachment forced the Navajo to agree to peace.<sup>88</sup> The Interregnum of Mexican sovereignty was about to begin. The Western Bastion remained on the hill.

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<sup>86</sup>There is no published portrayal of the events of the years, 1794-1821. See SANM, documents: 2095, Santa Fe, 27 March 1808, Return of Auxiliaries; to 2992, Cebolleta, 9 July 1821, Navajo Peace.

<sup>87</sup>Vicente to Manrique, Laguna, 14 September 1813, Report of Apache-Navajo hostilities, SANM, Documento 2514.

<sup>88</sup>Baca to Melgares, Cebolleta, 9 July 1821, SANM, Documento 2992.

## CHAPTER II

### THE MEXICAN PERIOD, 1821-1846

The Interregnum of Mexican Sovereignty in New Mexico and for Laguna is an obscure period. Apparently, the defense problem was left in as much neglect as it was in the other provinces of the north. Under the Mexican republic, there was little real change in the system of government from that which had previously exercised power in the province. The office of the Governor did, however, arbitrarily control all branches of it. The Governor, or Jefe Politico from 1823 to 1837, was no longer subject to any central military control and, proficient or not, directed military affairs. While the Mexican constitution of 1824 provided for the federal congress to pass laws for the organization of the territory, it did not do so, and on only two known occasions did territorial representatives attend a national congress.<sup>1</sup>

During Mexican rule, the internal political system did change. During the Spanish period, each alcalde had supremely ruled his village under the auspices of the alcalde mayor who was appointed by the Governor. Now, Laguna and other villages lost their status as political Alcaldias. Under the Mexican

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<sup>1</sup>Ralph E. Twitchell, Leading Facts in New Mexican History, Albuquerque, 1912, v. II, pp. 7-9. "New Mexico was a province until 1824, being one of the Provincias Internas. On January 31 of that year, it was joined to the provinces of Chihuahua and Durango, forming the Estado Interno del Norte. The people of Durango were not satisfied with this however, and . . . New Mexico was made a territory of the Mexican republic . . . [that same year]."

republic, the main settlements of Albuquerque, Taos, and La Canada elected ayuntamientos (assemblies), and they became the regional governing bodies. Laguna and some others now elected their alcalde, who exercised only judicial authority in the (former) Alcaldia.<sup>2</sup>

Political neglect and defense neglect can both be attributed to the same cause - a prediliction to insure equal justice to everyone. The system did not permit the Governor to exercise his control authority. Jose Escudero, in his Noticias, states in Section II, page 45, that

"In general, it is believed that this political chief [the Governor] is a judge over alcaldes, a sort of court of appeals, to whom those who have received sentences which they consider unjust carry their appeals. Because of this erroneous conception, this officer is always occupied settling ridiculous suits, and is harassed by a thousand impertinent complaints against the judges."

Mexico and the territory did try to organize its defense. A bill was passed by the Mexican congress on May 31, 1826, providing that four cavalry companies were authorized for the territory, but they were never funded. The territorial council created two military companies in 1826, one at

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<sup>2</sup>Don Jose Agustin de Escudero, Noticias Historicas y Estadisticas . . . del Nuevo Mexico, Mexico, 1849; as translated by H. Bailey Carrol and J. Villasana Haggard in Three New Mexico Chronicles . . ., Albuquerque, 1942, p. 47.

Albuquerque and the other at Santa Fe. These were organized on paper, but were seldom up to strength and very rarely paid. They were never used. In 1836 a powder factory was established at Santa Fe. In 1837, even the pretense of a military department was dropped and the remnants of the two companies were disbanded.<sup>3</sup>

The system of using Indian military auxiliaries to protect the frontiers fell into disarray. For the Mexican territory, this was a serious blunder. For the future U.S. territories of New Mexico and Arizona, it was a disaster. Both the Gileño and the Navajo tribes grew in strength and audacity, fattening themselves on the produce of both territories, while slaying the inhabitants.<sup>4</sup>

The disbandment of Indian auxiliaries left a military vacuum. They had formed the backbone of defense for the province. There had been no civil militia in the military sense of the word - trained standby citizenry.<sup>5</sup> The militia of the Spanish period campaigns had been support auxiliaries, a levee of the population for the physical help needed to move

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<sup>3</sup>Charles F. Coan, A History of New Mexico, Chicago, 1925, p. 327.

<sup>4</sup>Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria, Norman, 1967, pp. 7-9.

<sup>5</sup>Escudero, Noticias . . ., p. 82: However, in Section III, p. 70, it is clarified that the major complaint was that the levee was never trained but was subject to the penal code. Three militia cavalry units were formed in the late Spanish period and were used in campaigning. They were not trained and General Salcedo y Salcedo continually railed about their campaign military mistakes.

and sustain large groups of armed men in the field. The Spanish period militia had not been a military partner of the army. That role had been reserved by the Indian auxiliaries.

While the Laguna armed force disbanded as auxiliaries of a military department, the Pueblo still maintained a defense system. The alert and mustering procedures remained in effect. More arms became available. By 1828, new trade routes had been opened to the south, and to the American communities in the east, and the problem of acquisition of firearms became not one of prohibition, but one of prohibitive cost.<sup>6</sup>

The Navajo and Gileño Indians were continually raiding the Rio Grande settlements during the Mexican period. The areas to the north of Paguate continued to be the favorite for raiding Navajo bands, while the Gileños concentrated their raids to the south. The small military fort at Cebolleta was maintained by volunteers of that settlement after the revolution in Mexico. Little documentary evidence for the battles which occurred during the Mexican period is available. John M. Gunn, whose biography and role in the final Apache campaign, is portrayed in chapter 3, gathered oral history statements from the Laguna elders in the late nineteenth century and wrote of them in a series of articles in Records of the Past,

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<sup>6</sup>Firearms had been prohibited to Indians, except military auxiliaries on campaign, until 1776. See: Bernardo de Galvez, Instructions for Governing . . . New Spain, 1786 (Translated and edited by Donald E. Worcester), p. 23.

Washington, 1904. He later authored a book which is the only publication portraying some of the raids of this period.<sup>7</sup>

The only recorded attacks were those made by Gileños on Laguna in the summer of 1833.<sup>8</sup> The documents do not indicate the results. John Gunn states:

"The history from here [1836] down to the occupation of the country by the Americans is meager and not of much interest. There were occasional raids of the Navajos and Apaches, and even Utes. These prowling nomads never attacked the pueblos of Laguna and Acoma in force, but contented themselves with waylaying the lone herder or hunter, robbing him, and in many cases leaving his dead body as a ghastly reminder of their wanton atrocities. Many wonderful tales of daring are told by the old men of the villages; of fights with these wild denizens of the mountains; of children that were captured by the Navajos or Apaches, and certain instances, when, after long years, they returned to their native pueblos. Many of these stories are strange and romantic. It was necessary for the people to be continually on their guard . . . The only door to the dwellings was a hole

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<sup>7</sup>John M. Gunn, Schat-Chen, A History of the Traditions and Narratives of the Queres Indians of Laguna and Acoma, Albuquerque, 1917.

<sup>8</sup>Coan, A History of New Mexico, p. 347.

in the roof, only accessible by means of a ladder, which could be drawn up in time of siege. The windows were small, with slats set in, or sometimes a slab of selenite (crystallized gypsum) to answer the purpose of glass."<sup>9</sup>

Of the Apache raids in this period, John Gunn relates "It was during a storm that a little boy was herding a bunch of goats about two miles west of the village of Laguna. He had sought the shelter of a stunted cedar tree . . . when, like an apparition, a painted Apache warrior on his mustang loomed up alongside him. The Apache reached down and grabbed the boy and rode away to join his companions. They were on their homeward journey from a marauding and theiving trip and in due time they reached their country, the Mogollon Mountains, two hundred miles southwest of Laguna. The boy was, of course, considered a servant and the property of the man who captured him, but he was allowed most all of the privileges of other children and as he grew up he became an expert with the bow and arrow and a daring horseman, and could outdistance the swiftest of his captors. There was jealousy, however, among some of the younger men on account

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<sup>9</sup>Gunn, Schat-Chen, pp. 58-59.

of his abilities, but especially with one whose affections were centered on a certain dusky damsel who seemed to prefer the society of the captive. She overheard a plot to assassinate the Laguna to get rid of him and lost no time in telling him what she had heard, telling him that he would have to make a break for his liberty, otherwise they would kill him. The plan was arranged that he should hide somewhere near the camp that night and the next day, and the following night she would tie a fleet horse where he could find it and then it would be up to him to make his get-away. So in the night, when all was quiet, he went to a big hollow log which lay on the bank of a little stream close to the camp and crawled into the cavity. The next day the children came to play along the stream and around the old log. Now the Apaches as well as a great many of the Indians of this section of the country, are very superstitious about a rattle-snake, so he imitated the chur-ur-ur-ur of the reptile and they all ran away. When night came he crawled out from his retreat and went cautiously to the place designated and found the horse and a little [little] sack of food. It took but a moment to untie the animal and spring onto his back but

by some misfortune he was apprehended and then began a chase through the dark defiles and steep trails of the mountains. It was hard work to make much distance in the dark so when the day dawned he knew that his pursuers were close behind him, and as the hours passed that they were gaining. Ahead of him was a deep gorge or canyon [this undoubtedly was Apache Canyon, very famous in the oral history legends of Laguna]. Now there is another peculiar feature of nature in this country and that is what is commonly called a cloudburst. It seems that the cloud vapor collects over one spot, piling up miles in height, and then as the vapor begins to condense the water falls in torrents. Such a phenomenon was just happening at the head of this gulch, but he reached the opposite bank just as the flood swept by and when he had gained the ridge beyond, looking back, he could see his pursuers baffled by the raging torrent of water. He kept his course, eventually reaching Laguna. His parents were still living and welcomed their longlost son."<sup>10</sup>

In his narratives of old Laguna stories, Gunn describes a Navajo attack on the Spanish settlement of Cebolleta  
". . . the Navajos laid siege to the town in

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<sup>10</sup>Gunn, Schat-Chen, pp. 62-64.

earnest. The village was at that time surrounded by a high wall, but the Navajos, numbering about 3,000, succeeded in forcing the gates, and would have massacred the entire population, but for the timely assistance of the Laguna Indians . . . When the Navajos broke through the gates the the settlers were compelled to barricade themselves in their houses, and then the fight began at close quarters.

It is said that a woman killed a Navajo chief by dropping a metate from a window on his head. A metate is a [large] stone used for grinding corn by hand. The story says that there was an American in the village at the time [?]. They called him the sargento (sergeant). He had received a desperate wound from an arrow, but with the fighting instinct peculiar to those old pioneers, he climbed to a window, and there with his trusty rifle fought until he died from the effect of his wound. The Laguna Indians in the meantime had attacked the Navajos in the rear, and the latter were compelled to retreat."<sup>11</sup>

The presence of an American in Cebolleta, if true, is not surprising. With the closed Spanish economic system crumbling, and the Mexicans unable to fill the economic vacuum, the

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<sup>11</sup>Gunn, Schat-Chen . . . , p. 56.

American frontiersmen were developing the resources of the Mexican west.<sup>12</sup> New Mexico was becoming dependent upon the United States for merchandise and revenue.

The Americans had a great affect on the regions of the Gila River drainage, and on Laguna. They trapped extensively in the Gila basins, in Arizona, and criss-crossed the region on exploratory trips. It is difficult to determine what affect these Americans had on the military situation on the New Mexican western frontier. Obviously, from the record, it was both good and bad.

Large Gileño raids on Laguna area settlements seem to have ceased during the Mexican period. But they increased further south in the vicinity of the Santa Rita mines.<sup>13</sup> The importance of Santa Rita, and of mining operations in central southwestern New Mexico near eastern Arizona, certainly was

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<sup>12</sup>Coan, A History of New Mexico, p. 301.

<sup>13</sup>Santa Rita lies just to the east of Silver City, in the heartland of New Mexican mining activities. T.M. Pierce, in New Mexico Place Names, p. 149, states that in 1966 it was "one of the greatest open pit excavations in the world." L. Bradford Prince, in Historical Sketches of New Mexico, N.Y., 1883, p. 241, relates that the copper deposits were discovered in 1800 by Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Carrisco of Chihuahua, that he sold the property to one Francisco Elguea of Chihuahua in 1804, who then began to work the mine. Coan, in A History of New Mexico, p. 326, states "The mining of copper at the Santa Rita del Cobre was carried on by Americans under lease from the heirs of Francisco Elguea of Chihuahua who held the title to the grant until 1873. In 1825 the mine was worked by Sylvester and James Ohio Pattie who . . . continued their operations until 1827. In 1828 a Frenchman named Coursier . . . running the mine. Robert McKnight operated the mine from 1832 until 1836. The last owner of the mine during the Mexican period was Leonardo Pesqueros who took control of the mine in 1840. . . ." Prince states that even the early mining operations required 100 mules to transport the ore.

greater than historians have accorded to it during the Mexican period. Bancroft places primary importance for the southern drive of the Gileños on the neglect of presidios during this period, and to failure of Mexico to live up to previous Spanish welfare commitments to the Gileños.<sup>14</sup> The Gila Apaches did turn south with great fury following the demise of Spain, but penetration of the Mexican and American into the very heartland of Apacheria, throughout the whole Santa Rita region, certainly must have alarmed the Apache hierarchy and turned their attention to the south.<sup>15</sup> It was fortunate for Laguna. The Navajos had grown strong and bold as Mexican strength waned, and as political government crumbled.

Among the documents of the New Mexico Archives, Mexican Period, is found increasing reference to Navajo activity and attacks on the New Mexican western frontier beginning in 1833. Coan states on page 327 that Navajo and Apache raids were made on Laguna and Jemez in the summer of 1833, and that "Josiah Gregg stated that between 1833 and 1843 the Navajos ravaged the country with little danger to themselves."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Bancroft, History of . . . New Mexico, pp. 400-403.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 301: one must reflect on the documentary sources available to Bancroft, and of his surety that some old mines were found at this time with tools still in them dating from the 1680 Rebellion era.

<sup>16</sup>Circular No. 1, February 18, 1837, NMA (see List of Abbreviations), v. 122, and pp. 2468 through 2472, photostats. The author accomplished all archival research for this period in the Special Collections Department, Coronado Library, University of New Mexico.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE AMERICAN PERIOD, 1846-1881

American sovereignty in New Mexico, and on the last western frontier, was presaged by an unpardonable act and followed by a serious mistake. The Pueblo of Laguna, and the whole western New Mexican frontier, suffered grievously from the effects of both.

By 1835, both American traders and American miners had penetrated the very hearts of Apacheria and the Land of The Navajos. The Americans were the recipients of friendly feelings by both. But, both tribes were unalterably dedicated to destruction of things Spanish in general, and Mexican in particular. The Spanish and the Mexican were civilized, the tribes were not. The American chose to side with the former.

In the fall of 1835 the father of Juan José, a famous Gileño chief, was killed in a raid on his rancheria, by Mexican irregulars. Juan took his band on the warpath, and soon put the northwest frontier of Mexico to the torch. The Mexican government placed a large reward on his head. An American trader friend, James Johnson, collected it. The Apache never again fully trusted an American.<sup>1</sup>

During the Spanish and Mexican periods of sovereignty, the government of New Mexico had authorized the mounting of supervised but irregular military campaigns by Indian

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<sup>1</sup>Observations on Early Days in California and New Mexico, an unpublished manuscript by Benjamin D. Wilson, 1863, as cited in Frank C. Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, N.Y., 1932, pp. 155-56.

auxiliaries against Apache-Navajo bands engaged in raiding. On September 15, 1846, the American Government of the Territory of New Mexico forbade any further expeditions.<sup>2</sup>

On August 19, 1846, General Stephen Watts Kearny entered New Mexico with an American army of occupation. Early in September he met with Navajo chiefs and demanded allegiance and peace. On September 18 General Kearny dispatched two detachments totaling 185 soldiers under the commands of Colonel Congreve Jackson and Major William Gilpin to force the provisions of his demand on a recalcitrant Navajo nation. On September 30 Colonel Jackson's command reached Laguna and camped at Cubero, on the frontier of the Navajo nation. Meanwhile, Navajo bands raided Kearny's supply train and the village of Algodones north of Albuquerque, killed seven villagers, and ran off herds of cattle and sheep.<sup>3</sup>

On October 26 General Kearny dispatched Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan, with an army of 300 soldiers, to cooperate in reduction of the Navajos. By November 10, Doniphan's army entered Laguna.<sup>4</sup>

By November 12, the forces of Doniphan, Jackson, and

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<sup>2</sup>William A. Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 1846-1868, Santa Fe, 1952, p. 21. On September 15, 1846, at a general council of all the heads of villages including all Pueblo Indian governors of New Mexico, General Stephen W. Kearny prohibited any civilian expeditions against "wild" Indian tribes.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 22-23.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

Gilpin had combined at Ojo del Oso (Bear Spring), in the foothills of present Mount Taylor east of where Grants, New Mexico, was later established. Since General Kearny had authorized enlistment of Pueblo Indian scouts for the campaign, presumably Laguna Scouts, who knew the region well, accompanied the expedition. By November 22 the principle Navajo chiefs, "at bayonet point," signed a treaty of peace. Doniphan arranged a later peace at Zuni between that Pueblo and the Navajo nation, passed back through Laguna, and proceeded down the Rio Grande toward Mexico and conquest. By December, Navajo bands again began to raid and destroy on the western frontier of New Mexico.<sup>5</sup>

On March 3, 1851, James S. Calhoun, Indian Agent for New Mexico since April 7, 1849, was inaugurated as the first Governor of the U.S. Territory of New Mexico. During the five previous years, the western frontier of New Mexico had been aflame from raids. Apache, Ute, and Navajo had raided settlements, stolen livestock, and murdered many settlers. The army chased after them, but seemed powerless to kill or capture many. Like the Arizonans of thirty years later, the civilians of New Mexico sent delegations to Washington, complaining that the army did not understand frontier warfare, was incapable of defending settlements, lacked the spirit of hot pursuit, and was afraid to bring the "wild" Indians to bay.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 24-26.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-46.

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 24-26.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-46.

During August and September of 1849, Colonel John Washington, the Military-Governor of New Mexico, subdued the Navajo nation with an army of 120 regular infantry soldiers, 55 regular artillermen, 130 New Mexico Volunteer Militia, and 55 Keres Indian auxiliaries.<sup>7</sup>

Although the Navajo leaders again signed a peace treaty under the duress of armed might, they did not long remain inactive. The Gileños, unhindered by even the pretense of formal peace, joined in unrestrained raiding. Between 1850 and 1858, in a territory whose total population did not exceed 70,000 people including Indians, property claims were made on the federal government for over five-hundred thousand dollars. Each of the attacks listed in seventy of these claims occurred between Socorro on the lower Rio Grande and San Mateo Mountains (Mount Taylor), northwest of Laguna. The Western Bastion was under a virtual state of siege again.

Losses were not limited to Pueblo Indians. In July of 1851, Indian Agent for New Mexico James S. Calhoun reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that "about the fifteenth of this month, near the Pueblo of Laguna, the Navajos killed three men . . . The murdered men were Americans, engaged in complying with a Government contract for hay." On July 12, 1854, in a statement made to the clerk of the 3rd U.S. District

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<sup>7</sup>For a complete report by the official chronicler of the Washington expedition, see: Lieutenant James H. Simpson, Navajo Expedition, Journal of a Military Reconnaissance from Santa Fe, New Mexico, to the Navajo Country, made in 1849, ed. and annotated by Frank McNitt, Norman, 1964.

Court, Vicente Romero of Socorro, stated

". . . on or about the fifteenth day of February, eighteen hundred and fifty-three, one cow . . . , one ox . . . , and two heifers . . . , were stolen, taken and driven away . . . from within two miles of the town of Socorro, by a party of Indians, six in number, belonging to the tribe called the Gila Apache . . . That I was taken prisoner . . . and remained in their custody for two days and two nights, and then made my escape from the said Indians, near the San Mateo mountains . . . ."

Dr. M. Steck, Indian Agent in 1857, in his report to the Commissioner, stated:

"The Mogollon band have been depredating largely upon the property of Socorro and Valencia counties [Laguna is in Valencia county] . . . during the last year, and the marauding party who killed the late agent . . . was of both [Mogollon and Coyotero] these bands. The actual murderers were actually a small party of Mogollon Indians detached from the main body, under the command of one of their principle captains."

Indian Agent James S. Calhoun, in his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1849, stated: "Sometime about the 5th of this month [October], at and near the Spanish village of Le Bugarito (?), not more than fifteen miles

northwest of Laguna, Navajos, and others unknown, attacked the people of said village, in the daytime, killed two Spaniards, and wounded one, and succeeded in carrying off, as a captive, a woman . . . Official reports of the period bog down in a mass of killings, thefts, outrages, and kidnappings. The Gileños in the south and the Navajos in the north were running amok, and U.S. authorities while prohibiting the ancient procedures of military auxiliaries or military retaliation, had been unable to prevent depredations, or to chase and chastise.<sup>8</sup>

The Navajos continued, in increasing tempo, their depredations on the New Mexican western frontier. The Lagunas, fearful of the federal government, quietly suffered under the onslaught. Cebolleta was again deserted, the Navajo pushed on Pagate,<sup>9</sup> and finally the U.S. Army drove them back and stationed a detachment at Cebolleta.<sup>10</sup> The presence of U.S. Army detachments at Laguna (Cebolleta) apparently served the

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<sup>8</sup>John S. Watts, Indian Depredations in New Mexico, Washington, D.C., 1858, pp. 5-66. John Watts was an attorney for a group of New Mexicans whose claims he put forth in this cited contemporary work. San Mateo mountain refers, not to Mount Taylor, NW of Laguna, but to the San Mateo Mountains south of Magdalena, and northwest of the home lair of the Hot Springs Apaches, from whence Geronimo later carried out such devastating raids on New Mexico and Arizona.

<sup>9</sup>AIHRP UNM Project, Mrs. W.K. Marmon interview, December 12, 1968, the Pagate Grant.

<sup>10</sup>The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun, while Indian Agent at Santa Fe and Superintendent of Indian Affairs in New Mexico. Ed. by Annie H. Abel, Washington, GPO, 1915, p. 263-280: Actually, a detachment was stationed intermittently at Laguna from 1850 to 1861.

same purpose as had the Laguna military auxiliaries for almost two hundred years previously. The western bastion again served to separate the two Apache (Navajo and Gileño) groups, and gave the Lagunas a respite on the northern sector.

When the Civil War broke out, the detachments at Cebolleta were withdrawn for more urgent duties. Navajo depredations increased, reaching such a crescendo that the Governor overrode federal restrictions, organized and used militia units to quell them. Militia, combined with regular army units, drove the Navajo to their ignominious exile at Bosque Redondo.<sup>11</sup>

The militia employed to conquer the Navajos in 1868, in cooperation with regular army units, was organized in 1867. The process of organization and formation had consumed many years and much effort. On October 1, 1849, James S. Calhoun, attached to the staff of Colonel Washington during the Zuni Peace Treaty campaign, had written to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that a militia was absolutely necessary in the new territory. In that same report, he proposed that Pueblo Indians be armed to keep the peace. He stated: "if properly cared for and instructed, in all Indian Wars, the

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<sup>11</sup>Coupled with Watts' Indian Depredations in New Mexico, L.R. Bailey, The Long Walk, Los Angeles, 1964, presents a complete history of the Navajo people from 1849 through 1868, after which they no longer presented a serious problem. The author also used extensively the Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, GPO, years 1850-1868, in this work. A complete file of the Reports in photostat are in AIHRP, UNM Project, years 1850-1892.

Pueblos would be very important auxiliaries."<sup>12</sup>

Calhoun, as Governor, strongly recommended that Indian Sub Agents be placed in each Pueblo, that the army be required to cooperate in an auxiliary defense system, and that Pueblo Indians be trained, armed and used for frontier combat. On October 15, 1849, he wrote to the Secretary of the Interior:

"These [Indian] agents should be intrusted with Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, to be used as emergencies might require, under the direction of a general superintendent, and should be selected, not only with regard to their prudence and discretion, but with a view to the proper training of the Pueblo Indians, in the efficient use of our arms."<sup>13</sup>

Calhoun went on to recommend a coordinated defense system, cutting off the southern Apaches from the Navajos in the north. His plan was not detailed in diagram, but it was well thought out. He stated:

"That I may be distinctly understood upon this point, look at the location of Laguna-Zuni-Jemez, and other [Pueblos] . . . Now the Ordnance and

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<sup>12</sup>Abel, Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun, p. 36. Later, Governor James C. Calhoun visited every pueblo in New Mexico, discussed economic affairs, defense requirements.

<sup>13</sup>Abel, The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun, p. 57.

Ordnance Stores, under the control as before suggested, would enable these people, effectually, to protect themselves against their implacable enemies, and at the same time, a vigorous and rapid movement along the line of communications between the Pueblos, and other points, would give them the additional and important power of interrupting those who would dare penetrate towards the heart of New Mexico."<sup>14</sup>

In another letter to the Commissioner, William Medill, on October 29, 1849, he stated: "One more word . . . allow me to organize a force from the Pueblo Indians, with the means to subsist and pay them . . ."<sup>15</sup>

His advice was not followed. The militia first organized in 1867 to subjugate the Navajos, was composed only of Caucasians until the reorganization of 1880. Some Pueblo Indians were used as scouts. Presumably, Lagunas were included. The old Indians say they were.<sup>16</sup> In the meantime, the Lagunas suffered in silence.

During the years from 1867 to 1879, the Laguna Indians were defenseless against the marauders from the south. It must be understood however, that the raids were diminished, consisting of small parties, and seldom resulted in many

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>16</sup>AIHRP, UNM Project, Interview, Charlie Atsye, 8 May 1968.

deaths. The taking captive of children continued, and remained the most galling aspect of the Gileño raids. If the Lagunas broke federal law, if they did carry out small and secret reprisal raids, it would be difficult for any father or mother to blame them.

The Lagunas did not remain plaisant. They retained their ancient "early warning system" and remained alert. It was not against the federal law to protect one's self, and the Lagunas did. They built the round forts of stone (torreons), typical of those times, especially on their lands far to the south of the village. Every male who could afford one, owned the best firearm available. Otherwise they still used bows and arrows.<sup>17</sup>

Beginning in 1868, there was a noticeable increase in Gileño raids in New Mexico. Whether or not this was spill-out from the mounting Apache fury in Arizona, has not been determined. Certain it is, that the Gila River Apaches, from Tucson east to the Rio Grande, were in some way aligned in a last desperate stand to protect Apacheria and throw out the white man.<sup>18</sup> That some officials of the U.S. government were aware that there was a concert of Gileño effort, is revealed

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<sup>17</sup>AIHRP, UNM Project, Interview of Charlie Atsyne, 8 May 1968.

<sup>18</sup>The most comprehensive account of the period 1868-1887 and of the region, is to be found in Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria, Norman, 1967. On pp. 13-14 is found an interesting account of marriage contracts, designed to bind various Gileño tribes together in a compact or union.

in an 1867 ultimatum to the Gila chiefs to gather at Alamosa Canyon or suffer a campaign of extermination.<sup>19</sup> Alamosa Canyon was a favorite rendezvous point for Gileño raiding parties, but it is only sixty miles south of Laguna, in New Mexico, and some two hundred miles from the heartland of Apacheria!

The Gileño raids of this period in New Mexico were generally confined to the southwestern quarter of the state, radiating out from their homeland in the headwaters of the upper and lower Gila rivers. In each succeeding year after 1868, the various reports available reveal a rising level of Apache depredations in New Mexico and Arizona, until 1886. The attacks on Laguna became hit-and-run, not on the pueblo itself, but on the sheep and horse herds, and on the ranches, especially south of Laguna.<sup>20</sup>

John Gunn, writing some thirty-six years after the event, just after his arrival at Laguna in 1881, relates a matter-of-fact but horrible account of a raid.

"The last raid by the Apaches in this part of the country was in the summer of 1881 while Vitorio was chief of the tribe. They came in from the south, a band of about fifty warriors. From the time they left their stronghold their trail was

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<sup>19</sup>Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1868.

<sup>20</sup>AIHRP, UNM Project, Mrs. Walter K. Marmon, and Mr. Charlie Atsye interviews, May 1967 - December 1968. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1868-1885.

marked by destruction. At the Cienega, from where we will follow their course, a spring and ranch about forty-five miles south of Laguna, were two Mexican families. They barricaded themselves in a little fortress which had been built for such emergencies and were able to repel the attack. The next place was a spring and ranch house known as Ojo Torribio. There was no one living at this place at the time, but a Mexican named Pablo Pino had just reached the place with two wagon-loads of freight for his sheep ranch, seventy-five miles southwest, and seeing a band of Indians approaching suspected it to be Apaches on the war path. He drove his oxen into the corral and then taking several sticks to represent rifles he and his son climbed to the top of the house, which had a parapet about two feet high along the edge of the roof furnished with loop-holes for defense. He arranged his sticks so it might appear to the Apaches that eight or ten men were concealed on the roof. The bluff worked, for, after surveying the situation and a short parley, the Indians went on, giving the house a wide berth. The fact was that he had one good rifle, a .45-caliber magazine gun, which might have done considerable execution.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Gunn, Schat-Chen, p. 60. Pablo Pino was a nephew of Guachino Pino, who settled at El Rito in 1825, and claimed the El Rito Grant about seven miles east of Laguna. He was married

The Apaches crossed over a high bridge, or tableland rather, to the head of the El Rito valley. On this tableland they met a sheep herd. They killed the two herders and scattered the sheep to the four winds. At the south end of the El Rito valley was a Mexican ranchman by the name of Gregorio Montanio, with his family, and the morning of the day the Apaches made the descent into the valley his wife told of a dream . . . . and described the coming of the Apaches so vividly that they decided to hide out for the day. So . . . they repaired to a little spring about a mile distant, where there were huge rocks which offered excellent places for concealment, and as the day passed they began to think it a false alarm, but about two o'clock in the afternoon they saw smoke in the direction of their dwellings and then they knew that the Apaches were there. They saw their house in flames. The corral and wagons, everything that would burn, was subjected to the torch. There were two big wagons loaded with wool belonging to sheep men by the name of Ballejos. These they burned and they killed every living thing around the place that they could find.

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to an American, Francis Skinner, who had come to Laguna in 1851 as an assistant to the wife of Samuel C. Gorman, the first Protestant missionary to Laguna.

A Laguna Indian was hunting a stray horse in that part of the valley and saw the band of Apaches as they wound down through the hills. Not stopping to estimate the number or their possible direction, his duty as he considered it was to warn the pueblo, thirty miles distant, where he arrived after dark, but long before he arrived the village was aroused by . . . cry of warning or war whoop . . . An advanced guard was hurriedly dispatched to engage and intercept the enemy, while runners were sent to the different villages to give the alarm, and in an incredibly short space of time warriors began to arrive, armed for strife . . . They were all well armed with modern firearms and each had his emergency ration rolled up in a cloth and tied around his body. But it seems that the Apaches . . . instead of coming any further north they turned abruptly west and ascended out of the valley at a place called Alcon [perhaps Balcon, Spanish for balcony]. Here, at the brink of this mesa or tableland they ran afoul of a big herd of sheep. They killed the two herders . . . and took what sheep they wanted to eat and went on. The cook, or camp man of the sheep herd, had gone for water with his burros (donkeys) . . . He saw the Apaches killing his companions and made a

hasty retreat . . . thus saving his scalp.

The Apaches went from here to a big spring and ranch some fifteen miles distant, known as the Seboya, arriving there early in the morning while the people . . . were at breakfast. They were mistaken for Navajos on a hunting expedition . . . a fusillade from a score or more of [Apache] rifles and the two [Mexican] men fell dead . . . The Apaches took the woman with them. They were closely pursued . . . but managed to evade . . . and reached Sonora, in Mexico. After two years of captivity the woman got away and returned to her people in Cubero. The Lagunas, knowing that the Apaches might be followed by United States troops, abandoned the trail following several miles . . . ."22

John Gunn went on to say that when news arrived of the deserved demise of Victorio, the Lagunas hoped that that would have been the last gathering of the clans. They didn't get their wish. The main arena of the final solution was to be farther south, in the cornerlands of New Mexico and Arizona, but the clans would assemble once more. The two corner regions suffered three more years of terrifying ordeal. Then, in 1885, in a gasp of waning strength, the last Apache forays took place, and the final campaign was waged. Laguna played its role well.

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<sup>22</sup>Gunn, Schat-Chen, pp. 59-62.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE LAST CAMPAIGN

On a mild but sunny afternoon in the late autumn of 1917, in the ancient Indian Pueblo of Laguna in New Mexico, an official of the Department of the Interior solemnly handed certificates of service and pension to The Last of The Marmon Battalion.<sup>1</sup> The twelve assembled men comprised the remaining members of what had been Troop F, Company I, 1st Regiment, New Mexico Volunteer Militia (Cavalry). They were: Fred Seracino, Topatata, Kowteya, Burns, Sinai, Tsitai, Goyetia, Levantonio, Angus Perry, George Pino, John M. Gunn, and Robert G. Marmon.<sup>2</sup> They were better known at that time as The Laguna Scouts.

Certainly no stranger nor more wistful ceremony has ever been held within the boundaries of this Nation, for the simple honors of that day officially terminated the services of one of America's oldest and most faithful military auxiliary forces; quietly, without fanfare, and without notice.<sup>3</sup> These

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<sup>1</sup>SANM, Governors Papers, Edmund G. Ross, Militia. The term "The Marmon Battalion" is not an invention of the author. It is used in Governor's Requisitions, Pay Vouchers, etc., with great frequency.

<sup>2</sup>AIHRP Records, UNM Project, Laguna Scouts Identity Lists, and SANM, AGO, Muster Rolls, May-December, 1885. The members were identified by Mrs. Walter K. Marmon, the former Susie Rayes of Paguete, and wife of a deceased son of Robert G. Marmon, and by Wallace Gunn of Cubero, New Mexico, nephew of John M. Gunn of this narrative. Their identification was collated with names appearing in the militia muster rolls.

<sup>3</sup>BNM, Noticias de Escalante, Legaje 3. Photostat copies were consulted in Special Collections Library of U.N.M. (University of New Mexico). Some of the auxiliary forces



Troop F, Company I,  
Autumn 1917

Figure 8





Lt. Walter G. Marmon  
2nd Ohio Volunteers, circa 1864

Figure 9

62/65 2nd Lt & Dept Missouri." His Diary states that he was promoted to First Lieutenant prior to being mustered out. In 1868 Walter G. Marmon entered New Mexico with the Darling Survey Party,<sup>5</sup> and in 1870 he settled in Laguna Pueblo. He was appointed Government School Teacher for Laguna in 1871 and he remained in that position until 1878. In 1877 Walter married Mary Seracino, a daughter of Pueblo official Luis Seracino, and in the same year was selected to serve on the Pueblo Council. He became a trader, was elected Pueblo Governor, and helped draft the written Laguna Constitution. Colonel Marmon died at Ramah, New Mexico, on November 11, 1899, while serving as deputy-surveyer for the Territory of New Mexico.<sup>6</sup>

The Old Man organized the first Troop F as a part of Company I of the New Mexico Volunteer Militia in December, 1882. He was made Commanding Captain of the Company, and the Mustering Officer for the first ceremonies. During 1883 he travelled back and forth between Laguna and Santa Fe, procured arms and equipment, planned the Company's role in the new militia system, and coordinated training and tactics. He personally supervised the qualification of the raw troopers in the use of their

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<sup>5</sup>Bancroft, Hubert Howe, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888. San Francisco, 1889, p. 733. Captain Ehud N. Darling was commissioned by the U.S. Geological Survey to survey the Navajo Reservation, and other areas, beginning in 1868. In 1870 the Darling Survey worked for the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad and it can be assumed that Colonel Marmon first saw Laguna during that survey.

<sup>6</sup>Albuquerque Journal-Democrat, November 12, 1899. Spec-  
Correspondence. "Col. Walter G. Marmon died suddenly at Ramah,  
New Mexico, Saturday, November 11, at 2 P.M."

issue weapons, and devised an efficient system for their storage and fast issue during emergencies.<sup>7</sup> The Old Man encouraged and assisted the organization of other militia companies in the region too, but he had always insisted that his "Laguna Boys" should be first and best. He cajoled and argued and fought in Santa Fe until they transferred his boys to the cavalry - back in the saddles where they belonged!

Walter Marmon organized Company I in accordance with the basic Territorial Militia plan, with four troops and fifteen troopers assigned to each. The Company had an assigned Commanding Captain, an Adjutant, a 2nd Lieutenant, a Sergeant Major, and two musicians. A Sergeant was in charge of each Troop. Troop F was the Old Man's favorite. It was composed of his closest friends, had been trained by his brother Robert G. Marmon,<sup>8</sup> and was commanded by his second cousin John M. Gunn.

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<sup>7</sup>AIHRP Records, Laguna, Marmon Interviews. Mrs. W.K. Marmon recalls that the guns were stored in a special storm cellar which the Colonel had built on the river side of the Old Marmon House, and that the troopers would be issued their weapons as they ran past on the way to their horses. Mrs. Edith (Marmon) Lorenzo recalls her father-in-law telling stories of the weekly training periods and the Colonel firing for practice with the troopers.

<sup>8</sup>SANM, AGO, Muster Rolls, December 1882. New Mexico History, Illustrated, 1907. AIHRP Records, UNM Project, Laguna Biographies. Robert Gunn Marmon was a native of Kenton, Ohio. Muster rolls list his age as 32 in 1882, thus marking his date of birth about 1850. He studied engineering at Northwestern Ohio Normal School in Lebanon. He accompanied the surveyor, George H. Pradt to Laguna in 1875. Robert married a Laguna maiden and started a cattle ranch south of Laguna at Dripping Springs. He started a lumber mill in Laguna, and near the turn of the century he organized the first "tourist agency" there. He was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the Territorial Militia in 1882, promoted to 1st Lieutenant in 1883, to Captain in

The New Mexico Territorial Militia had been reorganized under the administration of Governor Lionel A. Sheldon,<sup>9</sup> and the locationing and contemplated use was coordinated with the general southwest plan of the Ninth U.S. Army District in New Mexico under the command of General Ranald S. Mackenzie. In 1883, as a result of the Indian campaigns of 1882-83, the militia was reorganized again. The basic organization now consisted of a command echelon and three regiments - one of cavalry and two of infantry, with a different geographical distribution. The cavalry was further organized into three battalions - one in the south, one in the north, and one in the west-central region of the Territory.<sup>10</sup> During non-active periods of service, commanders of battalions served in the staff of regimental commanders, and during active service the Captains of companies might take active command of two companies, with the First Lieutenants assuming command in their absence.<sup>11</sup> In addition, the distribution within the battalions

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1884, and to Major in 1885. He was serving as a Colonel in the 1st Regiment when it disbanded in 1894. Robert succeeded his brother, Walter, as government school teacher at Laguna in 1878. He became a trader and opened a general store in Laguna.

<sup>9</sup>SANM, Governors Papers, Lionel A. Sheldon. The Report of the Governor, 1883. "The militia of New Mexico has been thoroughly reorganized for three years . . ."

<sup>10</sup>SANM, Governors Papers, Edmund G. Ross, Report of The Territory of New Mexico for the Years 1883 and 1884, Exhibit A, Roster of the N.M.V.M.

<sup>11</sup>SANM, Governors Papers, Edmund G. Ross, Adjutant General's Report, 1884. New Mexico Historical Review, v. II, No. 2, April 1927, Necrology of Major George H. Pradt. Lt. Colonel Walter G. Marmon served on the staff of First Regiment Cavalry in 1884. During the campaign of 1885, Captain Robert G. Marmon

was made unbalanced, companies being assigned to battalions according to the danger in the different regions and the regular army distribution. Thus the greatest concentration of companies per battalion, infantry as well as cavalry, was in the south where the experiences of 1882-82 indicated a greater need for a picket line in depth; thirteen cavalry companies being assigned there.

The Marmon Battalion seems to have been the only militia battalion which operated as a unit in the field, other companies operating as separate units under the command of their designated regiments.<sup>12</sup> The Battalion was, in effect, a field expedient first tried in 1882 to control the supply and deployment of Companies I, K, L, and M, when they were active as 3rd Battalion in the field. Later after deployments during 1883 had proven the inefficiency of operation without staff, Headquarters Company of The Marmon Battalion was added.

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assumed command of Companies I & L, and Major Pradt assumed command of Companies K & M, both of these units operating under the command of Colonel W.G. Marmon and each of the companies under the command of their regular commanders or their adjutants.

<sup>12</sup>SANM, AGO, Report, January 1, 1884. The internal militia organization was constantly changing. In his report for the year 1883, Adjutant General Bartlett indicated that during the year, eleven companies had been disbanded but that thirteen new companies had been organized! In a detailed outline for the systematic placement of the militia in the new geographic defense plan, he locates only fifteen companies of the thirty organized on paper. Also: SANM, Governors Papers, L. Bradford Prince. On April 16, 1890, in General Order No. 3, Governor and Commander-in-chief Prince declared, "It is appearing . . . that said regiment [1st Regiment, Infantry] has no actual existence . . . it is ordered that said regiment be disbanded." This order is typical of the flux in organization.

George H. Pradt normally served as Adjutant of Headquarters Company of The Battalion. The Battalion was unique in have a Headquarters Company but it was also unique in another respect, for the companies were ethnic in composition.<sup>13</sup> Company I was located at Laguna under the command of Robert G. Marmon and composed entirely of Pueblo Indians (except the command echelon in the beginning; but, Pueblo Indians did rise to commissioned rank). The other three companies were composed of Spanish-Americans. Company K was located at San Rafael under the command of Captain Dumas Provencher (curiously, a Canadian by birth). Company L was located at Cubero under the command of Captain Gregorio N. Otero, and Company M was located at San Mateo under the command of Captain Manuel Chaves. Many of the personnel of Company M were from Cebolleta, and little changed in culture and dress from the Spanish Period.

Pay and allowances for members of the Marmon Battalion were the same as that for other units of the Territorial Militia. It was paid only for active service approved by the Governor. Privates were paid 45¢ per day. An allowance of \$2.00 per day was paid for the forage of the privately-owned horses, and the divergence of pay between private and private's horse drew an especially strong blast from the Adjutant General in his 1884 report to the Governor! Officers and Non-commissioned Officers were paid according to a monthly pay scale, which in 1885

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<sup>13</sup>SANH, Muster Rolls, Governor Lionel A. Sheldon & Edmund G. Ross. While the ethnic compositions are surmised by the author from the surnames, in most cases the given names tend to confirm the surmise.

The Roster of Company I, Dec. 1882

Walter G. Marmon	Captain	Scho te kuh
George H. Pradt	1st Lt.	John Get te
Robert G. Marmon	2nd Lt.	Li neh
John M. Gunn	1st Sgt.	Lo ya
Jose V. Pasano	Sgt.	Luh wi cea
William Watemah	Sgt.	Phillip Luk bin is Ky
Joseph Kewery	Sgt.	Lo rey
Neovy	Sgt.	Le a ria, George
George Watery	1st Corp	U ni, Harmon
Angus Kytsh	2nd Corp	Yastea
Iateyeh	3rd Corp	Kow i ty
Frank Kao was	4th Corp	She i such
Chawa Kum	Pvt.	Palle Batiste
Chaveh		Francisco Ghli
Elvin		Ha pi
Eah ny		He oh yi
Guero		Kow u ni
He co		Kow y u ni
John Wa ah a		Murushe
Hi ow		Antonio Pasano
Kow y misuch		Pedro Gurricino
Bob Ki ate yeh		Si ki eh
Ko wi cu ry		Se on yea
Walter Koity		Sa to eh
Kow u ni		
Ka eh		
Kow t yea		
Ki tu meh		
Joseph Lion		
Ka such		
Po ni		
Ow astie		
Peter		
Garra ci neh		
Gau yea, Ramon		
Skate way, Henry		
Show i ty		
Sin i		
Se o se weh		
Se o gu a		
Francis Se wa kery		
Si we a		

Figure 10

was: Captain - \$155.35 per month, Lieutenant - \$129.00 per month, First Sergeant - \$83.65 per month, Sergeants - \$79.55 per month, and Corporals - \$77.50 per month.<sup>14</sup> These scales were roughly the same as the regular army pay scales of the same period.

Uniforms were not furnished, to officer or enlisted personnel, nor was any defrayment made for wear and tear of the uniform while the Battalion was in service in the field. Uniforms were, however, highly prized by all volunteer troopers, and the Adjutant General Report for 1884 makes special note of the cavalry uniforms of Laguna Company I at the annual militia competitions held in Santa Fe. These were purchased by The Laguna Scouts at great expense when they were transferred from Infantry to Cavalry in 1883, and they were completely worn out in the campaigning of 1885.<sup>15</sup> While the uniform was not a required item for enlisted personnel, AGO General Order No. 10 dated March 16, 1882, required that officers of the Territorial Militia wear the same uniform as that prescribed for the Regular Army (with exceptions for the types of buttons, fatigue hats, and trouser stripes), while for the non-commissioned officer that word - "may" - was used which, in the time-honored jargon of the military service, meant they'd better!

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<sup>14</sup>SANM, Muster Rolls, May-June 1885. SANM, AGO, Report for 1884.

<sup>15</sup>SANM, Governors Papers, Militia, L. Bradford Prince. In a letter from Colonel W.G. Marmon to AG Colonel W.S. Fletcher at the late date of June 23, 1891, he recounts the acquisition and wearing-out of the uniforms, and makes one of apparently many impassioned pleas for re-imbusement to The Scouts.



Troop F, Company I,  
circa 1882

Figure 11

Another General Order set forth militia policies on training and generally the requirements matched those of the Regular Army. Weekly drill schedules were strictly adhered to, annual marksmanship training and competitions were held in the Marmon Battalion, and the Laguna Scouts were always among the best.<sup>16</sup> The AGO Report for 1884 states that "The troop of cavalry at Laguna is composed entirely of Laguna Indians, and though they do not speak English, all commands are given in that language, and their proficiency in the drill and manual is remarkable." The Report further states that "The Zuni Indians, who were present at the drill in Santa Fe, became emulous of the Lagunas, and . . . authorized Mr. Frank Cushing to take the necessary steps to form a company from among them."<sup>17</sup>

In accordance with the Table of Allowance and Organization outlined in AG Edward L. Bartlett's militia reorganization of 1883-84, each company of the Marmon Battalion was required to attain and maintain a strength of sixty officer and enlisted personnel. Only Company I at Laguna ever attained that strength. According to muster rolls accomplished at the

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<sup>16</sup>AIHRP Records, UNM Project. Mrs. W.K. Marmon remembers that the Scouts still held weekly drill sessions when she was a little girl in the late '80s, and Mrs. Edith (Marmon) Lorenzo relates in other interviews her father-in-law's stories of the firing pits near the Pueblo and of the professional hustle and bustle when they were firing.

<sup>17</sup>SANM, AGO Report for 1884, Muster Rolls, May-December 1885. The Zuni Company was formed, but it would appear from the documents that it was not sufficiently well-organized to participate in the Apache Campaign of 1885.

beginning of the 1885 campaign, Company I was at strength, Companies K and M had strengths of forty-five personnel each, and Company L at Cubero mustered only forty personnel.

The companies of the Battalion were armed with the caliber .50 Springfield rifle until late in 1883. These were withdrawn at the time of their transfer from Infantry to Cavalry, and the caliber .50 Sharps carbine was issued. As in the Regular Army, officers furnished their own sidearms and sabers.<sup>18</sup>

The mission of the Marmon Battalion was to serve as the moving anvil of a new defense plan. The Battalion was located in four key positions on the line of the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad, near the south of the Navajo reservation, and within striking distance of an imagined picket line across the north of the Mogollon, Fox, Escondido, Datil, and Gallinas Mountains. Thus the Battalion could swiftly repulse any unlikely thrusts from the Navajo in the north and, hopefully, contain any Apache forays from the south. The "hammers" of this defense arrangement were the thirteen companies of volunteer cavalry on the line of the Atchison-Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad and on the Mexican border (eight east of the line and five west of it), and the five companies of cavalry situated

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<sup>18</sup>SANM, Governors Papers, L. Bradford Prince, Militia. Report of the Territory of New Mexico for the Years 1883 & 1884; AIERP Records, UNM Project. In a letter to the Governor dated August 30, 1892, AG Colonel W.S. Fletcher reported that the "old Springfield [and Sharps?] guns are now supposed to be in the hands of the territorial militia." Mrs. W.K. Marmon reports that she saw "new rifles" arrive circa 1892.

along the WNW and the NNW borders with Arizona and Utah.<sup>19</sup>

This plan, and the movements of the Marmon Battalion during the Campaign of 1885, was a part of the general plan to meet the threat of the Apache in the southwest. Units in the field were kept abreast of the developing situation by the AGO through the liberal use of the telegraph. It is apparent that many messages were coordinated and dispatched from Santa Fe so as to arrive at small telegraph stations just prior to the calculated arrival there of a field unit.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>SANN, AGO, Report of January 1, 1884, p. 86. "This distribution is more available, in my opinion, for exigencies that may arise, than a patrol or a 'Ranger' service would be." It is apparent that Adjutant General Bartlett had modified a plan originated in the mind of the first Territorial Governor and many times advocated by him to the military commander of the territory. Abel, A.H., The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun, p. 57: In a letter addressed to Secretary of the Interior William Medill and dated October 15, 1849, Governor Calhoun set forth a plan similar to that of Adjutant General Bartlett and stated, "That I may be distinctly understood on this point [the recommendation to organize and station territorial militia units strategically along roads, mountain, and railroad lines], look at the location of Laguna - Zuni - Jemez, and other places - Now the Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, under the control as before suggested, would enable these people, effectually, to protect themselves against their implacable enemies, and at the same time, a vigorous and rapid movement along the line of communication between the Pueblos, and other points, would give them additional power of interrupting those who dare penetrate towards the heart of New Mexico."

<sup>20</sup>SANN, Governors Papers, Militia Expenses, Edmund G. Ross. Governor's Requisitions with attached Western Union Vouchers. The author checked these against the positions of various N.M. militia units during the campaign. It is interesting to note however that the withdrawal message to Colonel W.G. Marmon was sent to Laguna, to be forwarded by (horse) courier to his position in the Apache Creek-Fort Tularosa region. This might indicate that the telegraph lines had been cut in that area and not yet repaired. It could also indicate that Santa Fe was aware that Colonel Marmon was operating farther south than the original plan intended.

Beginning in the late 1870's, Apacheria had been in a turmoil. Especially in the area of southeast Arizona and southwest New Mexico the situation can be described as being out of hand. Anglo raiding parties took revenge on Apache groups wherever they could be found, and the Apache alternated between devastating raids on Anglo settlements and swift retreats into their sheltered reservations. Victorio and his band had been killed in Mexico in October of 1880, and Nana had ravaged the lower half of western New Mexico and eastern Arizona until driven into Mexico in late 1881. In late 1881, also, the Cibicu Affair\* had occurred, and the same regions had experienced repeated outrages by small but brutal groups from that affair, including the bands of Juh and Nachez, until they were finally driven farther south. There followed the raids of Juh and Chihuahua into Arizona, the break-out from San Carlos in which Loco figured so prominently, and for a short time thereafter more savage raids occurred in southeastern Arizona and southwestern New Mexico. The path across the Mogollon and Tularosa Mountains, and up through the Plains of San Agustin, had been a favorite of small Apache bands since the pre-Mexican period, and they passed over this route on their way to small but bloody raids in the Datil and Gallinas Mountain regions. During each of the periods of forays and tension, the region from Lake Valley - Silver City, north through the Warm Springs area, and up into the southern reaches of the Plains of San Agustin, had suffered heavily. Mines had been closed down, isolated homesteads wiped out, hidden fortunes

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\*A serious Apache attack on and breakout from Fort Apache reservation, caused by arrest of medicine-man Noch-ay-del-kinne, August 30, 1881.

stolen and used to finance further raids, inhabitants tortured and mutilated, ranches deserted and burned down, and the entire area devastated. West-central New Mexico and east-central Arizona from the Rio Grande to Phoenix was frightened, and the area appeared to be almost under siege. The Army, and the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico, were clamoring and planning for a final solution - and the Marmon Battalion was an important part of the plan. The militia companies of Arizona and New Mexico were prepared. The final campaign would soon be forthcoming.<sup>21</sup>

The Campaign of 1885 was touched off by Geronimo's most spectacular and bloody foray which began on May 17, 1885. Pursued by regular and militia forces under the overall command of General George C. Crook, he led raids into west-central New Mexico and then fled again into Mexico. But Chihuahua and his bands remained in western New Mexico and eastern Arizona until late June, and both he and Geronimo raided into southern New Mexico in September, October, and December.

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<sup>21</sup>For detailed coverage of the entire period and peril the most comprehensive work is Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria, 1967. A work which gives more of the flavor and excitement of campaigning and upon which Thrapp's work is partially based is Apache Days and After, by Brigadier General Thomas Cruse, 1941. A distinctly New Mexican understanding of the period can be gained from the text and copious notes of Ralph E. Twitchell in "Leading Facts of New Mexican History," 1911, pp. 428-450. The numerous recordings and transcripts of elderly Indians in the files of AIHRP Records, UNM Project, attest to the small raids and the "Apache Corridor." Charlie Atsyé, born in 1886 and raised on a ranch near the southern border of the Laguna lands, remembers raid scares as late as 1908. Ojo Caliente, from whence the dreaded Warm Springs Apache came, lies just to the SE of the Plains of San Agustin, in a canyon on the Alamosa River, and only eighteen miles north of Winston and fifty-five miles NW of Truth or Consequences.

On the morning of May 30, 1885, pursuant to telegraphic orders from the Governor of New Mexico, Colonel Walter G. Marmon directed that the four companies of 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, N.M.V.M., be mustered in and assembled. Meeting with the Battalion Staff, all of whom resided in the Pueblo of Laguna, he decided that the Battalion would be formed into two combat groups - the one to be composed of Companies I and L under the command of Captain Robert G. Marmon, and the other to be composed of Companies K and M under the command of Battalion Adjutant Major George H. Pradt.<sup>22</sup> Colonel Marmon attached the now reduced Battalion Staff to the group under the command of Captain Marmon. The morning was occupied with planning, and directing the procurement of supplies and equipment.

In the afternoon the Battalion Staff met and discussed a plan for the situation.<sup>23</sup> A report had been received that a

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<sup>22</sup>New Mexico History, Illustrated, 1907. New Mexico Historical Review, v. II, No. 2, April, 1927, Necrology, Major George H. Pradt. AIHRP Records, UNM Project, W.K. Marmon Interviews. George H. Pradt was born on April 28, 1844, in Jersey Shore, Lycoming County, Pennsylvania. He served in the 40th Wisconsin Volunteers during 1864-65 and was discharged as a Corporal in 1865. He accompanied Robert G. Marmon to Santa Fe in 1875 and they both moved to Laguna in 1878. Pradt secured employment as a government surveyor shortly after entering New Mexico, and continued as a government surveyor until shortly before his death in 1918. He was commissioned 1st Lieutenant of Company I in 1882, and remained in the Marmon Battalion until its disbandment in 1893-94. He was promoted to Captain and to Major in 1883.

<sup>23</sup>SANM, Muster Rolls, June-July, 1885. New Mexico Historical Review, v. II, No. 2, April, 1927, Necrology, Major George H. Pradt. AIHRP Records, UNM Project. Diary of Walter G. Marmon, excerpts. There are two known reports of the Battalion route and operations: one attributed to Major Pradt and




Figure 12  
 The Apacheria Region - 1885  
 Austin N. Leiby - 1968

raiding party had entered the region to the north of the Datil Mountains and was moving towards the North Plains area. The Battalion, in moving south, would have to reconnoiter that area. For that reason, Major Pradt was ordered to assemble group A at San Rafael, and to proceed southeast and to the east of the malpais (an area of volcanic rock overflow) which lies south of Grants, and to cross the North Plains on the east side while proceeding in the general direction of Quemado. Group B would proceed south through Arroyo Colorado and toward the gap between the Datil and the Gallinas Mountains, and then would swing west toward Quemado. Both groups would maintain contact through a courier service, which would also be used to maintain contact with the home base at Laguna. Normal cavalry tactics would be followed, the Troops of each Company would be assigned patrol sectors as the situation would permit. Upon arrival and regrouping at Quemado, the campaign would proceed in accordance with the situation and orders from Santa Fe.

Group B was the first to take up the line of march. Company I departed Laguna in the early afternoon of May 31. The Battalion Staff, now accompanied by an "Infantry Surgeon,"<sup>24</sup>

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addressed to Lt. Colonel W.G. Marmon and which appears as an appendix to the cited NMHR article, and one which the author found written in terse notes in the back of the June Muster Roll.

<sup>24</sup>SANM, Muster Roll, "From May 30th to June 29th 1885," Record of Actions . . . The "Inf Surgeon" mentioned in Captain Marmon's terse report must have been provided by Company C, 1st Infantry Regiment, organized at that time in the American Valley, Socorro County, and the nearest location of any militia infantry unit.

made a detour to Cubero, in order to hurry-along Company L, and to direct the line of march so that it would intersect that of Company I south of Laguna. Company I marched south, through the Arroyo Colorado, and passed the mouth of Dripping Springs Canyon. The sixty troopers, accompanied by a pack-train of twenty-one horses and mules, made camp about sundown near the present site of the Marmon Ranch, north of Mesa de Oro.

Group B broke camp early on the morning of June 1, preceded by the usual scouts and skirmishes, and marched for about five hours, stopping about noon near the Gunn Ranch north of Blue Water Creek and about thirty miles south of Laguna. There the group was joined by Battalion Staff and Company L, they have departed San Rafael the previous day, and having completed a march of some fifty-five miles across malpais country and the Acoma reservation. The march was taken up by the now consolidated group after the noon break, and group B reached the Alamocita district that day having travelled a distance of about thirty miles.<sup>25</sup> A base camp was set up, and the group remained in the district for four days. Patrols were sent out to the east and south, and they reconnoitered the entire area. Robert Marmon's report states that these patrols scouted "the adjacent country for a distance of 25 miles," which would indicate that the scouting parties operated

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<sup>25</sup>Rickey, Don Jr., Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay, 1963, p. 244. This exceeded the regular army average miles per day. Rickey states that an average of many marches "indicates a usual daily distance of about twenty miles."

as semi-autonomous units, perhaps remaining over-night in sub-camps. It would also mean that the patrols reconnoitered the Rio Salado and Ladrones Mountains, areas which had long provided sanctuaries for renegade Navajo bands.

In the meantime, group A under the command of Major Pradt assembled at Grants Station.<sup>26</sup> On June 1 provisions and ammunition were procured and the pack train assembled. The group marched to San Rafael on June 2, and was quartered in houses for the night by the kind townspeople. On June 3, group A completed a march of twenty-five miles, proceeding southeast across malpais, then east along the edge of the malpais, finally camping near the Cebolleta Ranch west of Putney Mesa. Very early in the morning of June 4, because of reports of raids farther east and south, Major Pradt split his command and changed direction, personally taking a small squad east directly over 8,000 foot high Putney Mesa, while the main body of group A proceeded around the Mesa under the command of Captain Provencher of Company K. The squad reached Cebolla Ranch (a sheep corral and station) near Acoma Creek at about 8 a.m. The main body of group A arrived at the Ranch about 4 p.m. Major Pradt detached a squad to guard the ranch and to patrol the area, and marched that same evening with the main body to the Blue Water Creek area some ten miles south. On June 5,

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<sup>26</sup>SANM, Muster Rolls, June-July 1885, and AGO Report, clearly indicates that Major Pradt in his report, or W.A.F. Walter in his Necrology of the Major in NMHR article previously cited, strangely erred in listing Companies L and K as being assigned to group A. Group A consisted of Companies K and M.

group A marched some twenty-two miles, south and east through the Estacado Spring area and over Cachow Mesa, camping somewhere near the present Martin Ranch in the gap area between the Datil and Gallinas Mountains. According to the reports of Major Pradt and Captain Robert G. Marmon, groups A and B must have been camped within some six or seven miles of each other, or at least the base camps were in close proximity. Major Pradt reported that he "arrived at the Belleview [Martin] Ranch at 4 p.m. and reported [to Colonel Marmon] for further orders." There is no record in any of the archival documents nor in Colonel Marmon's diary of his order to Major Pradt, but the ensuing actions indicate that he decided to change his original plan, for group A remained in the Datil-Gallinas Mountains gap area on patrol duty, and group B slipped through the gap and proceeded west. A review of the situation certainly reveals that his change was warranted.

On May 31 General George C. Crook had taken another look at his situation, and he had reported to his superiors that the situation "indicates troubles similar to the Victoria outbreak, which will be very difficult to suppress." On June 2 he reported an even dimmer view: "The Indians shortly after crossing New Mexican line evidently divided into small parties which raided in widely separated localities, while the women and children were hidden away in the mountains. Troops have been following around the different raiding parties without other than to break down their stock. It is impossible with troops to catch the raiding parties or afford citizens so

scattered among the mountains protection from such parties." General Crook was worried about the area to the east of the Upper Gila, and reported troop dispositions, "Maj. Van Vliet with five troops . . . and thirty Apache scouts, is moving north . . . towards Datil Range. Capt. Chaffee with one troop . . . is in vicinity of Cuchillo Negro. Capt. Lee with three troops . . . is moving across Black Range between Smith and Van Vliet." And he indicated that the pressure was beginning to bear, that the raiding parties were beginning to turn south. But, the danger was still high, for Crook figured that by this time they had killed at least seventeen civilians, seven near Alma, five near Silver City, two near old Camp Vincent, and three near Grafton. "If the Indians get among these mountains again . . . !" <sup>27</sup> That some of the Apaches had never left "the mountains" was borne out by a later event, for in July a band of ten or twelve who had been hiding in the New Mexican mountains swooped down on the border from the north, driving forty or more head of horses before them <sup>28</sup> and giving southern New Mexico borderlands a good scare.

Major Pradt's group A remained in a blocking position between the Datil-Gallinas Mountains and the Plains of San Agustin until June 21, when the Laguna courier delivered to him a message from the Governor addressed to Colonel Marmon and directing termination of the campaign. Until that time patrols were maintained daily, in The Plains, through the "Trincheria"

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<sup>27</sup>Dan L. Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, pp. 322-23.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 329.

(trench) separating the northern from the southern Datils, and in the gap between the Gallinas and the Magdalena Mountains. On June 10 a scouting party from group A took up the trail of a raiding party fleeing north. The trail was lost in the northern Datils, but non-militia Pueblo Indians picked up the trail. Three of the party turned south and disappeared. The remaining raider, a renegade Laguna named Huisia,<sup>29</sup> was tracked down and killed. On June 21 Major Pradt directed the recall of all patrols and the assembly of group A for return to Laguna and Grants Station, and sent a scout courier to notify Colonel Marmon of the withdrawal.

On June 6, group B of the Marmon Battalion broke base camp, slipped through the Datil-Gallinas gap, and turned west on the "Rito Quemado" road. The report of Robert G. Marmon details group B movements until June 20, when he was dispatched with a squad to take the "sick and disabled" back to Laguna.

Group B of the Marmon Battalion proceeded through Datil, New Mexico and, turning south down the route over which NM Highway 12 now is constructed, made camp in the vicinity of Horse Springs. Maintaining patrols in constant movement and utilizing standard U.S. Army cavalry procedures, the one-hundred-man unit passed down the valley, through Old Fort Tularosa at Aragon, New Mexico, around the now deserted Apache Creek,

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<sup>29</sup>AIHRP Records, UNM Project, Linn Shiyea Interview, December 5, 1968. The author was amazed at discovering that Mr. Shiyea knew the name of the unknown renegade whose story is recounted in Major Pradt's report.

and on the evening of June 8 made camp in the area of Cienega Canyon on the San Francisco River. Progress up the tortuous valley of the San Francisco was slow, and on June 9 group B made camp in the vicinity of Luna, New Mexico, just twenty-five miles north of hard-hit Alma. On June 10 patrols were dispatched to reconnoiter the entire Luna Valley, and a guide, one James Taylor of Springerville, Arizona, was hired for five dollars per day to advise the Colonel and lead the Battalion in the unknown region. Early on the morning of June 11 the group moved out in formation, with scouting parties out toward Blue River in the south, Luna Lake in the west, and Hell-roaring Mesa in the north. About noon the Marmon Battalion crossed the boundary near Alpine and entered the Territory of Arizona.<sup>30</sup> Turning north at Alpine, Arizona, group B kept the march until arrival at the foot of Escudillo Mountain some five miles east of Nutrioso, Arizona. There a base camp was set up, out-guards were stationed, and the Battalion settled down to reconnoiter the area. As Robert Marmon reports in his "Record of Actions . . ." on the back of the July 6 muster roll, "The time up to the 20th was spent in scouting the Escudillo Range Luna Valley Blue Creek [River] Johnsons Basin on which date I was ordered to take a detail of 10 men and proceed to Laguna as bearing dispatches also as guard to a wagon

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<sup>30</sup>SANM, Muster Rolls, July 6, 1885, Record of Actions . . . Report of Captain Robert G. Marmon: "accompanied Lt. Col. Marmon & Troop L were on Rio Quemado Road via Village of Rito Quemado, Straughters Ranch, Cow Springs, Cienega Amarilla W Devits Ranch on \_\_\_\_\_ foot of Escudillos Mnts. - Where we went into camp."

containing two ladies and a little child fleeing the Apaches . . . Which detail I performed and on the evening of 29 June arrived in Laguna."

With the departure of Captain Marmon, John M. Gunn was promoted to Captain and placed in command of Company I.<sup>31</sup> José Pasano, a Keres-Laguna Indian, was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant - a rare occurrence in the militia and in the history of the West - and he was designated Adjutant of Company I.

On June 25, the couriers sent by Major Pradt to deliver the withdrawal notice from the Governor arrived. Base camp was taken up and preparations were made for the long trip home. The line of march to Springerville, Arizona, was made that day; James Taylor was issued a Territorial Voucher for his services as a guide. On June 26 the group arrived at Red Hill, New Mexico; on June 27 at Quemado, on June 28 at Datil, and on June 30 group B arrived home in Laguna. The role of the Marmon Battalion in the Apache Campaign of 1885 was ended.

The records do not indicate with certainty when the

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<sup>31</sup>SANM, AGO, Muster Rolls, 1882, 1885. New Mexico History, Illustrated, 1907. AIHRP Records, UNM Project. John M. Gunn was native to Hardin County, where he was born in 1861. He was a cousin of the Marmon brothers and he arrived in Laguna in 1882. He worked with the surveyor, George H. Pradt, until the arrival of his brother, Kenneth C., in 1885, when they began a cattle ranch south of Laguna. In 1893 John built a flour mill in Laguna and marketed his product under the trade-name "Pansy." In 1904 John and his brother opened the Gunn Brothers Store in Laguna. In 1905, John organized the New Mexico Pumice Stone Company, using lithographic limestone deposits in the area. John was mustered into the militia in 1882 as a sergeant, he was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant and to 1st Lieutenant in 1883-84. He was the author of several articles in "Records of the Past," Washington, D.C., 1904, and of the book Schat-Chen, A History of Acoma and Laguna, 1917.

Battalion disbanded. After 1893 the Companies gradually faded from lack of volunteer personnel, and they no longer appeared on the Muster Roll after 1894.

At the ceremony on the bluff in 1917, certificates were handed to each of the remaining members, and taps was sounded from a nearby hill. The assembled group and their families enjoyed a typical Pueblo Indian feast, the official of the Interior Department left, and the silence of eternity descended on The Western Bastion.

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