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opi History, 1940–1974

HARD O. CLEMMER

Hopi of the atomic age reflect the kaleidoscope of ıl, economic, and ideological poses evident in most ɔns of the modern industrial world. At the same time, lamental behavior patterns and perceptual modes ist from aboriginal times. Two issues that emerged as ral focuses of Hopi concern in the 1950s and 1960s : land and resource use and cultural sovereignty. and has always been the mainstay of Hopi culture.

Hopi ceremonial cycle, still practiced at all three as in the 1970s, expresses a philosophical imperative ıdating proper preparation, use, and appreciation of l and its generative powers. Hopi elders of the 1960s 1970s still spoke of the land reverently and emotion-, one elder even referring to it as "the Hopis' social ırity" (Clemmer 1974). These elders refer to Hopi l as a "shrine" that extends far beyond the Hopi ıges to the Grand Canyon, the San Francisco Peaks, northern reaches of Black Mesa, Zuni Salt Lake, and th of Route 66 (Clemmer 1968–1970)

Of course the United States government has never n[illegible]ged such an extensive parcel as exclusively ɔi. The 1882 executive order reservation included only and one-half million acres and completely excluded Hopi settlement of Moenkopi (see "Hopi Social ;anization," fig. 1, this vol.). By 1900 Navajos had ved onto a good portion of the Hopi reservation, and pis began to fear that if this trend continued, they ıld be surrounded by Navajos whose use of land for :k raising would confine the Hopis to their villages. In 9 Hopi representatives met with Commissioner of ian Affairs John Collier to enlist his support in ıfirming the boundaries of the Hopi shrine and enforc- the exclusivity of at least the 1882 reservation. The eting produced no tangible results.

Hopis' fears that the United States would not protect pis' special relationship to their land were heightened en the Hopi and Navajo reservations were divided into zing districts. As the main administrative agency ıcerned with Indian lands, the Bureau of Indian airs assumed administration of the districts. In 1943 BIA's Hopi Indian Agency took charge of District Six ts area, even though District Six included only 631,306 es (Hopi Indian Agency 1968:6) immediately sur- ınding the 11 Hopi reservation villages.

Although Hopis were assured that District Six would t b[illegible]me the new Hopi reservation, in fact Hopis' fears were confirmed. The Hopi Agency implemented stock reduction to improve grazing potential only in District Six, leaving the rest of reservation stock reduction to Navajo agencies. For practical purposes, then, the Interior Department's interpretation of the stock reduction procedures shrank the Hopi land base to an almost token fraction of the enshrined area venerated in Hopi ceremonies.

The postwar years brought increased government attempts to establish its presence in Hopi land and also brought, for the first time, conscious action by Hopis to deal with the problems of non-Hopi jurisdiction over their lands. Two of the most important legislative actions accomplishing the government's intent were passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 and the Navajo-Hopi Act of 1950. Hopis, for their part, reestablished the Hopi tribal council and evolved a new political group referring to themselves as the Hopi Traditionals.

Revival of the Council

The Indian Claims Commission was authorized to rule on claims for monetary compensation brought against the United States by any tribal entity recognized as representing a tribe or identifiable Indian group. By far the most common proceedings were those over lands taken by the United States without rendering just compensation or without due process of law. According to Indian Claims Commission statutes, once the award is made and the money is in the hands of the Indians, such payment "shall finally dispose of all rights, claims or demands" that the claimants could make (J.D. Forbes 1965:45).

The BIA officially had nothing to do with the Claims Commission. However, the BIA took responsibility for disseminating information about the claims, calling meetings, and supervising referenda (see J.D. Forbes 1967:248–253, 257–259; Costo 1974). Teachers in the Hopi Day School at Kyakotsmovi (New Oraibi) were encouraged to talk about the claims in class, and the agency superintendent encouraged Hopis to submit a claim.

Hopis from Second Mesa who had spearheaded the attempt to establish the Hopi claim to their shrine for Commissioner Collier were joined by people from First Mesa and Moenkopi in a trip to Washington in 1950. Their intention was to see what they could do about

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pressing their land claim. In Washington they were told "that the only salvation for the Hopi people was . . . to revive the Hopi Tribal Council," which had been disbanded in 1940 after functioning sporadically and ineffectively for four years (Emmons 1955:310–311). These "progressives" enlisted the aid of the agency superintendent and persuaded 7 of the 13 villages to select representatives to the council. The council was finally reconstituted in 1951, just in time to retain a lawyer and submit a claim (Emmons 1955:312; Clemmer 1973:26) before the deadline expired.

Revival of the council came at a time when a lot of attention was being focused on the Hopi and Navajo reservations. The Navajo-Hopi Act had authorized expenditure of $88,570,000 for general improvement of both reservations. On the Hopi reservation, such improvements were items like wells, stock troughs, fences, flood-control dikes, and roads. Coupled with revival of the government-supported council, the act intensified the government's presence among the Hopi by providing jobs and services and by encouraging Hopis to think of the United States and its agencies as part of the normal state of affairs.

Two Strategies

While those who pushed for the council's revival generally supported the government's presence, the legacy of the ideological split of 1906 was reflected in a renewed resistance to government policies. This resistance was publicly expressed to the Indian world when two Hopis spoke against the Navajo-Hopi Act at the annual meeting of the National Congress of American Indians in 1949. The spokesmen presented a viewpoint diametrically opposed to that of council supporters and reflected a growing concern among traditional elders that, without



John S. Boyden, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Fig. 1. Delegation of Hopis meeting in the courtroom of Salt Lake City District Judge for the purpose of signing their first attorney's contract, July 12, 1951. They are: (seated left to right), Homer Homewytewa, Kyakotsmovi; Homer Cooyama, Kyakotsmovi; Roger Honahni, Upper Moenkopi; Lewis Numkena, Upper Moenkopi; John S. Boyden, Salt Lake City attorney retained by the Hopis; Judge A.H. Ellett, Salt Lake City District Judge; Ned Nayatewa, Sichomovi; Andrew Seechoma, Walpi; Hale Secakuku, Shipaulovi; David Talawiftema, Shipaulovi; Julius Toopkema, Bacabi; Howard Talayumptewa, Bacabi; (standing left to right), Samuel Shing, Moenkopi; Dewey Healing, First Mesa (Tewa); Dean Tevaya, Sichomovi; James S. Beck, Bureau of Indian Affairs employee; Logan Koopee, Sichomovi. Photographer unknown.

non-Hopi allies to counter government influence, Hopi cultural sovereignty could easily be compromised.

The ideological basis of the spokesmen's message was expressed in a letter sent to President Harry Truman, also in 1949. This document should have dispelled any thoughts that Hopi religious elders suffered from torpidity born of mystical detachment. It rejected the notion of Hopis "asking the government for land that is ours" through participation in claims proceedings, denied oil companies drilling access to Hopi lands, denounced the Navajo-Hopi Act appropriations as an effort "to reduce the Hopi people under this plan," and refused participation in any military action resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance. It stated, in part: "This land is a sacred home of the Hopi people. . . . It was given to the Hopi people the task to guard this land . . . by obedience to our traditional and religious instructions and by being faithful to our Great Spirit Massau'u. . . . We have never abandoned our sovereignty to any foreign power or nation. . ." (Talahaftewa et al. 1949).

The document was signed by 24 ceremonial leaders from four villages. Although the letter expressed a militancy unusual for that period, it reflected the firm belief of these elders that Hopi mythic prophecy was unfolding in a manner that necessitated action on their part. Traditionally, a Hopi community adjusts psychologically to stress from the outside through mythic ideology, which regards present and future as the revelation of predictable forces whose seeds were sown in past events (see Whorf 1956:58, 59–60; Loeffler 1971).

The predictive force of Hopi mythology is indicated by a version of the Hopi origin and migration myth told to missionary H.R. Voth (1905:21–26). The storyteller incorporates the White man into the myth as *pahá·na,* the Hopis' elder brother. Upon emerging from the underworld, the elder brother headed eastward, but if the Hopi ever got into trouble, the elder brother would return and punish those who were causing trouble. The elder brother started out, "and they became the White Men as they traveled eastward. . . . But the Hopi are still looking towards their elder brother. . . . Our old men and ancestors have said that some White Men would be coming to them, but they would not be the White Men like our elder brother, and they would be worrying us."

By 1947 the second generation of elders who had to deal with Whites decided to announce that elder brother was needed. Around that year a clan elder from Second Mesa stated in a kiva meeting that in the early days of his training as a religious leader he was instructed that when a gourd of ashes fell from the sky, he was to tell teachings, prophecies, and traditions that had previously been secret. Other clan elders mentioned similar instructions. A series of meetings brought elders from all three mesas; and clan functions and duties, religious philosophy, and prophecies were discussed. Results of these meetings were an increase in initiates to religious sodalities; communication of esoteric religious ceremonies to young people; assured perpetuation of ceremonies that were about to disappear; and the start of the counter-campaign to the acculturative pressures of United States jurisdiction, resulting in emergence of the Hopi Traditionals as a political entity.

Obviously by 1950 two definite political strategies with separate leaderships had emerged among the Hopi, each communicating a different ideology to the agencies of non-Indian jurisdiction. The two strategies may manifest what Alice Schlegel (personal communication 1972) refers to as the "linearity and dialectic involved in Hopi cosmology in an almost Hegelian progression of time and space . . . encapsulated in the ceremonial cycle."

This dialectic process is seen in the continuing pursuit of diametrically opposed strategies by the tribal council and the Hopi Traditionals. The Traditionals asserted that the Hopis were an independent nation, not even extending diplomatic recognition to the United States through treaty negotiation, since the Hopi never signed a treaty with the United States. The council supporters, reflecting the influence of 60 years of Christian missionizing efforts, asserted that as "the younger generation of the Hopis who are not baptized into Hopi ceremonial customs," they had "chosen the civilized method of democratic government in dealing with others for the welfare of our people" (Emmons 1955:288).

Land Issues and Economic Development

For both the Hopi Traditionals and the council supporters, land emerged as the central focus of attention in the 1960s. Just as the Traditionals asserted their caretakership of Mother Earth, the tribal council asserted economic interest in Hopi land resources as a basis for political strength and influence. After filing a claim with the Claims Commission, the council next started negotiations with the Navajos over the areas of the Hopi reservation outside District Six, which by 1953 had become occupied almost exclusively by Navajos. After several years of fruitless negotiations between the Hopi and Navajo tribal councils, Congress passed a bill authorizing the Hopis to sue the Navajos to settle the land question in court. Filed in 1961, the suit was resolved by a three-judge panel in 1962. The panel ruled that Hopis had exclusive right and interest in District Six, but only "joint, undivided and equal rights and interests . . . to all of the executive order reservation . . . lying outside . . . district six" with the Navajos. Hopis were not happy with the decision, since it required them to pursue an aggressive strategy to enforce their rights and officially diminished what was operationally a shrunken land base.

Despite limited access to once exclusive Hopi territory, the tribal council has successfully promoted economic exploitation of land and its resources. A legacy of the Navajo-Hopi Act was a report published by the Bureau

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of Indian Affairs in 1956 assessing the economic feasibility of mineral exploitation (Kiersch 1955-1956, 1). Between 1961 and 1964 the tribal council secured leases for prospecting, exploring, and drilling for oil, gas, and minerals. These leases brought $3,139,104.43 in royalties (Anonymous 1961; Hopi Indian Agency 1968; Anonymous 1964). Regular income greatly bolstered the council's image and made it more like a real government. From this income, the council authorized payment of $1,000,000 for legal fees and services to their attorney, reserving about $500,000 for operating expenses, a meeting hall and headquarters, and regular compensation for council members.

The remaining $1,600,000 was invested in constructing an undergarment factory for the B.V.D. Company (fig. 2) on lands donated as a "Hopi industrial park" by private individuals and the city of Winslow in that off-reservation town. After two years of operation, the factory threatened to close down in 1971. Worker dissatisfaction, Hopi complaints of B.V.D.'s failure to pay rent, and Indians' lack of enthusiasm for relocating to Winslow indicated that the B.V.D. factory was anything but an unqualified success. Nevertheless, the Hopi and Navajo tribal councils, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, B.V.D., and the city of Winslow launched a cooperative effort to pump new life into this important Hopi investment (Anonymous 1971). This attempt was not successful, and the factory closed in 1975.

Around the same time as the council began its B.V.D. venture, it also began to provide more services and employment for Hopis under the BIA's "buy Indian" policy and under various programs of the federal War on Poverty. Through a grant-loan from the Economic Development Administration and $144,700 of its own money, the council constructed a motel-café-museum complex on Second Mesa. Known as the Hopi Cultural Center, the building opened in 1970, featuring excellent displays of contemporary Hopi weaving, carving, and visual art.



Winslow Mail, Ariz.
Fig. 2. B.V.D. factory, Winslow, Ariz. Photograph by unidentified photographer, probably 1969-1971.

The largest economic development scheme in which the tribal council has gotten involved is the 1966 leasing of a portion of the joint use area in conjunction with the Navajo Tribe to Peabody Coal Company. Peabody began strip-mining an area of Black Mesa in 1970, agreeing to pay the Hopi Tribe an annual royalty of approximately $500,000. In addition to coal, Peabody also negotiated to pump 38 billion gallons of water from underneath Black Mesa for processing the coal for power plants (McGavock and Levings 1973; Martone 1974).

Although the mining operations guaranteed a steady income to the tribal council, many observers (Clemmer 1970, 1973; Josephy 1971; Aarons 1971; Budnik 1972; Brom 1974) feared that runoff from the mining area could adversely affect Hopi crops, that Peabody's plans for reseeding and recontouring the mined area would not reverse the environmental damage to the fragile ecosystem, that no amount of money could undo the possible harmful effects of pollution from the power plants (see U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1970), and that pumping operations could seriously deplete accessible water supplies (McGavock and Levings 1973; Martone 1974).

The Hopi Traditionals, after several years of waning support, mustered impressive opposition to the strip-mining (fig. 3). In 1970 village chiefs and ceremonial leaders representing 10 of the 13 villages organized to file a lawsuit against the secretary of the interior and Peabody Coal Company. Filing of the suit in May 1971 followed nearly a year of village meetings at which Hopis, environmental experts and advocates, lawyers, and anthropologists aired their opinions. There was much discussion of Hopi prophecy, the significance of Black Mesa as a portion of the Hopi shrine, and the advisability of subjecting Hopi sovereignty to arbitration under United States law. There were even a couple of dramatic exchanges between Hopi Traditionals and Peabody representatives.

The 1971 suit (Lomayaktewa et al. *v.* Morton) alleged that the Hopi tribal council did not constitute a proper quorum when it signed the lease (see Clemmer 1973) and charged the secretary of the interior with exceeding his authority when he approved it. The basis of the suit was that the strip-mining violated "the most sacred elements of traditional Hopi religion, culture and way of life." In a statement prepared for the complaint, six Hopi elders explained that Black Mesa was "part of the heart of our Mother Earth" granted to the Hopi to hold "in trust in a spiritual way for the Great Spirit, Massau'u." "Title," they asserted, "is vested in the whole makeup of Hopi life.

Fig. 3. Hopi man viewing the Peabody Coal Company's strip mine at Black Mesa. Photograph by Terrence Moore, 1970.

. . . If the land is abused, the sacredness of Hopi life will disappear."

Although this view conflicted with the council's strategy of economic development, it is clear that Traditionals and council supporters were alike in valuing land and its resources. Whether land was used for economic purposes or as a basis for religious activity and ritual enactment of the mythic process, land was regarded as the most crucial factor for the perpetuation of the Hopi as a viable Indian nation. In one sense, the tribal council's negotiation of leases with Peabody Coal was an effort at asserting their claim to the "joint use" area that was formerly exclusively Hopi. Certainly the 6,000 Hopis were conscious of their diminished position in relation to the economic and political power of the surrounding Navajo Nation. In 1970 the Navajo tribal council infuriated the Hopis by offering to purchase the Hopis' half-interest in the joint use area (fig. 4). The tribal council denounced and rejected the offer, and the Hopi Traditionals issued their own statement to the same effect, stating that no Hopi land was for sale (C.H. Johnson 1970).

Many Hopis saw land and land resources as crucial for Hopis' ability as an Indian nation to withstand the economic onslaught that development of the Southwest as a major metropolitan area could bring (see Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Systems Operations 1969;



Woodfin Camp and Associates.
Fig. 4. One of several meetings called by the Hopi-Navajo Unity Committee to discuss the division of the joint use area. Thomas Banyacya (standing) and Mina Lanza (seated at right) were prominent Hopis on the committee, which was formed to oppose division and relocation. Photograph by Dan Budnick, Shongopavi, May 1972.

Fig. 5. Sign placed outside Old Oraibi by Mina Lanza, in 1974, closing the village to tourists. (See Hopi 1977). Mina Lanza functioned as "village chief" *(ki-kmögʷi)* from 1960 until her death in 1978, although her brother, Myron Poliquaptewa, was also recognized as village chief by some villagers. The sign was put up at the request of villagers because of their experiences with disrespectful tourists. Photograph by Cradoc Bagshaw, 1975.

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Martone 1974). Although by the 1970s there were several hundred Hopis attending college, few could expect reservation employment from federal or tribal agencies dependent on fluctuating government funding. Climatic factors limit agriculture to a subsistence basis, and stock production in the 1970s was severely limited by inadequate land. Efforts to work out a legislative plan for relocating Navajos, enlarging the exclusive Hopi area, and including Moenkopi in a new and diminished Hopi reservation had not solved the Hopi land problem as of 1975.

Although in many respects the tribal council had intensified non-Indian influence over the Hopi after its revival in 1951, the dialectical process of cooperation and resistance manifested by the council and the Traditionals represented multiple strategies aimed at one goal: perpetuation of Hopi cultural sovereignty and the processes that underlie it. It is evident that for Hopis, land—whether it is maintained as the Great Spirit ordained it or is incorporated into non-Indian use patterns—is the crucial variable for maintaining these processes.

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